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HPC with Enhanced User Separation

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arxiv 2409.10770 v1 pith:UWX6MTTW submitted 2024-09-16 cs.DC

HPC with Enhanced User Separation

Andrew Prout , Albert Reuther , Michael Houle , Michael Jones , Peter Michaleas , LaToya Anderson , William Arcand , Bill Bergeron
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David Bestor Alex Bonn Daniel Burrill Chansup Byun Vijay Gadepally Matthew Hubbell Hayden Jananthan Piotr Luszczek Lauren Milechin Guillermo Morales Julie Mullen Antonio Rosa Charles Yee Jeremy Kepner
This is my paper
classification cs.DC
keywords researchsecurityseparationsoftwaresystemsuserworkflowsaccelerators
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal T4 reserved
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HPC systems used for research run a wide variety of software and workflows. This software is often written or modified by users to meet the needs of their research projects, and rarely is built with security in mind. In this paper we explore several of the key techniques that MIT Lincoln Laboratory Supercomputing Center has deployed on its systems to manage the security implications of these workflows by providing enforced separation for processes, filesystem access, network traffic, and accelerators to make every user feel like they are running on a personal HPC.

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Cited by 1 Pith paper

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  1. Trusted Credentials, Untrusted Behavior: Benchmarking LLM-Agent Security in High-Performance Computing

    cs.CR 2026-07 conditional novelty 6.0

    Valid HPC credentials do not protect against an LLM agent being hijacked by adversarial content in logs, tools, or shared files; this position paper defines that threat and proposes a benchmark.