pith. sign in

arxiv: 2502.04538 · v5 · submitted 2025-02-06 · 💻 cs.CR

"Security vs. Interoperability" Arguments: An Analytical Framework

Daji Landis , Elettra Bietti , Sunoo Park This is my paper

Pith reviewed 2026-05-23 03:20 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💻 cs.CR
keywords securityinteroperabilityantitrusttaxonomyregulatory frameworkeconomic incentivesmarket powercase studies
0
0 comments X

The pith

A taxonomy divides security objections to platform interoperability into engineering, vetting, and hybrid categories, supported by an assessment framework.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper sets out to organize security arguments raised against interoperability requirements in big tech regulation. It creates a three-part taxonomy and an accompanying analytical framework, then applies both to real cases drawn from EU antitrust contexts. The framework helps separate technical security issues from other factors. A side-by-side comparison of the cases uncovers recurring links between security claims, economic incentives, and market power. The result supplies a structured method for examining such arguments as regulators consider new interoperability rules.

Core claim

The authors propose a taxonomy of security versus interoperability concerns consisting of engineering, vetting, and hybrid categories. They introduce an analytical framework for assessing these concerns in practice, demonstrate it through multiple case studies, and perform a comparative analysis that identifies recurring patterns in the roles of economic incentives and market power within each category.

What carries the argument

The three-category taxonomy of SvI concerns (engineering, vetting, hybrid) together with the analytical framework for evaluating real-world instances against economic and market factors.

If this is right

  • The framework distinguishes engineering concerns focused on technical compatibility from vetting concerns focused on review processes.
  • Hybrid concerns combine elements of both and tend to arise where market power is concentrated.
  • Security arguments exhibit distinct incentive structures in each of the three categories.
  • Comparative analysis shows market power influences which category of argument dominant firms emphasize.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • Regulators could apply the same taxonomy to interoperability disputes outside the EU.
  • The framework might be extended to non-antitrust settings such as data-portability mandates.
  • Further case studies could test whether the identified patterns hold when smaller platforms raise security objections.
  • The taxonomy offers a way to track how security claims evolve as interoperability requirements are implemented.

Load-bearing premise

The three categories cover the full range of security versus interoperability arguments and the selected case studies are representative enough to reveal general patterns in incentives and market power.

What would settle it

A documented security objection to interoperability that cannot be placed in any of the three categories, or a new case study whose incentive patterns contradict those identified for its category.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2502.04538 by Daji Landis, Elettra Bietti, Sunoo Park.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: Our taxonomy and horizontal/vertical interoperation (strong/weak [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p007_1.png] view at source ↗
read the original abstract

Concerns about big tech's monopoly power have featured prominently in recent media and policy discourse, as regulators across the European Union (EU), the United States (US) and beyond have ramped up efforts to promote healthier market competition. One favored approach is to require certain kinds of interoperation between platforms, to mitigate the current concentration of power in the biggest companies. Unsurprisingly, interoperability initiatives have generally been met with resistance by big tech companies. Perhaps more surprisingly, a significant part of that pushback has been in the name of security -- that is, arguing against interoperation on the basis that it will undermine security. We conduct a systematic examination of "security vs. interoperability" (SvI) discourse in the context of EU antitrust and competition proceedings. Our resulting contributions are threefold. First, we propose a taxonomy of SvI concerns in three categories: engineering, vetting, and hybrid. Second, we present an analytical framework for assessing real-world SvI concerns, and illustrate its utility by analyzing several case studies spanning our three taxonomy categories. Third, we undertake a comparative analysis that highlights key considerations around the interplay of economic incentives, market power, and security across our diverse case study contexts, identifying common patterns in each taxonomy category. Our contributions provide valuable analytical tools for experts and non-experts alike to critically assess SvI discourse in today's fast-paced regulatory landscape.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

3 major / 0 minor

Summary. The manuscript conducts a systematic examination of 'security vs. interoperability' (SvI) discourse in EU antitrust and competition proceedings. It proposes a taxonomy of SvI concerns in three categories (engineering, vetting, and hybrid), presents an analytical framework illustrated via case studies spanning the categories, and performs a comparative analysis of the interplay between economic incentives, market power, and security to identify common patterns within each category.

Significance. If the taxonomy can be shown to be exhaustive and the case studies representative, the framework would supply concrete tools for distinguishing technical security objections from those shaped by market power in regulatory settings. The comparative analysis could surface recurring incentive structures useful to both technical experts and policymakers evaluating interoperability mandates.

major comments (3)
  1. Abstract: the central claims rest on the existence of a taxonomy, framework, and comparative analysis, yet the abstract supplies no account of how the three categories were derived, how case studies were chosen, or any validation procedure, rendering the support for the claims unassessable from the stated contributions.
  2. §3 (Taxonomy section): the engineering/vetting/hybrid partition is asserted without evidence or argument that the categories are exhaustive or mutually exclusive, which is load-bearing for the claim that the taxonomy organizes the full range of real-world SvI arguments.
  3. §5 (Case-study section): the selected cases are analyzed but no sampling frame, search protocol, or representativeness argument is supplied, so the patterns extracted in the subsequent comparative analysis cannot be generalized beyond author judgment.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

3 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for their insightful comments. We address the major comments point by point below, with plans for revisions where the manuscript can be strengthened.

read point-by-point responses

  1. Referee: Abstract: the central claims rest on the existence of a taxonomy, framework, and comparative analysis, yet the abstract supplies no account of how the three categories were derived, how case studies were chosen, or any validation procedure, rendering the support for the claims unassessable from the stated contributions.

    Authors: We concur that the abstract should provide more transparency on the development of the taxonomy and case selection. The revised abstract will indicate that the categories emerged from analyzing SvI arguments in EU antitrust cases and technical reports, case studies were selected for their relevance to each category, and the analysis is qualitative and illustrative. revision: yes

  2. Referee: §3 (Taxonomy section): the engineering/vetting/hybrid partition is asserted without evidence or argument that the categories are exhaustive or mutually exclusive, which is load-bearing for the claim that the taxonomy organizes the full range of real-world SvI arguments.

    Authors: We did not intend to claim that the taxonomy is exhaustive or that the categories are always mutually exclusive. The partition is based on the primary nature of the security concerns raised. We will revise §3 to include an explanation of how the categories were identified and discuss limitations, including possible hybrid cases and the scope of applicability. revision: partial

  3. Referee: §5 (Case-study section): the selected cases are analyzed but no sampling frame, search protocol, or representativeness argument is supplied, so the patterns extracted in the subsequent comparative analysis cannot be generalized beyond author judgment.

    Authors: The cases are illustrative of the framework's application and the patterns observed within them. We will add text in §5 describing the criteria for selecting the cases (prominent proceedings with explicit SvI arguments) and clarify that the comparative analysis is not meant for broad generalization but to highlight recurring themes. revision: yes

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No circularity: original taxonomy and framework with no self-referential derivation

full rationale

The paper proposes a new three-category taxonomy (engineering, vetting, hybrid) and an analytical framework as original contributions, then applies them to case studies for illustration and comparative analysis. No equations, fitted parameters, predictions, or self-citations appear as load-bearing steps in the derivation chain. The taxonomy and framework are presented as author-constructed analytical tools rather than quantities derived from their own inputs or prior self-work; case studies serve as examples, not as data to which the framework is fitted and then 'predicted' back. This satisfies the default expectation of a self-contained conceptual paper with no reduction by construction.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 1 axioms · 0 invented entities

This is a conceptual policy paper; the central claims rest on domain assumptions about the nature of regulatory discourse rather than on fitted parameters or new postulated entities.

axioms (1)
  • domain assumption The three taxonomy categories (engineering, vetting, hybrid) are sufficient to classify the relevant SvI arguments arising in EU antitrust proceedings.
    Invoked when the authors state they conduct a systematic examination and propose the taxonomy as the first contribution.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5777 in / 1157 out tokens · 35346 ms · 2026-05-23T03:20:33.542380+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

82 extracted references · 82 canonical work pages · 1 internal anchor

  1. [1]

    Why information security is hard-an economic perspective

    A NDERSON , R. Why information security is hard-an economic perspective. In Seventeenth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (01 2002), pp. 358 – 365

    work page 2002

  2. [2]

    Security Engineering, 3rd Edition , 3rd edition

    A NDERSON , R. Security Engineering, 3rd Edition , 3rd edition. ed. Wiley, 2020

    work page 2020

  3. [3]

    J., AND MOORE , T

    A NDERSON , R. J., AND MOORE , T. Information security economics - and beyond. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2007, 27th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 19-23, 2007, Proceedings (2007), A. Menezes, Ed., vol. 4622 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science , Springer, pp. 68–91

    work page 2007

  4. [4]

    Host-based card emulation overview

    A NDROID . Host-based card emulation overview. Android Devel- opers, 2024. Permalink: https://perma.cc/CGA5-NLXL, URL:https: //developer.android.com/develop/connectivity/nfc/hce

    work page 2024

  5. [5]

    App review guidelines

    A PPLE . App review guidelines. Apple Developer Resources. Sec- tion 2.5.6, Permalink: https://perma.cc/WL67-ZYUH, URL: https: //developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/

    work page

  6. [6]

    Using alternative browser engines in the European Union

    A PPLE . Using alternative browser engines in the European Union. Apple Developer Resources. Permalink: , URL: https://developer. apple.com/support/alternative-browser-engines/

    work page

  7. [7]

    How Apple Pay keeps users’ purchases protected

    A PPLE . How Apple Pay keeps users’ purchases protected. Apple Platform Security, 2021. Permalink: https://perma.cc/9WBC-QMDA, URL: https://support.apple.com/en-gb/guide/security/seccb53a35f0/ web

    work page 2021

  8. [8]

    App review guidelines, 2024

    A PPLE . App review guidelines, 2024. Permalink: https://perma. cc/C5UG-8ZQG, URL: https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/ guidelines/

    work page 2024

  9. [9]

    Apple developer program license agreement, 2024

    A PPLE . Apple developer program license agreement, 2024. Perma- link: https://perma.cc/P7T3-CELL, URL: https://developer.apple. com/support/terms/apple-developer-program-license-agreement/ #ADPLA6.1

    work page 2024

  10. [10]

    Apple platform security, 2024

    A PPLE . Apple platform security, 2024. Permalink: https:// perma.cc/Z4F5-HVJ8, URL: https://help.apple.com/pdf/security/en US/apple-platform-security-guide.pdf

    work page 2024

  11. [11]

    Developers can soon offer in-app NFC transactions using the Secure Element

    A PPLE . Developers can soon offer in-app NFC transactions using the Secure Element. Apple Newsroom, 2024. Permalink: https://perma. cc/LJ9Q-G4WE

    work page 2024

  12. [12]

    Getting started as an alternative app marketplace in the European Union

    A PPLE . Getting started as an alternative app marketplace in the European Union. Apple Developer Resources, 2024. Permalink: https: //perma.cc/U6VL-959G, URL: https://developer.apple.com/support/ alternative-app-marketplace-in-the-eu/

    work page 2024

  13. [13]

    Getting started with web distribution in the EU

    A PPLE . Getting started with web distribution in the EU. Apple De- veloper Resources, 2024. Permalink: https://perma.cc/5ZGR-736K, URL: https://developer.apple.com/support/web-distribution-eu/

    work page 2024

  14. [14]

    HCE-based contactless NFC transactions for apps in the European Economic Area (EEA)

    A PPLE . HCE-based contactless NFC transactions for apps in the European Economic Area (EEA). Apple Developer Support, 2024. Permalink: https://perma.cc/G4A6-DSRN, URL: https://developer. apple.com/support/hce-transactions-in-apps/

    work page 2024

  15. [15]

    It’s getting personal., 2024

    A PPLE . It’s getting personal., 2024. Permalink: https:// perma.cc/AW34-KRYW, URL: https://developer.apple.com/support/ downloads/DMA-Interoperability-Dec-2024.pdf

    work page 2024

  16. [16]

    Notarizing macOS software before distribution

    A PPLE . Notarizing macOS software before distribution. Ap- ple Developer Documentation, 2024. Permalink: https://perma. cc/7X5E-SK9D, URL: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/ security/notarizing-macos-software-before-distribution

    work page 2024

  17. [17]

    Using alternative payment options on the App Store in the European Union

    A PPLE . Using alternative payment options on the App Store in the European Union. Apple Developer Resources, 2024. Permalink: https: //perma.cc/7CVJ-XCR3, URL: https://developer.apple.com/support/ apps-using-alternative-payment-providers-in-the-eu/

    work page 2024

  18. [18]

    What is the difference between iMessage, RCS, and SMS/MMS? Apple Support, 2024

    A PPLE . What is the difference between iMessage, RCS, and SMS/MMS? Apple Support, 2024. Permalink: https://perma.cc/ D2T4-6W6W, URL: https://support.apple.com/en-us/104972

    work page 2024

  19. [19]

    Distributing your app from your website

    A PPLE . Distributing your app from your website. Apple Developer Support, 2025. Permalink: https://perma.cc/HL9D-XX6K, URL: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/appdistribution/ distributing-your-app-from-your-website

    work page 2025

  20. [20]

    Membership details

    A PPLE . Membership details. Apple Developer Program,

    work page

  21. [21]

    Permalink: https://perma.cc/9TJS-96E2, URL: https:// developer.apple.com/programs/whats-included/

    work page

  22. [22]

    Understanding the core technology fee for ios and ipados apps in the european union

    A PPLE . Understanding the core technology fee for ios and ipados apps in the european union. Apple Developer Support, 2025. Perma- link: https://perma.cc/3T9J-9P2E, URL: https://developer.apple.com/ support/core-technology-fee/

    work page 2025

  23. [23]

    Apple announces changes to iOS, Safari, and the App Store in the European Union, 2024

    A PPLE NEWSROOM . Apple announces changes to iOS, Safari, and the App Store in the European Union, 2024. Permalink: https://perma. cc/Z25U-UKGX

    work page 2024

  24. [24]

    Explainer: Competition, Data and Interoperability in digital markets | Privacy International

    B IETTI , E. Explainer: Competition, Data and Interoperability in digital markets | Privacy International. Privacy International

    work page

  25. [25]

    One protocol to rule them all? On securing interoperable messaging

    B LESSING , J., AND ANDERSON , R. One protocol to rule them all? On securing interoperable messaging. In Security Protocols XXVIII (Cham, 2023), F. Stajano, V . Maty ´aˇs, B. Christianson, and J. Anderson, Eds., Springer Nature Switzerland

    work page 2023

  26. [26]

    DMA: Horizontal and vertical interoperability obligations

    B OURREAU , M. DMA: Horizontal and vertical interoperability obligations. Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE), 2022

    work page 2022

  27. [27]

    Discontinued privacy: Personal data leaks in Apple bluetooth-low-energy continuity protocols

    C ELOSIA , G., AND CUNCHE , M. Discontinued privacy: Personal data leaks in Apple bluetooth-low-energy continuity protocols. Pro- ceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2020 (12 2019)

    work page 2020

  28. [28]

    C HESHIRE , S. D. Proximity Wi-Fi, U.S. Patent US20180083858A1, Mar. 2018. asignee: Apple Inc

    work page 2018

  29. [29]

    Evil never sleeps: When wireless malware stays on after turning off iPhones

    C LASSEN , J., H EINRICH , A., R EITH , R., AND HOLLICK , M. Evil never sleeps: When wireless malware stays on after turning off iPhones. In Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (May 2022), WiSec ’22, ACM, p. 146–156

    work page 2022

  30. [30]

    Happy MitM: fun and toys in every bluetooth device

    C LASSEN , J., AND HOLLICK , M. Happy MitM: fun and toys in every bluetooth device. In Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (June 2021), WiSec ’21, ACM, p. 72–77

    work page 2021

  31. [31]

    Between Truth and Power: The Legal Constructions of Informational Capitalism

    C OHEN , J. Between Truth and Power: The Legal Constructions of Informational Capitalism . Oxford University Press, 10 2019

    work page 2019

  32. [32]

    F., AND GARFINKEL , S

    C RANOR , L. F., AND GARFINKEL , S. Security and Usability: De- signing Secure Systems that People Can Use . O’Reilly Media, 2005

    work page 2005

  33. [33]

    Complying with the digital markets act

    D AVIS, G. Complying with the digital markets act. Ap- ple, 2024. Permalink: https://perma.cc/2KRG-LQ59, URL: https: //developer.apple.com/security/complying-with-the-dma.pdf

    work page 2024

  34. [34]

    E LECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER . FBI v. Apple. https: //epic.org/documents/apple-v-fbi-2

    work page

  35. [35]

    Competition case search

    EU C OMMISSION . Competition case search. URL: https:// competition-cases.ec.europa.eu/search

    work page

  36. [36]

    Commission closes investigation into Apple’s user choice obligations and issues preliminary findings on rules for alter- native apps under the Digital Markets Act

    EU C OMMISSION . Commission closes investigation into Apple’s user choice obligations and issues preliminary findings on rules for alter- native apps under the Digital Markets Act. Press Release, 2025. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip 25 1086

    work page 2025

  37. [37]

    NACE rev

    E UROSTAT . NACE rev. 2 statistical classification of economic activi- ties in the European Community. Methodologies and Working papers. ISSN 1977-0375

    work page 1977

  38. [38]

    Cybersecurity Mission Creep, Sept

    F IDLER , M. Cybersecurity Mission Creep, Sept. 2023. draft on file with authors

    work page 2023

  39. [39]

    The Blue Bubble

    F OX, M. DOJ v. “The Blue Bubble”. Corporate and Business Law Journal, 2024

    work page 2024

  40. [40]

    M., AND VAN SCHEWICK , B

    F RISCHMANN , B. M., AND VAN SCHEWICK , B. Network Neutrality and the Economics of an Information Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo. Jurimetrics, V ol. 47, Sept. 2007

    work page 2007

  41. [41]

    D., M UHAMEDAGI ´C, M., AND SAENZ , D

    G ARCIA -SWARTZ, D. D., M UHAMEDAGI ´C, M., AND SAENZ , D. The role of prices and network effects in the growth of the iphone platform. Technological F orecasting and Social Change 147 (2019), 110–122

    work page 2019

  42. [42]

    The DOJ Puts Apple’s iMessage Encryption in the Antitrust Crosshairs

    G REENBERG , A., AND COUTS , A. The DOJ Puts Apple’s iMessage Encryption in the Antitrust Crosshairs. Wired, 2024. Permalink:https://perma.cc/B8X5-QPXJ, URL: https://www.wired. com/story/apple-doj-antitrust-imessage-encryption/

    work page 2024

  43. [43]

    ToothPicker: Apple picking in the iOS bluetooth stack

    H EINZE , D., C LASSEN , J., AND HOLLICK , M. ToothPicker: Apple picking in the iOS bluetooth stack. In 14th USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies (WOOT 20) (Aug. 2020), USENIX Associa- tion

    work page 2020

  44. [44]

    Antitrust Interoperability Remedies

    H OVENKAMP , H. Antitrust Interoperability Remedies. U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 22-14, Jan. 2023

    work page 2023

  45. [45]

    Two-sided markets, pricing, and network effects

    J ULLIEN , B., P AVAN, A., AND RYSMAN , M. Two-sided markets, pricing, and network effects. In Handbook of Industrial Organization, V olume 4, K. Ho, A. Hortac ¸su, and A. Lizzeri, Eds., vol. 4 of Handbook of Industrial Organization . Elsevier, 2021, pp. 485–592

    work page 2021

  46. [46]

    K ADES , M., AND MORTON , F. S. Interoperability as a competition remedy for digital networks. Equitable Growth

    work page

  47. [47]

    Net neutrality rules struck down by appeals court

    K ANG , C. Net neutrality rules struck down by appeals court. New York Times, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/02/technology/ net-neutrality-rules-fcc.html

    work page 2025

  48. [48]

    Android vs iPhone security: which is safer? Norton Blog, 2024

    K NEZEVIC , O. Android vs iPhone security: which is safer? Norton Blog, 2024. Permalink:https://perma.cc/TE3C-HHE3, URL: https:// us.norton.com/blog/mobile/android-vs-ios-which-is-more-secure

    work page 2024

  49. [49]

    A., AND SAMUELSON , P

    L EMLEY , M. A., AND SAMUELSON , P. Interfaces and Interoperabil- ity After Google v. Oracle. Texas Law Review (Nov. 2021)

    work page 2021

  50. [50]

    Interoperability in end-to-end encrypted messaging

    L EN, J., G HOSH , E., G RUBBS , P., AND R ¨OSLER , P. Interoperability in end-to-end encrypted messaging. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/386, 2023

    work page 2023

  51. [51]

    L ENAERTS , K., G UTMAN , K., AND NOWAK, J. T. EU Procedural Law. Oxford European Union Law Library, 2023

    work page 2023

  52. [52]

    SoK: On the analysis of web browser security, 2021

    L IM, J., J IN, Y., ALHARTHI , M., Z HANG , X., J UNG , J., G UPTA, R., LI, K., J ANG , D., AND KIM, T. SoK: On the analysis of web browser security, 2021

    work page 2021

  53. [53]

    A formal analysis of apple’s iMessage PQ3 protocol

    L INKER , F., SASSE , R., AND BASIN , D. A formal analysis of apple’s iMessage PQ3 protocol. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2024/1395, 2024

    work page 2024

  54. [54]

    L OO, R. V. Privacy pretexts. Cornell Law Review 1 108 (2022)

    work page 2022

  55. [55]

    Time does not heal all wounds: A longitudinal analysis of security- mechanism support in mobile browsers

    L UO, M., L APERDRIX , P., H ONARMAND , N., AND NIKIFORAKIS , N. Time does not heal all wounds: A longitudinal analysis of security- mechanism support in mobile browsers. In Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium (01 2019)

    work page 2019

  56. [56]

    Handoff all your privacy – a review of Apple’s bluetooth low energy continuity protocol

    M ARTIN , J., A LPUCHE , D., B ODEMAN , K., B ROWN , L., F ENSKE , E., F OPPE , L., M AYBERRY, T., RYE, E., S IPES , B., AND TEPLOV, S. Handoff all your privacy – a review of Apple’s bluetooth low energy continuity protocol. Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2019 (10 2019), 34–53

    work page 2019

  57. [57]

    Harvard and Georgia Tech professors de- bunk Apple’s security pretext for App Store monopolism: Epic Games v

    M UELLER , F. Harvard and Georgia Tech professors de- bunk Apple’s security pretext for App Store monopolism: Epic Games v. Apple. Foss Patents, 2021. Permalink: https:// perma.cc/GX96-H5H8, URL: http://www.fosspatents.com/2021/03/ harvard-and-georgia-tech-professors.html

    work page 2021

  58. [58]

    Microeconomic Theory

    N ICHOLSON , W., AND SNYDER , C. Microeconomic Theory. Thom- son South-Western, 2008

    work page 2008

  59. [59]

    Google completes fitbit acquisition

    O STERLOH , R. Google completes fitbit acquisition. Google,

    work page

  60. [60]

    google/products/platforms-devices/fitbit-acquisition/

    Permalink:https://perma.cc/52UF-Z4GC, URL: https://blog. google/products/platforms-devices/fitbit-acquisition/

    work page

  61. [61]

    Is there any actual reason why Apple doesn’t allow any other browser engines other than WebKit on iOS/iPadOS

    R/IOS. Is there any actual reason why Apple doesn’t allow any other browser engines other than WebKit on iOS/iPadOS. Reddit,

    work page

  62. [62]

    https://www.reddit.com/r/ios/comments/18trk72/is there any actual reason why apple doesnt allow/

    work page

  63. [63]

    Surveillance intermediaries

    R OZENSHTEIN , A. Surveillance intermediaries. Stanford Law Review 70 (01 2018), 99–189

    work page 2018

  64. [64]

    Making messaging interoperability with third parties safe for users in Europe

    S ECURITY . Making messaging interoperability with third parties safe for users in Europe. Engineering at Meta, 2024. Permalink: https:// perma.cc/57JX-DCKN, URL https://engineering.fb.com/2024/03/06/ security/whatsapp-messenger-messaging-interoperability-eu/

    work page 2024

  65. [65]

    The new Lochner

    S HANOR , A. The new Lochner. Wisconsin law review 2016 (01 2016), 133–208

    work page 2016

  66. [66]

    Network externalities and app store fees in mobile platforms, 2021

    S INGH , A., H OSANAGAR , K., AND NEVO, A. Network externalities and app store fees in mobile platforms, 2021. Preprint available at SSRN

    work page 2021

  67. [67]

    Apple, google defeats to fuel EU’s crackdown on big tech

    S TOLTON , S. Apple, google defeats to fuel EU’s crackdown on big tech. Bloomberg, 2024

    work page 2024

  68. [68]

    Dis- rupting continuity of apple’s wireless ecosystem security: New track- ing, DoS, and MitM attacks on iOS and macOS through bluetooth low energy, AWDL, and Wi-Fi

    S TUTE , M., H EINRICH , A., L ORENZ , J., AND HOLLICK , M. Dis- rupting continuity of apple’s wireless ecosystem security: New track- ing, DoS, and MitM attacks on iOS and macOS through bluetooth low energy, AWDL, and Wi-Fi. In 30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 21) (Aug. 2021), USENIX Association, pp. 3917– 3934

    work page 2021

  69. [69]

    One Billion Apples' Secret Sauce: Recipe for the Apple Wireless Direct Link Ad hoc Protocol

    S TUTE , M., K REITSCHMANN , D., AND HOLLICK , M. One billion apples’ secret sauce: Recipe for the Apple Wireless Direct Link ad hoc protocol. CoRR abs/1808.03156 (2018)

    work page internal anchor Pith review Pith/arXiv arXiv 2018

  70. [70]

    A billion open interfaces for eve and mallory: MitM, DoS, and tracking attacks on iOS and macOS through apple wireless direct link

    S TUTE , M., N ARAIN , S., M ARIOTTO , A., H EINRICH , A., K RE- ITSCHMANN , D., N OUBIR , G., AND HOLLICK , M. A billion open interfaces for eve and mallory: MitM, DoS, and tracking attacks on iOS and macOS through apple wireless direct link. In 28th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 19) (Santa Clara, CA, Aug. 2019), USENIX Association, pp. 37–54

    work page 2019

  71. [71]

    Mobile browsers and cloud gaming market investigation, WP2: The requirement for browsers operating on iOS devices to use Apple’s WebKit browser engine

    T HE COMPETITION AND MARKETS AUTHORITY . Mobile browsers and cloud gaming market investigation, WP2: The requirement for browsers operating on iOS devices to use Apple’s WebKit browser engine. The Competition and Markets Authority, 2024

    work page 2024

  72. [72]

    Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neutrality Regulation, Oct

    VAN SCHEWICK , B. Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neutrality Regulation, Oct. 2005

    work page 2005

  73. [73]

    Network Neutrality and Quality of Service: What a Non-Discrimination Rule Should Look Like

    VAN SCHEWICK , B. Network Neutrality and Quality of Service: What a Non-Discrimination Rule Should Look Like. Stanford Law Review (June 2014)

    work page 2014

  74. [74]

    A fast, open source web browser engine

    W EBKIT. A fast, open source web browser engine. Permalink: https: //perma.cc/6FXU-98GZ, URL: webkit.org, 2025

    work page 2025

  75. [75]

    Regulating Interoperability: Lessons from AT&T, Mi- crosoft, and Beyond

    W EISER , P. Regulating Interoperability: Lessons from AT&T, Mi- crosoft, and Beyond. Antitrust Law Journal (Jan. 2009)

    work page 2009

  76. [76]

    Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination

    W U, T. Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination. J. on Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 2 (Jan. 2003), 141

    work page 2003

  77. [77]

    Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate

    W U, T., AND YOO, C. Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate. Federal Communications Law Journal 59 (2007)

    work page 2007

  78. [78]

    Y OO, C. S. Beyond network neutrality. Harvard Journal of Law & Technology (2005). Appendix Fee calculations comparing App Store Fee and CTF We briefly illustrate that the cost of paying the core technology fee (CTF) is not necessarily less expensive than the current 30% commission fee. Suppose there is an app that costs C1 and has no in-app purchases ava...

    work page 2005

  79. [79]

    How do interoperation and economic incentives clash (or not)? Network effects are more impor- tant than interoperation and Apple can use its green bubbles to push iPhone uptake Forcing third parties through exist- ing vetting means collecting fees opening that up could result in a loss of revenue Preventing interoperation keeps other developers from offer...

    work page

  80. [80]

    How do security arguments and economic incentives align (or not)? Interoperation could reduce uptake pressure and would be an engineer- ing challenge Being gatekeeper on security grounds coincides with extracting rent and keeping out competition If only in-house products can be trusted with certain features, no competitors can offer similar prod- ucts

    work page

Showing first 80 references.