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Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices
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We consider a refinement to the notions of collusion-resistance in transaction fee mechanisms. In particular, we require that the collusion is by itself incentive-compatible and individually rational to all of its participants. We then study the structural properties of these notions, and importantly, characterize the class of collusion-resistant and incentive-compatible transaction fee mechanisms in the single bidder case, and show that this is exactly the class of posted-price where the price is not too prohibitive. We analyze welfare and revenue implications, as well as the shape of the solution space, for both regular and non-regular distributions.
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