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Safeguarding LLM Embeddings in End-Cloud Collaboration via Entropy-Driven Perturbation
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Recent studies improve on-device language model (LM) inference through end-cloud collaboration, where the end device retrieves useful information from cloud databases to enhance local processing, known as Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG). Typically, to retrieve information from the cloud while safeguarding privacy, the end device transforms original data into embeddings with a local embedding model. However, the recently emerging Embedding Inversion Attacks (EIAs) can still recover the original data from text embeddings (e.g., training a recovery model to map embeddings back to original texts), posing a significant threat to user privacy. To address this risk, we propose EntroGuard, an entropy-driven perturbation-based embedding privacy protection method, which can protect the privacy of text embeddings while maintaining retrieval accuracy during the end-cloud collaboration. Specifically, to defeat various EIAs, we perturb the embeddings to increase the entropy of the recovered text in the common structure of recovery models, thus steering the embeddings toward meaningless texts rather than original sensitive texts during the recovery process. To maintain retrieval performance in the cloud, we constrain the perturbations within a bound, applying the strategy of reducing them where redundant and increasing them where sparse. Moreover, EntroGuard can be directly integrated into end devices without requiring any modifications to the embedding model. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that EntroGuard can reduce the risk of privacy leakage by up to 8 times at most with negligible loss of retrieval performance compared to existing privacy-preserving methods.
Forward citations
Cited by 2 Pith papers
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SHARD: cell-keyed residual splitting for alignment-resistant private dense retrieval
SHARD shards private embedding residuals into cell-local keyed groups to raise the anchor requirement for alignment attacks by a factor of C while preserving full-dimensional nDCG@10 via encrypted reranking.
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Hybrid privacy-aware semantic search: SVD-truncated document geometry and CKKS-encrypted query reranking under a restricted threat model
SVD truncation plus a secret rotation on documents and CKKS on queries preserves sub-second retrieval quality while collapsing off-the-shelf inversion, with document protection failing under known-plaintext Procrustes...
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