Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links
Paper Citation Record · LEDGER
Contractual Reinforcement Learning: Pulling Arms with Invisible Hands
As of 8 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 0 of 0 outbound references and 3 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2407.01458.
A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.
Coverage vector
One-hop event checks from named stored sources.
Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00
Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-07T14:53:58.959421Z
A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.
Source: arxiv_reference, observed 2026-05-10T09:18:31.674359Z
Reference resolution
0 of 0 outbound references displayed
- verified exact0
- verified fuzzy0
- unresolved0
- parse uncertain0
- malformed identifier0
- metadata mismatch0
External citation measurements
No source-named external measurement is stored.
Outbound references
No outbound reference observations are available for this paper version.
Pith citing papers
Observation 475dff40-5cf1-4c99-9a6c-962f66fa311a · inbound
Provably Efficient Algorithm for Best Scoring Rule Identification in Online Principal-Agent Information Acquisition cites this paper.
Provably Efficient Algorithm for Best Scoring Rule Identification in Online Principal-Agent Information Acquisition Contractual Reinforcement Learning: Pulling Arms with Invisible Hands
Reference 53
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T14:53:58.959421Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 46d66d4f-ee05-4395-9569-8465266007b3 · inbound
Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals cites this paper.
Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals Contractual Reinforcement Learning: Pulling Arms with Invisible Hands
Reference 32
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-07T13:03:57.940291Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 1ac80fa5-4b33-43c1-8cc2-a7d960748499 · inbound
The Power of Information for Intermediate States in Contract Design cites this paper.
The Power of Information for Intermediate States in Contract Design Contractual Reinforcement Learning: Pulling Arms with Invisible Hands
Reference 14
- Resolution
- verified exact
- arxiv_id, observed 2026-05-10T09:18:31.676587Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-07T06:34:17.273281+00:00.