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Minimum Cut Representability of Stable Matching Problems

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arxiv 2504.04577 v1 pith:U7DXWYP5 submitted 2025-04-06 math.OC cs.DM

classification math.OCcs.DM
keywords problemsminimumstablefeasibilityframeworkmatchingdifferentialsfunction
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We introduce and study Minimum Cut Representability, a framework to solve optimization and feasibility problems over stable matchings by representing them as minimum s-t cut problems on digraphs over rotations. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on objective functions and feasibility sets for problems to be minimum cut representable. In particular, we define the concepts of first and second order differentials of a function over stable matchings and show that a problem is minimum cut representable if and only if, roughly speaking, the objective function can be expressed solely using these differentials, and the feasibility set is a sublattice of the stable matching lattice. To demonstrate the practical relevance of our framework, we study a range of real-world applications, including problems involving school choice with siblings and a two-stage stochastic stable matching problem. We show how our framework can be used to help solving these problems.

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Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score.

  1. Maximally Diverse Stable Matchings: Optimizing Arbitrary Institutional Objectives

    cs.GT 2026-04 unverdicted novelty 7.0 of 10

    A general polynomial-time framework finds stable matchings that minimize utilitarian or egalitarian objectives for any polynomial-time computable set functions by reducing them to linear edge weights.

  2. Stable Matchings with Minimum Utility Gap

    cs.GT 2026-07 accept novelty 6.0 of 10

    Both the difference and ratio versions of minimizing the utility gap across agents in a many-to-many stable matching are solvable in O(n⁴ + n²T_v) time via rotation-poset chain structure and sliding-window feasibility...

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