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AutoJailbreak: Exploring Jailbreak Attacks and Defenses through a Dependency Lens

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arxiv 2406.03805 v1 pith:U3HKKR6C submitted 2024-06-06 cs.CR

classification cs.CR
keywords jailbreakattackattacksdefensedependencystrategiestextttdefenses
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Jailbreak attacks in large language models (LLMs) entail inducing the models to generate content that breaches ethical and legal norm through the use of malicious prompts, posing a substantial threat to LLM security. Current strategies for jailbreak attack and defense often focus on optimizing locally within specific algorithmic frameworks, resulting in ineffective optimization and limited scalability. In this paper, we present a systematic analysis of the dependency relationships in jailbreak attack and defense techniques, generalizing them to all possible attack surfaces. We employ directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to position and analyze existing jailbreak attacks, defenses, and evaluation methodologies, and propose three comprehensive, automated, and logical frameworks. \texttt{AutoAttack} investigates dependencies in two lines of jailbreak optimization strategies: genetic algorithm (GA)-based attacks and adversarial-generation-based attacks, respectively. We then introduce an ensemble jailbreak attack to exploit these dependencies. \texttt{AutoDefense} offers a mixture-of-defenders approach by leveraging the dependency relationships in pre-generative and post-generative defense strategies. \texttt{AutoEvaluation} introduces a novel evaluation method that distinguishes hallucinations, which are often overlooked, from jailbreak attack and defense responses. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that the proposed ensemble jailbreak attack and defense framework significantly outperforms existing research.

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Cited by 4 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. SoK: Systematizing LLM Prompt Security: Taxonomies, Datasets, and Unified Evaluation of Attacks and Defenses

    cs.CR 2025-10 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    A systemization of LLM jailbreak security that adds linked taxonomies, an evaluation platform, and JailbreakDB, while its main attack–defense comparison results remain deferred.

  2. Does Safety Training of LLMs Generalize to Semantically Related Natural Prompts?

    cs.CL 2024-12 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    A new attack pipeline, ReG-QA, generates natural, semantically related questions from a toxic seed and jailbreaks aligned LLMs at rates up to 93% on GPT-3.5 and 82% on GPT-4.

  3. The VLLM Safety Paradox: Dual Ease in Jailbreak Attack and Defense

    cs.CR 2024-11 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Near-perfect jailbreak defenses for vision-language models are mostly over-refusal, and the two standard ways of scoring jailbreaks agree only at chance level.

  4. Preventing Jailbreak Prompts as Malicious Tools for Cybercriminals: A Cyber Defense Perspective

    cs.CR 2024-11 conditional novelty 2.0 of 10

    A structured survey of jailbreak prompts and layered defenses for large language models, with six illustrative case studies and no empirical evaluation.

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