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As Firm As Their Foundations: Can open-sourced foundation models be used to create adversarial examples for downstream tasks?

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arxiv 2403.12693 v1 pith:SDO3P7DN submitted 2024-03-19 cs.CV

classification cs.CV
keywords downstreammodelsfoundationadversarialclipopen-sourcedsystemslearning
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Foundation models pre-trained on web-scale vision-language data, such as CLIP, are widely used as cornerstones of powerful machine learning systems. While pre-training offers clear advantages for downstream learning, it also endows downstream models with shared adversarial vulnerabilities that can be easily identified through the open-sourced foundation model. In this work, we expose such vulnerabilities in CLIP's downstream models and show that foundation models can serve as a basis for attacking their downstream systems. In particular, we propose a simple yet effective adversarial attack strategy termed Patch Representation Misalignment (PRM). Solely based on open-sourced CLIP vision encoders, this method produces adversaries that simultaneously fool more than 20 downstream models spanning 4 common vision-language tasks (semantic segmentation, object detection, image captioning and visual question-answering). Our findings highlight the concerning safety risks introduced by the extensive usage of public foundational models in the development of downstream systems, calling for extra caution in these scenarios.

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Cited by 3 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. VIP: Visual Information Protection through Adversarial Attacks on Vision-Language Models

    eess.IV 2025-07 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    A perturbation computed from early attention and value matrices can make LLaVA, Instruct-BLIP, and BLIP2-T5 fail to detect objects inside a specified image region while keeping the rest of the image usable.

  2. One Object, Multiple Lies: A Benchmark for Cross-task Adversarial Attack on Unified Vision-Language Models

    cs.CV 2025-07 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    A single adversarial image can make a unified vision-language model misclassify the same object across captioning, detection, region classification, and localization, and the new CrossVLAD benchmark and CRAFT attack m...

  3. Contrastive Spectral Rectification: Test-Time Defense towards Zero-shot Adversarial Robustness of CLIP

    cs.CV 2026-01 conditional novelty 4.0 of 10

    CSR detects and repairs adversarial CLIP inputs by comparing features with a low-pass filtered copy and applying a small contrastive PGD correction, claiming SOTA robust accuracy on 16 benchmarks.

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