Pith. sign in

REVIEW 1 cited by

Why does time feel the way it does? Towards a principled account of temporal experience

Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.

This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.

SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event

T0 review · schema-true

One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.

pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp

arxiv 2412.13198 v1 pith:74SJC7CI submitted 2024-11-30 q-bio.NC

classification q-bio.NC
keywords timeaccountexperiencecause-effectstructuredirectedflowinggrids
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
0 comments
read the original abstract

Time flows, or at least the time of our experience does. Can we provide an objective account of why experience, confined to the short window of the conscious present, encompasses a succession of moments that slip away from now to then--an account of why time feels flowing? Integrated Information Theory (IIT) aims to account for both the presence and quality of consciousness in objective, physical terms. Given a substrate's architecture and current state, the formalism of IIT allows one to unfold the cause-effect power of the substrate, yielding a cause-effect structure. According to IIT, this accounts in full for the presence and quality of experience, without any additional ingredients. In previous work, we showed how unfolding the cause-effect structure of non-directed grids, like those found in many posterior cortical areas, can account for the way space feels--namely, extended. Here we show that unfolding the cause-effect structure of directed grids can account for how time feels--namely, flowing. First, we argue that the conscious present is experienced as flowing because it is composed of phenomenal distinctions (moments) that are directed, and these distinctions are related in a way that satisfies directed inclusion, connection, and fusion. We then show that directed grids, which we conjecture constitute the substrate of temporal experience, yield a cause-effect structure that accounts for these and other properties of temporal experience. In this account, the experienced present does not correspond to a process unrolling in "clock time," but to a cause-effect structure specified by a system in its current state: time is a structure, not a process. We conclude by outlining similarities and differences between the experience of time and space, and some implications for the neuroscience, psychophysics, and philosophy of time.

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Forward citations

Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. On the utility of toy models for theories of consciousness

    q-bio.NC 2025-07 conditional novelty 3.0 of 10

    A consciousness researcher makes the case that toy models help clarify, test, and compare theories of consciousness, using IIT and GWT as case studies.

Pith tools