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Rapid Response: Mitigating LLM Jailbreaks with a Few Examples

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arxiv 2411.07494 v1 pith:O4U6KDNO submitted 2024-11-12 cs.CL

classification cs.CL
keywords jailbreaksexamplesobservedrapidresponseattacksblockdefense
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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As large language models (LLMs) grow more powerful, ensuring their safety against misuse becomes crucial. While researchers have focused on developing robust defenses, no method has yet achieved complete invulnerability to attacks. We propose an alternative approach: instead of seeking perfect adversarial robustness, we develop rapid response techniques to look to block whole classes of jailbreaks after observing only a handful of attacks. To study this setting, we develop RapidResponseBench, a benchmark that measures a defense's robustness against various jailbreak strategies after adapting to a few observed examples. We evaluate five rapid response methods, all of which use jailbreak proliferation, where we automatically generate additional jailbreaks similar to the examples observed. Our strongest method, which fine-tunes an input classifier to block proliferated jailbreaks, reduces attack success rate by a factor greater than 240 on an in-distribution set of jailbreaks and a factor greater than 15 on an out-of-distribution set, having observed just one example of each jailbreaking strategy. Moreover, further studies suggest that the quality of proliferation model and number of proliferated examples play an key role in the effectiveness of this defense. Overall, our results highlight the potential of responding rapidly to novel jailbreaks to limit LLM misuse.

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Cited by 4 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. LLM in the Middle: A Systematic Review of Threats and Mitigations to Real-World LLM-based Systems

    cs.CR 2025-09 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    A systematic review that categorizes LLM threats, severity scores, and mitigations across development and operation life cycles and multiple deployment scenarios.

  2. Test-Time Immunization: A Universal Defense Framework Against Jailbreaks for (Multimodal) Large Language Models

    cs.CR 2025-05 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    TIM detects jailbreaks at test time using a gist-token classifier and adaptively fine-tunes the model with LoRA on detected harmful prompts, cutting attack success rates to near zero on tested benchmarks.

  3. Scalable Defense against In-the-wild Jailbreaking Attacks with Safety Context Retrieval

    cs.CR 2025-05 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    SCR uses retrieval-augmented generation to fetch refusal examples that block jailbreak attacks, but the reported advantages are partly overstated.

  4. A Red Teaming Roadmap Towards System-Level Safety

    cs.CR 2025-05 conditional novelty 4.0 of 10

    A position paper from Scale AI argues that red teaming research should prioritize product-level safety specifications, realistic attacker models, and system-level monitoring over abstract model-level harm benchmarks.

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