RECORD
Model Predictive Control with adaptive resilience for Denial-of-Service Attacks mitigation on a Regulated Dam
Systems and Control · Submitted 28 Feb 2024
abstract compiled · 2026-09-23 · no language-model review
The authors' main claim We demonstrate the resulting MPC strategy's effectiveness in 2 attack scenarios on a real system with actual data, the regulated Olginate dam of Lake Como.
The compiled record
The paper's own sentences, arranged. Each label is drawn from a closed vocabulary; the number beside it is the probability the classifier gave that label. Numbers in the tables are the authors', checked by code. No sentence in this record was written by a model.
Open the compiled record
The abstract, sentence by sentence
In recent years, SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems have increasingly become the target of cyber attacks. SCADAs are no longer isolated, as web-based applications expose strategic infrastructures to the outside world connection. In a cyber-warfare context, we propose a Model Predictive Control (MPC) architecture with adaptive resilience, capable of guaranteeing control performance in normal operating conditions and driving towards resilience against DoS (controller-actuator) attacks when needed. Since the attackers' goal is typically to maximize the system damage, we assume they solve an adversarial optimal control problem. An adaptive resilience factor is then designed as a function of the intensity function of a Hawkes process, a point process model estimating the occurrence of random events in time, trained on a moving window to estimate the return time of the next attack. We demonstrate the resulting MPC strategy's effectiveness in 2 attack scenarios on a real system with actual data, the regulated Olginate dam of Lake Como.
background contribution method result interpretation main claim
| # | sentence | role | the authors' own work | states the main conclusion | strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| s0 | In recent years, SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems have increasingly become the target of cyber attacks. | background 1.00 | 0.05 | 0.02 | asserted 1.00 |
| s1 | SCADAs are no longer isolated, as web-based applications expose strategic infrastructures to the outside world connection. | background 1.00 | 0.06 | 0.02 | asserted 1.00 |
| s2 | In a cyber-warfare context, we propose a Model Predictive Control (MPC) architecture with adaptive resilience, capable of guaranteeing control performance in normal operating conditions and driving towards resilience against DoS (controller-actuator) attacks when needed. | contribution 0.98 | 0.85 | 0.54 | asserted 0.80 |
| s3 | Since the attackers' goal is typically to maximize the system damage, we assume they solve an adversarial optimal control problem. | method 0.79 | 0.15 | 0.04 | hedged possibility 0.50 |
| s4 | An adaptive resilience factor is then designed as a function of the intensity function of a Hawkes process, a point process model estimating the occurrence of random events in time, trained on a moving window to estimate the return time of the next attack. | method 0.97 | 0.89 | 0.06 | asserted 1.00 |
| s5 | We demonstrate the resulting MPC strategy's effectiveness in 2 attack scenarios on a real system with actual data, the regulated Olginate dam of Lake Como. | result 0.63 | 0.96 | 0.54 | asserted 1.00 |
What was examined, and what was not
- arXiv listing abstract v1
- full text
- figures and tables
- references and citing sentences
- relations to other papers
- P abstract
- S sections
- T body sentences
- C citations
- R cross-paper relations
The paper
Original abstract
In recent years, SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems have increasingly become the target of cyber attacks. SCADAs are no longer isolated, as web-based applications expose strategic infrastructures to the outside world connection. In a cyber-warfare context, we propose a Model Predictive Control (MPC) architecture with adaptive resilience, capable of guaranteeing control performance in normal operating conditions and driving towards resilience against DoS (controller-actuator) attacks when needed. Since the attackers' goal is typically to maximize the system damage, we assume they solve an adversarial optimal control problem. An adaptive resilience factor is then designed as a function of the intensity function of a Hawkes process, a point process model estimating the occurrence of random events in time, trained on a moving window to estimate the return time of the next attack. We demonstrate the resulting MPC strategy's effectiveness in 2 attack scenarios on a real system with actual data, the regulated Olginate dam of Lake Como.
Human review
How the literature uses it
What this paper does with the arXiv papers it cites
What it cites · 1 sentence without a confident label
Uses the method or tool of 1 paper
-
This is possible thanks to Hawkes processes ( [ref] ), a class of point processes that allows us to estimate the return time of an event whose occurrence is apparently random in time.
Hawkes Processes · INTRODUCTION · 0.92
Discussion
Know something about this paper? Leave a comment, or highlight any passage above to comment on it.