Pith. sign in

Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information

As of 18 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 32 of 32 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2501.06181.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2501.06181 v2

Coverage vector

measured 32 of 32 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.114433Z

measured 32 of 32 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00

measured 0 of 0 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: cited_works

Reference resolution

32 of 32 outbound references displayed

  • verified exact3
  • verified fuzzy24
  • unresolved5
  • parse uncertain0
  • malformed identifier0
  • metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation 96bfc6bd-07d3-4c50-ba52-1809c194b76b · outbound

This paper cites Bas ¸ar and G.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Bas ¸ar and G

Reference 1

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.014268Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.014268Z digest=sha256:2643c7973da8a45d5daa1413896779e476dd9890f97246ff0412a4522145867e

Observation a0b3f413-28b0-4900-80b9-b5da7c9588a3 · outbound

This paper cites A multistage pursuit-evasion game that admits a gaussian random process as a maximin control policy,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information A multistage pursuit-evasion game that admits a gaussian random process as a maximin control policy,

Reference 2

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.380170Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.017742Z digest=sha256:199419c26d4d354a86d0d4b519b15d801600a48c85a2cc975f335869ebe0717e

Observation e3648e7b-02da-464b-94b2-1827191eb6dc · outbound

This paper cites Differential games with imperfect state information,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Differential games with imperfect state information,

Reference 3

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.372399Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.021313Z digest=sha256:2b5f0ac4c8924ec2c869e1236f5de7273106b84e749e9444bbf67ccc6d6735c8

Observation 14e70ee5-f253-463f-83be-bf7a20005c17 · outbound

This paper cites Decomposition techniques for markov zero-sum games with nested information,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Decomposition techniques for markov zero-sum games with nested information,

Reference 4

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.364948Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.025271Z digest=sha256:2cce7e5290382f9a180c9e5cb28e041300ae62662c123156c566d8ce9738f9a1

Observation 7891cf13-8f2a-410d-9424-e74044193484 · outbound

This paper cites Common informa- tion based markov perfect equilibria for linear-gaussian games with asymmetric information,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Common informa- tion based markov perfect equilibria for linear-gaussian games with asymmetric information,

Reference 5

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.356499Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.029344Z digest=sha256:161ee6b64b22d620c469e780abbcd7bfc6f805cd309bf7f17a5d241425d594c1

Observation ea92dab1-08fa-4ea2-901a-b7ad82160791 · outbound

This paper cites Zero-sum stochastic games with asymmetric information,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Zero-sum stochastic games with asymmetric information,

Reference 6

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.348538Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.032359Z digest=sha256:0803685bc942b7c8ef7128113ca5d8d6f799d6cd0cc4cc88c3d82ae711062492

Observation 377e1c5e-b0c8-4002-bb85-484c96879597 · outbound

This paper cites Linear-quadratic Gaussian Games with Asymmetric Information: Belief Corrections Using the Opponents Actions.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Linear-quadratic Gaussian Games with Asymmetric Information: Belief Corrections Using the Opponents Actions

Reference 7

Resolution
verified exact
local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.163084Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.036347Z digest=sha256:7bbf00617bb59dda8767ada6571f6cb489551a6a7b2d20194ca0ac3d7b54a5a4

Observation 9b851f73-b30b-4a56-bc78-6788a102ff1f · outbound

This paper cites Stochastic dynamic games in belief space,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Stochastic dynamic games in belief space,

Reference 8

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.339956Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.039724Z digest=sha256:ce222d87e408919cd9ffda27dd5c0bd3c73c8d422d9079bdfc4bb2e82198c9df

Observation a0de676c-1a2e-4cdb-828b-f791a723b854 · outbound

This paper cites Learning Mixed Strategies in Trajectory Games.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Learning Mixed Strategies in Trajectory Games

Reference 9

Resolution
verified exact
local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.151746Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.042647Z digest=sha256:49bfbf7c3c2349ff34e8c93e08403dc371e164dbbef08dc113c60d91c006a631

Observation fd79f582-5fc5-4956-bd0f-fae3a02b11d7 · outbound

This paper cites Learning equilibria in asymmetric auction games,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Learning equilibria in asymmetric auction games,

Reference 10

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.332436Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.045817Z digest=sha256:cd695b817b1f22ab395249ed031fb49c1fec7a4f682a50a748790588557e9ffd

Observation b3dd8bd1-650f-4c31-b30b-88b7da05764c · outbound

This paper cites Dynamic games with asymmetric information and resource constrained players with applications to security of cyberphysical systems,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Dynamic games with asymmetric information and resource constrained players with applications to security of cyberphysical systems,

Reference 11

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.323855Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.049125Z digest=sha256:d68292e61445e631c7e4389e64ba40d5af8e6a225b91503c2093a050856ef8a5

Observation ad79ed4e-a9cd-4401-8f50-b6548a689bc1 · outbound

This paper cites Dynamic games for secure and resilient control system design,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Dynamic games for secure and resilient control system design,

Reference 12

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.315606Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.052226Z digest=sha256:cb27492495a08a68788939192cb177f795bbd44cccb3dc94b162f5da088b147e

Observation ea30db2e-feae-4a87-84b9-2347f88b539a · outbound

This paper cites Games with incomplete information played by “bayesian.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Games with incomplete information played by “bayesian

Reference 13

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.056285Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.056285Z digest=sha256:f0ddea22d78aa2ba2702ef35c0bccf2309418e46104859f9cbc00b8e1287640e

Observation 43998a7c-d036-4d5d-a276-ed818ca24f8a · outbound

This paper cites The market for “lemons.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information The market for “lemons

Reference 14

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.302517Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.060796Z digest=sha256:8f134e1e0938cf799cf229dbc18b414307bccf8de6480304831b5332106d6332

Observation 537ac002-73d2-4e45-997e-0cf51f19d14b · outbound

This paper cites Agreeing to disagree,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Agreeing to disagree,

Reference 15

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.294862Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.063626Z digest=sha256:87c1ffb9adb047dade8e9c9a6d3b5c33befff8aa22e30ce1670db35e45283114

Observation 285ca93f-b695-4d50-ab7d-66dfd8f4d6a5 · outbound

This paper cites Job market signaling,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Job market signaling,

Reference 16

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.285903Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.066825Z digest=sha256:4f6f8ebfd9e7ace4e851ba144e48f1ffd16819663f3dc2dc175154748677d4c1

Observation 2239ecfa-dafc-4866-a92f-63ff17d814ef · outbound

This paper cites Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information,

Reference 17

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.278346Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.069678Z digest=sha256:83666c0fc12ec1128806a0b3b8aaf08cdb485a661ee148481f8df4a707feac6c

Observation fca1bf44-2067-4ea3-9b8e-ed26de2a1ce5 · outbound

This paper cites The theory of learning in games, economics learning and social evolution series,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information The theory of learning in games, economics learning and social evolution series,

Reference 18

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.270029Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.072378Z digest=sha256:1aeb6fa639f1f68ea13f26514ce451c16d2eaf03b9d4eb19e080ab844ff10837

Observation e72f04a9-9ebb-4bfb-b0ab-dd55e8839190 · outbound

This paper cites Computing Best-Response Strategies in Infinite Games of Incomplete Information.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Computing Best-Response Strategies in Infinite Games of Incomplete Information

Reference 19

Resolution
verified exact
local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.140250Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.074997Z digest=sha256:bf0d6957078ae53cdfb26c9a024c16dd24e44afced06dbe98a8c44241f6a5dab

Observation be506546-5f96-4a90-8f0c-0f8ad7ea8dda · outbound

This paper cites On the rate of convergence of continuous-time fictitious play,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information On the rate of convergence of continuous-time fictitious play,

Reference 20

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.261483Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.078253Z digest=sha256:c7dfd9952f19f2a2d0622f0f4921d0936558e3936a7dcf5985bfc9ba30ddb195

Observation f9e88f7e-7464-40ab-83ac-51478f3401d5 · outbound

This paper cites Best response dynamics for continuous zero-sum games,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Best response dynamics for continuous zero-sum games,

Reference 21

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.253099Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.080771Z digest=sha256:118ed7c95ccace150466a68b4d2ccded86809e7baa944df3aacc4665a2b698a5

Observation d86cb2a1-7a1a-4dbf-b15c-ea09ea28637d · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Unresolved cited work

Reference 22

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.083798Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.083798Z digest=sha256:43c028e7fb745badb579484db3f1b38584fcd60741cc94811fd9c7dbe950a8ca

Observation cbe13efd-9912-46fb-885f-f2a78cdb05bc · outbound

This paper cites Best response model predictive control for agile interactions between autonomous ground vehicles,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Best response model predictive control for agile interactions between autonomous ground vehicles,

Reference 23

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.240570Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.087214Z digest=sha256:11674819b090eec4d33e735fa205e099f77a13fdc4b11fa5c2e0645d8903bde5

Observation ed3a6618-edbc-47fa-a653-2e780f13217d · outbound

This paper cites Game theoretic motion planning for multi-robot racing,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Game theoretic motion planning for multi-robot racing,

Reference 24

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.232636Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.091086Z digest=sha256:dd68a1d87e21f30bcec54631fab665e560d6b0df21d11e9b9700768b0878f974

Observation c231ce91-ad63-4fff-9175-7f135bea84ac · outbound

This paper cites Game- theoretic planning for self-driving cars in multivehicle competitive scenarios,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Game- theoretic planning for self-driving cars in multivehicle competitive scenarios,

Reference 25

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.093837Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.093837Z digest=sha256:391c347856a362ff9b0a9d55fb9f8f057afdaacd17fef661bdc35f31e2abb170

Observation 807a481e-cb7c-463f-b2e4-3d57447dbdec · outbound

This paper cites Controllability metrics, limitations and algorithms for complex networks,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Controllability metrics, limitations and algorithms for complex networks,

Reference 26

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.220543Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.096919Z digest=sha256:ebcd7c0b34cea5563f481b4a7147375fa611365bd7a5b1db222187d41edf71b4

Observation ff29a10d-f0ba-4c73-a36e-92092af0ebd4 · outbound

This paper cites Performance bounds for optimal and robust feedback control in networks,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Performance bounds for optimal and robust feedback control in networks,

Reference 27

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.212320Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.099405Z digest=sha256:1c3b212b7bf961ee33643496ad9e6f40abb4fc0a88f9b69711a7446f96949c4d

Observation 5674e98b-6ba6-4adf-82a7-bf7bef389a62 · outbound

This paper cites On the decay rate of hankel singular values and related issues,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information On the decay rate of hankel singular values and related issues,

Reference 28

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.204824Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.102909Z digest=sha256:207485fff6de13d24e70286a19e2b0a6f71d71f3d44afa54ce27f84de1b36d6d

Observation 035db1e5-2ff7-4d28-b337-e8de6d8c851e · outbound

This paper cites Least squares stationary optimal control and the algebraic Riccati equation,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Least squares stationary optimal control and the algebraic Riccati equation,

Reference 29

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.197190Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.105971Z digest=sha256:fa1bc4077c3175fb4764cbf6b4c701fa06b249554294403e869f5f22a7c10ee1

Observation 52cd3977-2b38-4cde-bc16-8ee555ab8797 · outbound

This paper cites The stable regulator problem and its inverse,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information The stable regulator problem and its inverse,

Reference 30

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.189161Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.108868Z digest=sha256:11f2e513e412a33acc2e4b6b6ebd4a7cb1b6b47d985c21f3e63357eb695e9968

Observation b580de59-2569-41a7-a9a1-8d02cb725599 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Unresolved cited work

Reference 31

Resolution
unresolved
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.179932Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.111400Z digest=sha256:b4d5892a78e1ed4c03243261405a9f6ba30971dca994f9027d4fe55bc6109330

Observation 39e08635-617d-4cad-92ba-bd08b8e4b35f · outbound

This paper cites All optimal Hankel-norm approximations of linear multivariable systems and their L, ∞ -error bounds†,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information All optimal Hankel-norm approximations of linear multivariable systems and their L, ∞ -error bounds†,

Reference 32

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.172122Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.114433Z digest=sha256:9b9da165ab7d95d0c5ea6578acdac0eee1e253527610938337c6fbde17b54a15

Pith citing papers

No inbound Pith citation observations are available.