Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Beyond Worst-Case Online Allocation via Dynamic Max-min Fairness

As of 9 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 0 of 0 outbound references and 4 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2310.08881.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2310.08881 v4

Coverage vector

measured 0 of 0 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 4 of 4 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00

measured 4 of 4 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.148404Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: arxiv_reference, observed 2026-07-01T12:45:44.770320Z

Reference resolution

0 of 0 outbound references displayed

verified exact0
verified fuzzy0
unresolved0
parse uncertain0
malformed identifier0
metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

No outbound reference observations are available for this paper version.

Pith citing papers

Observation fd27d337-be15-40b7-98be-a33a32391e04 · inbound

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits cites this paper.

Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Priors: Achieving Efficiency via Adaptive Costly Audits Beyond Worst-Case Online Allocation via Dynamic Max-min Fairness

Reference 22

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-08T05:20:08.148404Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 9b3824d2-33a8-478d-9197-63228184dc04 · inbound

Efficiency, Feasibility, and Incentive-Awareness in Constrained Online Resource Allocation cites this paper.

Efficiency, Feasibility, and Incentive-Awareness in Constrained Online Resource Allocation Beyond Worst-Case Online Allocation via Dynamic Max-min Fairness

Reference 28

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T18:10:18.976296Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 29a9c078-9a91-4026-b3a3-1be88753e8a8 · inbound

Prior-free Collusion-proof Dynamic Mechanisms cites this paper.

Prior-free Collusion-proof Dynamic Mechanisms Beyond Worst-Case Online Allocation via Dynamic Max-min Fairness

Reference 241

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T21:52:32.383398Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation cfcf4387-e73b-4dbc-ba34-dd5c8b9bb677 · inbound

Optimal Auction Design for Constrained Buyers cites this paper.

Optimal Auction Design for Constrained Buyers Beyond Worst-Case Online Allocation via Dynamic Max-min Fairness

Reference 3

Resolution: verified exact; arxiv_id, observed 2026-07-01T12:45:44.771866Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.