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Testing Language Model Agents Safely in the Wild

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arxiv 2311.10538 v3 pith:7E7IYP4P submitted 2023-11-17 cs.AI

classification cs.AI
keywords agentsafetestsagentsautonomousmonitorreal-worldsafety
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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A prerequisite for safe autonomy-in-the-wild is safe testing-in-the-wild. Yet real-world autonomous tests face several unique safety challenges, both due to the possibility of causing harm during a test, as well as the risk of encountering new unsafe agent behavior through interactions with real-world and potentially malicious actors. We propose a framework for conducting safe autonomous agent tests on the open internet: agent actions are audited by a context-sensitive monitor that enforces a stringent safety boundary to stop an unsafe test, with suspect behavior ranked and logged to be examined by humans. We design a basic safety monitor (AgentMonitor) that is flexible enough to monitor existing LLM agents, and, using an adversarial simulated agent, we measure its ability to identify and stop unsafe situations. Then we apply the AgentMonitor on a battery of real-world tests of AutoGPT, and we identify several limitations and challenges that will face the creation of safe in-the-wild tests as autonomous agents grow more capable.

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Cited by 3 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Execution-Grounded Security Testing for Coding Agents in Software Engineering Pipelines

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    PromptArmor prompts a separate LLM to detect and remove injected prompts from agent inputs, achieving below 1% false positive and false negative rates on AgentDojo.

  3. SoK: The Privacy Paradox of Large Language Models: Advancements, Privacy Risks, and Mitigation

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    A systematization-of-knowledge survey that categorizes LLM privacy risks into training data, prompts, outputs, and agents, and reviews limitations of current mitigations.

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