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arxiv: 2411.06498 · v2 · submitted 2024-11-10 · 💻 cs.AI · cs.CC

Barriers to Complexity-Theoretic Proofs that "AGI" Using Machine Learning is Impossible

Pith reviewed 2026-05-23 18:03 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💻 cs.AI cs.CC
keywords AGImachine learningcomplexity theoryintractability proofsinductive biashuman-like intelligencedata distribution
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The pith

A recent proof that machine learning cannot achieve human-like intelligence depends on an unstated assumption about how input-output pairs are distributed in the data.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper shows that van Rooij et al. 2024's complexity-theoretic argument against human-like intelligence via learning rests on an unjustified premise about the distribution of training examples. It identifies two core obstacles to salvaging the argument: the absence of a precise definition of human-like intelligence that works independently of any particular learner, and the need to incorporate the specific inductive biases of the machine learning system being analyzed. Attempts to repair the proof by restricting attention to particular subsets of the data run into parallel problems of defining which subsets count as relevant.

Core claim

The claimed proof that achieving human-like intelligence by learning from data is complexity-theoretically intractable relies on an assumption about the distribution of (input, output) tuples that is not justified by the argument; repairing the proof requires both a precise definition of human-like intelligence and an account of the inductive biases of the concrete machine learning system under consideration, while subset-based repairs face corresponding definitional barriers.

What carries the argument

The unjustified assumption about the distribution of (input, output) tuples in the data, which blocks any complexity bound from applying to actual learning systems.

If this is right

  • Any complexity-theoretic claim against ML-based AGI must state and defend its distribution over input-output pairs.
  • Definitions of human-like intelligence used in such proofs must be compatible with the inductive biases of the systems they analyze.
  • Subset-based variants of the argument require an explicit criterion for which data subsets are admissible.
  • General impossibility results cannot treat all possible learners as equivalent.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • Impossibility arguments may need to be indexed to families of learning algorithms rather than stated in learner-independent terms.
  • Empirical measurements of learnability on observed data distributions could provide a practical test independent of the theoretical barriers identified.

Load-bearing premise

That a precise complexity-theoretic definition of human-like intelligence can be stated without also fixing the inductive biases of the particular machine learning system being considered.

What would settle it

A revised proof that derives an intractability result while explicitly stating a data distribution, defining human-like intelligence in a way that does not depend on learner-specific biases, and justifying the choice of data subsets.

read the original abstract

A recent paper (van Rooij et al. 2024) claims to have proved that achieving human-like intelligence using learning from data is intractable in a complexity-theoretic sense. We point out that the proof relies on an unjustified assumption about the distribution of (input, output) tuples in the data. We briefly discuss that assumption in the context of two fundamental barriers to repairing the proof: the need to precisely define ``human-like," and the need to account for the fact that a particular machine learning system will have particular inductive biases that are key to the analysis. Another attempt to repair the proof, by focusing on subsets of the data, faces barriers in terms of defining the subsets.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

1 major / 1 minor

Summary. The manuscript argues that the intractability proof in van Rooij et al. (2024) for achieving human-like intelligence via machine learning from data rests on an unstated and unjustified assumption about the distribution of (input, output) tuples. It identifies two primary barriers to repairing the proof—the absence of a precise definition of 'human-like' intelligence and the failure to incorporate the inductive biases of any specific ML system—and notes that an alternative repair strategy based on data subsets encounters similar definitional obstacles.

Significance. If the identification of the distributional assumption is accurate, the paper usefully flags a methodological gap that future complexity-theoretic arguments against ML-based AGI would need to address explicitly. It earns credit for remaining within the scope of a commentary: it neither derives a new proof nor claims to refute the original result, but instead isolates concrete obstacles (precise definitions and inductive biases) that any repair must confront. This framing can help steer subsequent work toward more realistic models of data and learning.

major comments (1)
  1. [Abstract and barriers discussion] The central claim that van Rooij et al. (2024) relies on an unjustified distributional assumption is stated at a high level in the abstract and the paragraph discussing barriers; without a reconstruction of the relevant step in the original proof (e.g., the precise place where the distribution over tuples is invoked), it is difficult to assess whether the assumption is load-bearing or merely incidental.
minor comments (1)
  1. The manuscript would benefit from an explicit citation or short quotation locating the distributional assumption inside van Rooij et al. (2024) so readers can verify the critique without consulting the source paper.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

1 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for the detailed and constructive review. The suggestion to include a reconstruction of the relevant proof step is well-taken and will improve the clarity of the commentary. We address the major comment below and will revise the manuscript accordingly.

read point-by-point responses
  1. Referee: [Abstract and barriers discussion] The central claim that van Rooij et al. (2024) relies on an unjustified distributional assumption is stated at a high level in the abstract and the paragraph discussing barriers; without a reconstruction of the relevant step in the original proof (e.g., the precise place where the distribution over tuples is invoked), it is difficult to assess whether the assumption is load-bearing or merely incidental.

    Authors: We agree that a more explicit reconstruction of the step in van Rooij et al. (2024) where the distributional assumption over (input, output) tuples is invoked would help readers evaluate whether the assumption is load-bearing. In the revised manuscript we will add a concise paragraph (or short subsection) that reconstructs the relevant portion of the original argument, citing the specific place where the uniform or arbitrary distribution over tuples is used to establish intractability. This addition will remain within the scope of a commentary and will not introduce new technical results. revision: yes

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No significant circularity detected

full rationale

This is a short critique paper that identifies an assumption in van Rooij et al. 2024 about the distribution of (input, output) tuples and discusses two barriers to repairing their proof. No derivation chain, predictions, fitted parameters, or first-principles results are presented by the paper itself. The argument is logical identification of an external assumption rather than any self-referential reduction, self-citation load-bearing step, or renaming of known results. The paper is self-contained as commentary and contains no internal quantities that reduce to its own inputs by construction.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 1 axioms · 0 invented entities

The argument rests on the premise that the van Rooij et al. proof indeed uses an unstated distributional assumption and that definitional problems are load-bearing; these are treated as standard logical observations rather than new axioms. No free parameters or invented entities appear.

axioms (1)
  • domain assumption Logical analysis of assumptions in a proof is sufficient to identify barriers without needing the full formal details of the original proof.
    Invoked when the abstract states that the proof relies on an unjustified assumption and then discusses barriers to repair.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5637 in / 1290 out tokens · 32735 ms · 2026-05-23T18:03:29.245806+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

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Reference graph

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