A Review on Privacy in DAG-Based DLTs

Mayank Raikwar

REVIEW 4 major objections 4 minor 67 references

A Review on Privacy in DAG-Based DLTs

T0 review · 4 major / 4 minor · reviewed 2026-08-16 · deepseek-v4-flash

Challenge this review Re-run · record.json Download PDF Read on arXiv ↗ Review JSON

Pith's one-line read This review claims that privacy in DAG-based distributed ledgers has been largely overlooked, and it offers the first organized map of privacy notions, challenges, and cryptographic tools for these systems.

desk verdict Useful survey of privacy techniques for DAG-based ledgers, but the 'no prior work' novelty claim collapses against the paper's own reference list. read the letter →

arxiv 2504.15233 v1 pith:PNKSPB2I submitted 2025-04-21 cs.CR

Mayank Raikwar This is my paper · ORCID

classification cs.CR

keywords DAG-basedDLTdistributedledgerprivacyconfidentialityanonymityunlinkabilityzero-knowledgeproofstransactionmixingMEVresistance

verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

The pith

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The reading

Existing blockchains have a large body of privacy work, but DAG-based distributed ledgers were built for throughput and largely ignore privacy. This paper tries to close that gap by defining the three core privacy notions—confidentiality, anonymity/untraceability, and unlinkability—cataloging the obstacles created by the DAG structure, and mapping the cryptographic tools that could deliver privacy in these systems. The reason to care is practical: without privacy, DAG ledgers cannot serve applications that require confidential transactions, and public metadata exposes users to tracking, deanonymization, and manipulation of transaction ordering. If the paper is right, the missing piece is not new cryptography but focused engineering and research on applying known techniques to DAG-specific constraints.

What carries the argument

The analytical apparatus is a three-part taxonomy: the privacy notions (confidentiality, anonymity/untraceability, and unlinkability), the DAG-specific obstacles (tip selection, conflict resolution, performance, consensus, anonymization analysis, and attack vectors), and seven cryptographic solution families. The taxonomy is summarized in a matrix that lets each DAG-based DLT be assessed against which privacy notion it could satisfy and where it would break down, which is the mechanism that carries the survey's argument that privacy in DAG-based DLTs is an open and underexplored problem.

What would settle it

A systematic literature search with explicit databases, queries, and inclusion criteria that locates a published privacy-preserving DAG-based DLT—or a dedicated study of privacy notions in DAG-based DLTs—predating this review would refute the paper's central 'no prior work' claim. The paper's own examples, such as the privacy-aware IOTA ledger with decentralized mixing [31], set the bar: any predecessor satisfying unlinkability or anonymity would count.

Watch

Extended reading notes

Core claim

The paper's central claim is that no currently deployed DAG-based DLT is privacy-centric, and that, to the best of the author's knowledge, no prior work focuses on privacy notions in DAG-based DLTs. It argues that current DAG ledgers expose plaintext transaction data with pseudonymous addresses, so adversaries can track accounts through address reuse, taint analysis, transaction analysis, and metadata analysis. It then reviews seven families of cryptographic mechanisms used in blockchains—transaction mixing, zero-knowledge proofs, digital signatures, encryption, homomorphic encryption, anonymous broadcast, and trusted execution environments—and identifies where each could or already does provide privacy in DAG systems. The intended conclusion is that privacy in DAG-based DLTs is feasible but requires balancing DAG-specific consensus, performance, and conflict-resolution constraints.

Load-bearing premise

The survey's conclusion that no prior work focuses on privacy in DAG-based DLTs rests entirely on the author's literature search, and the paper gives no search methodology; if a relevant privacy-preserving DAG-based DLT or study was missed, the claimed gap and the state-of-the-art table are incomplete.

Editorial extensions

If this is right

Transaction mixing, zero-knowledge proofs, encryption, homomorphic encryption, anonymous broadcast, and trusted execution environments can each contribute at least one of the three privacy notions to DAG-based DLTs without inventing new cryptographic primitives.
Privacy in DAG ledgers directly reduces miner extractable value (MEV) attacks: hiding transaction contents before ordering makes transaction-order manipulation harder and improves fairness.
DAG-specific mechanisms—tip selection, conflict resolution, ordering, and consensus—are the points where privacy implementations break down, so privacy cannot be ported blindly from blockchains.
Current DAG-based systems with privacy features are few, for example Aleph Zero, Fino, MACT, Teegraph/TEEDAG, and privacy-aware IOTA and Nano mixers, confirming the paper's picture of an early-stage field.
A concrete research path is combining zero-knowledge proofs with signatures or encryption to reduce proof-generation cost while preserving privacy.

Reading between the lines

Editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

We infer that the 'no prior work' claim is best read as a gap claim about full DLT-level privacy rather than about individual privacy techniques, since the paper itself cites earlier work such as PDAG and privacy-aware IOTA mixing.
We infer that the same seven solution families can be tested immediately in DAG-based consensus protocols like Narwhal/Tusk and Bullshark, because their mempool and ordering layers already lend themselves to encrypted transactions and order-fairness.
We infer that the absence of a privacy-centric DAG DLT is a falsifiable prediction: the publication or release of such a system after this survey would directly change the landscape the paper describes.
We infer that the central research bottleneck is the privacy-versus-performance tradeoff, so benchmark studies of zero-knowledge proof and homomorphic encryption overhead on existing DAG systems would be a natural next step.

Share X Bluesky LinkedIn Reddit HN

Signed reviews

No signed human review yet.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, and a circularity audit.

Desk Editor's Note

read the letter

Read this as a catalog, not as a research claim. The survey is genuinely useful: it organizes privacy notions (confidentiality, anonymity, unlinkability), walks through the main techniques — mixing, ZKPs, signatures, encryption, homomorphic encryption, anonymous broadcast, TEEs — and for each gives challenges and instances in DAG-based DLTs. Table I is a handy snapshot, and the discussion of MEV resistance and performance trade-offs is a sensible framing. If you are new to privacy in DAG ledgers, this is a reasonable first stop.

The problem is the packaging. Section I-C says 'to the best of our knowledge, no prior work focuses on privacy notions in DAG-based DLTs,' and the paper leans on that to justify its existence. The stress-test note is right: the paper's own citations contradict it. [26] is a de-anonymization attack on IOTA's tip selection. [27] is a theoretical privacy analysis of IOTA. [30] and [31] propose mixers for IOTA privacy. [34] anonymizes Nano transactions. [52] and [53] are blockDAG systems using homomorphic encryption for transaction privacy. [58] is an anonymous consensus mechanism with a DAG ledger. Unless 'privacy notions' is narrowed to something like 'a systematic formal treatment of all three notions across the whole family,' the claim fails on contact. And there is no search methodology — no databases, inclusion criteria, or time window — so the negative claim is unreproducible.

There are also a couple of internal table/text inconsistencies. Table I's Homomorphic Encryption row says no existing instances, but Section IV-E names Dero [52] and Xelis [53] as working blockDAG applications. The Digital Signature row lists [48] as an existing instance, yet the text says no work exists on ring signatures in DAG-based DLTs and only suggests blind signatures as a possible fit for Fino [48]. These are fixable, but they underscore that the survey was assembled faster than it was checked.

None of this sinks the useful core. The synthesis is plausible and the topic is underserved. The fix is to reframe the contribution as 'a consolidated overview and mapping,' drop or soften the 'no prior work' assertion, add a short methodology paragraph, and reconcile the table with the text. With those changes it becomes a legitimate entry point for both researchers and practitioners.

Verdict: worth a serious referee, but it needs major revision before publication. If I were editing, I would send it out — surveys like this are valuable when they are honest about scope.

Referee Report

4 major / 4 minor

Summary. This paper is a review/survey of privacy in DAG-based distributed ledger technologies (DLTs). It informally defines three privacy notions (confidentiality, anonymity/unlinkability), discusses generic and DAG-specific privacy challenges, and surveys cryptographic mechanisms (transaction mixing, zero-knowledge proofs, digital signatures, encryption, homomorphic encryption, anonymous broadcast, and trusted execution environments). For each mechanism it lists privacy notions captured, challenges, existing instances, and possible instances in DAG-based DLTs. The paper's central claim, stated in Section I-C, is that "to the best of our knowledge, no prior work focuses on privacy notions in DAG-based DLTs," making this the first comprehensive examination of the area.

Significance. If the survey's claims were sustained, it would provide a useful entry point to privacy in DAG-based ledgers. The paper does offer a clear informal taxonomy of privacy notions, a structured review of cryptographic techniques with standard definitions, and a summary table (Table I) that could help practitioners and researchers map techniques to candidate DAG-based DLTs. The paper also correctly identifies several DAG-specific challenges (e.g., tip-selection privacy, conflict resolution with encrypted transactions, and performance overheads). However, the significance is substantially weakened by the overstated novelty claim: the paper's own references include multiple works that directly address privacy notions in DAG-structured ledgers. Moreover, no literature-search methodology is provided, so the survey's completeness claims cannot be independently assessed. These issues are fixable with a more careful framing and greater methodological transparency, but as written they undermine the central contribution.

major comments (4)

[Section I-C] The central novelty claim, "to the best of our knowledge, no prior work focuses on privacy notions in DAG-based DLTs," is contradicted by several works cited in the same paper. Section III-A cites Yang et al. [26] on a deanonymization attack against IOTA tip selection and proposes improvements to IOTA light-node privacy; Section III-E cites Tennant [27] on theoretical privacy analyses in IOTA; Section IV-A cites Sarfraz et al. [31] for a privacy-aware IOTA ledger providing unlinkability, and Werner et al. [34] for anonymizing Nano transactions; Section IV-E names Dero [52] and Xelis [53] as blockDAG systems using homomorphic encryption for transaction privacy; Section IV-F lists MACT [58], an anonymous consensus mechanism whose ledger is a DAG, and Teegraph [61]/TEEDAG [62] using TEEs for confidentiality. These works address Definitions 2-4 in DAG-structured ledgers. Unless "privacy notions" is arbitrarily narrowed to exclude these, the claim is false. The paper should either reject the claim or qualify it, e.g., by stating that no prior work offers a comprehensive cross-system survey of privacy in DAG-based DLTs.
[Methodology (abstract and Section I-C)] The paper claims to provide a "comprehensive examination" and a state-of-the-art table (Table I), but no search methodology is reported. There is no description of databases queried, search strings, inclusion/exclusion criteria, or the time window of the literature search. Without such information, neither the completeness of Table I nor the negative gap claim can be assessed by readers or reviewers. A review paper making a negative claim about the absence of prior work should document its search strategy.
[Section IV-E vs Table I] Table I lists Homomorphic Encryption with no existing instances ("-"), but Section IV-E explicitly states that "there have been a few works in DLTs using blockDAG structure that employ homomorphic encryption to provide privacy on transaction data [52], [53]" and names Dero and Xelis. This is an internal inconsistency. The table should list these works (or the text should clarify why blockDAG systems are excluded from the table, and state that criterion explicitly).
[Section I-B] The final sentence of Section I-B says that "in the current landscape of DAG-based DLT, the solutions and the associated challenges to achieve privacy notions have not been explored." This is a similarly broad negative assertion that is contradicted by the cited works in Sections III and IV. Please harmonize all novelty claims across the paper; as written, the repeated overstatement will mislead readers about the state of the art.

minor comments (4)

[Throughout] The manuscript contains typographical artifacts (e.g., "blockcha ins" and "Y et" in the abstract, "speciﬁcally" in the introduction) and inconsistent spelling of author names ("Sarfaraz" in Section IV-A vs. "Sarfraz" in reference [31]). Please proofread and standardize.
[Reference [51]] The year for Zama is given as "20123"; it should be "2023".
[Section IV-C/Table I] Table I lists [48] (Fino) under existing instances for Digital Signature, but the text in Section IV-C describes Fino only as a possible instance where blind signatures could be applied; the same work is also cited under Encryption (Section IV-D), where encrypted mempool transactions are described. Please clarify whether [48] is an existing digital-signature-based privacy implementation or an encryption-based one, and adjust the table accordingly.
[Section II-A] In the discussion of anonymity, "untraceable" is used where "unlinkable to identity" may be more precise given Definitions 2-4; consider aligning the terminology throughout for consistency.

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged · score 0.0 of 10

No circularity: the paper is a survey with no derivation chain, predictions, or fitted parameters; the sole self-citation is definitional and not load-bearing.

full rationale

This manuscript is a literature review on privacy in DAG-based DLTs. It contains no formal derivation, no fitted parameters, no empirical prediction, and no construction whose output equals its input by definition. The only self-citation is [16], the author's prior SoK on DAG-based consensus protocols, which is used to give a standard definition of a DAG-based DLT (Definition 1). This citation is not load-bearing for any privacy claim: the survey's content about privacy notions, challenges, solutions, and instances is assembled from a broad set of external references ([26], [27], [31], [34], [37], [48], [52], [53], [58], [61], [62], etc.). The central novelty assertion in Section I-C, that 'to the best of our knowledge, no prior work focuses on privacy notions in DAG-based DLTs,' is a completeness claim about the literature, not a derived result from the paper's own assumptions. Even if that claim is debatable or internally tensioned by the paper's own cited privacy-focused works on IOTA, Nano, blockDAG, and DAG-based anonymous consensus, a questionable literature-search claim is a correctness or completeness risk, not circularity. No equation is reused as its own output, no cited uniqueness theorem is imported from the authors to force a choice, and no ansatz is smuggled in via a self-citation. Accordingly, the circularity score is 0.

Assumptions & free parameters 0 free parameters · 3 assumptions · 0 invented entities

This is a review paper; it introduces no fitted parameters and no new entities. The survey rests on standard cryptographic definitions and on assumptions about the completeness of the cited literature.

assumptions (3)

domain assumption The definition of a DAG-based DLT (Definition 1) accurately characterizes the systems surveyed.
The definition is taken from the author's own previous SoK [16] and is used to delimit the scope of the survey.
domain assumption The surveyed list of projects (Aleph Zero, Hashgraph, IOTA, Obyte, Nano, Vite, etc.) is representative and complete.
The review's central claim that no privacy-centric DAG DLT exists relies on this completeness assumption.
standard math Standard cryptographic definitions (ZKP, signatures, encryption) are assumed correct from the literature.
Definitions 5-8 are reproduced from prior work and not proved in the paper.

how reviews work

0 comments

Cite this review

Pith. "Pith review of A Review on Privacy in DAG-Based DLTs." pith.science (2026). https://pith.science/paper/PNKSPB2I

@misc{pith2026250415233,
  author       = {Pith},
  title        = {Pith review of: A Review on Privacy in DAG-Based DLTs},
  year         = {2026},
  howpublished = {\url{https://pith.science/paper/PNKSPB2I}},
  note         = {Machine review of arXiv:2504.15233}
}

read the original abstract

Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG)-based Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) have emerged as a promising solution to the scalability issues inherent in traditional blockchains. However, amidst the focus on scalability, the crucial aspect of privacy within DAG-based DLTs has been largely overlooked. This paper seeks to address this gap by providing a comprehensive examination of privacy notions and challenges within DAG-based DLTs. We delve into potential methodologies to enhance privacy within these systems, while also analyzing the associated hurdles and real-world implementations within state-of-the-art DAG-based DLTs. By exploring these methodologies, we not only illuminate the current landscape of privacy in DAG-based DLTs but also outline future research directions in this evolving field.

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

67 extracted references · 65 canonical work pages

[26]

A Tip for IOTA Privacy: IOTA Light Node Deanonymization via Tip Selection

H. Y ang, S. Lee, and S. Kim, “A tip for iota privacy: Iota l ight node deanonymization via tip selection,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.11171 , 2024

work page Pith review arXiv 2024
[27]

Improving the anonymity of the iota crypto currency,

L. Tennant, “Improving the anonymity of the iota crypto currency,” Univ. Cambridge, Cambridge, UK, Tech. Rep , pp. 10–09, 2017

work page 2017
[30]

The tangle,

S. Popov, “The tangle,” White paper , vol. 1, no. 3, p. 30, 2018

work page 2018
[31]

Privacy a ware iota ledger: Decentralized mixing and unlinkable iota transact ions,

U. Sarfraz, M. Alam, S. Zeadally, and A. Khan, “Privacy a ware iota ledger: Decentralized mixing and unlinkable iota transact ions,” Com- puter Networks , vol. 148, pp. 361–372, 2019

work page 2019
[34]

Anonymization of transactions in distributed ledger technologies,

R. Werner, S. Lawrenz, and A. Rausch, “Anonymization of transactions in distributed ledger technologies,” in ADAPTIVE, 2020

work page 2020
[52]

Dlattice: A permission-les s blockchain based on dpos-ba-dag consensus for data tokenization,

T. Zhou, X. Li, and H. Zhao, “Dlattice: A permission-les s blockchain based on dpos-ba-dag consensus for data tokenization,” IEEE Access , vol. 7, pp. 39 273–39 287, 2019

work page 2019
[53]

A private blockdag using homomorphic encrypti on with smart contract support,

Xelis, “A private blockdag using homomorphic encrypti on with smart contract support,” 2024. [Online]. Available: https://xe lis.io

work page 2024
[58]

Nano [35], Vite [36], CDAG [47], Caper [46] Trusted Execution Environment Conﬁdentiality In performance [61], [62] Tusk [63], Bullshark [64], Fino [48]

work page
[48]

Hashgraph [39], Caper [46], Jointgraph [45], CDAG [47] Encryption Conﬁdentiality In conﬂict resolution [39], [48], [49] Nano [35], Vite [36], DLattice [50], Caper [46] Homomorphic Encryption Conﬁdentiality In performance – – Anonymous Broadcast Unlinkability Anonymity In attack vectors In anonymization

work page
[61]

Mact: A multi -channel anonymous consensus based on tor,

X. Li, Z. Zheng, P . Cheng, J. Li, and L. Y ou, “Mact: A multi -channel anonymous consensus based on tor,” W orld Wide W eb, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 1005–1029, 2023

work page 2023
[62]

Teedag: a high-throughput distribu ted ledger based on tee and directed acyclic graph,

X. Lu and C. Jiang, “Teedag: a high-throughput distribu ted ledger based on tee and directed acyclic graph,” Electronics, vol. 12, no. 11, p. 2393, 2023

work page 2023

Show all 67 references

[1]

[Online]

The Monero Project, “Monero,” 2014. [Online]. Availabl e: https://web.getmonero.org

2014
[2]

Zerocash: Decentralized anonymous payments fro m bitcoin,

E. B. Sasson, A. Chiesa, C. Garman, M. Green, I. Miers, E. T romer, and M. Virza, “Zerocash: Decentralized anonymous payments fro m bitcoin,” in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy . IEEE, 2014, pp. 459–474

2014
[3]

Zether: To wards privacy in a smart contract world,

B. B¨ unz, S. Agrawal, M. Zamani, and D. Boneh, “Zether: To wards privacy in a smart contract world,” in International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security . Springer, 2020, pp. 423– 443

2020
[4]

Pribank: conﬁdentia l blockchain scaling using short commit-and-proof nizk argument,

K. Gjøsteen, M. Raikwar, and S. Wu, “Pribank: conﬁdentia l blockchain scaling using short commit-and-proof nizk argument,” in Cryptogra- phers’ Track at the RSA Conference . Springer, 2022, pp. 589–619

2022
[5]

A sur vey on zero-knowledge proof in blockchain,

X. Sun, F. R. Y u, P . Zhang, Z. Sun, W. Xie, and X. Peng, “A sur vey on zero-knowledge proof in blockchain,” IEEE network, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 198–205, 2021

2021
[6]

Ringct 2.0: A compact accumulator-based (linkable ring signature) protocol for blockchain cryptocurrency monero,

S.-F. Sun, M. H. Au, J. K. Liu, and T. H. Y uen, “Ringct 2.0: A compact accumulator-based (linkable ring signature) protocol for blockchain cryptocurrency monero,” in Computer Security–ESORICS 2017: 22nd European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Oslo, Norway, Septem...

2017
[7]

On t he anonymity guarantees of anonymous proof-of-stake protoco ls,

M. Kohlweiss, V . Madathil, K. Nayak, and A. Scafuro, “On t he anonymity guarantees of anonymous proof-of-stake protoco ls,” in 2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy . IEEE, 2021, pp. 1818–1833

2021
[8]

Blind perm: Efﬁcient mev mitigation with an encrypted mempool and permu tation,

A. Kavousi, D. V . Le, P . Jovanovic, and G. Danezis, “Blind perm: Efﬁcient mev mitigation with an encrypted mempool and permu tation,” Cryptology ePrint Archive , 2023

2023
[9]

Computing blindfolded: New develo pments in fully homomorphic encryption,

V . V aikuntanathan, “Computing blindfolded: New develo pments in fully homomorphic encryption,” in 2011 IEEE 52nd Annual Symposium on F oundations of Computer Science . IEEE, 2011, pp. 5–16

2011
[10]

Non-interactive and information-the oretic secure ver- iﬁable secret sharing,

T. P . Pedersen, “Non-interactive and information-the oretic secure ver- iﬁable secret sharing,” in Annual international cryptology conference . Springer, 1991, pp. 129–140

1991
[11]

Decentralizing privacy: Using blockchain to protect personal data,

G. Zyskind, O. Nathan et al., “Decentralizing privacy: Using blockchain to protect personal data,” in 2015 IEEE security and privacy workshops . IEEE, 2015, pp. 180–184

2015
[12]

Differential p rivacy in blockchain technology: A futuristic approach,

M. U. Hassan, M. H. Rehmani, and J. Chen, “Differential p rivacy in blockchain technology: A futuristic approach,” Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing , vol. 145, pp. 50–74, 2020

2020
[13]

Preserving transact ion privacy in bitcoin,

Q. Wang, B. Qin, J. Hu, and F. Xiao, “Preserving transact ion privacy in bitcoin,” Future Generation Computer Systems , vol. 107, pp. 793–804, 2020

2020
[14]

Security and privacy on blo ckchain,

R. Zhang, R. Xue, and L. Liu, “Security and privacy on blo ckchain,” ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR) , vol. 52, no. 3, pp. 1–34, 2019

2019
[15]

A su rvey on privacy protection in blockchain system,

Q. Feng, D. He, S. Zeadally, M. K. Khan, and N. Kumar, “A su rvey on privacy protection in blockchain system,” Journal of network and computer applications, vol. 126, pp. 45–58, 2019

2019
[16]

Sok: Dag-ba sed consensus protocols,

M. Raikwar, N. Polyanskii, and S. M¨ uller, “Sok: Dag-ba sed consensus protocols,” in 2024 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC) . IEEE, 2024, pp. 1–18

2024
[17]

A transact ion-level model for blockchain privacy,

F.-X. Wicht, Z. Wang, D. V . Le, and C. Cachin, “A transact ion-level model for blockchain privacy,” Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/1902, 2023. [Online]. Available: https://eprint .iacr.org/2023/1902

2023
[18]

Flash boys 2.0: Frontrunning in decentralize d exchanges, miner extractable value, and consensus instability,

P . Daian, S. Goldfeder, T. Kell, Y . Li, X. Zhao, I. Bentov, L. Breidenbach, and A. Juels, “Flash boys 2.0: Frontrunning in decentralize d exchanges, miner extractable value, and consensus instability,” in 2020 IEEE Sym- posium on Security and Privacy (SP) . IEEE, 2020, pp. 910–927

2020
[19]

Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system,

S. Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system,” Whitepa- per, 2008

2008
[20]

Proof-of-stake consensus mechanisms f or future blockchain networks: fundamentals, applications and oppo rtunities,

C. T. Nguyen, D. T. Hoang, D. N. Nguyen, D. Niyato, H. T. Ng uyen, and E. Dutkiewicz, “Proof-of-stake consensus mechanisms f or future blockchain networks: fundamentals, applications and oppo rtunities,” IEEE access , vol. 7, pp. 85 727–85 745, 2019

2019
[21]

Fabzk: Supporting privacy-preserving, auditable smart contracts in hyperle dger fabric,

H. Kang, T. Dai, N. Jean-Louis, S. Tao, and X. Gu, “Fabzk: Supporting privacy-preserving, auditable smart contracts in hyperle dger fabric,” in 2019 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dep endable Systems and Networks (DSN) . IEEE, 2019, pp. 543–555. TABLE I SUMM...

2019
[22]

An a uditable conﬁdentiality protocol for blockchain transactions,

A. Li, G. D’Angelo, S.-K. Tang, F. Fang, and B. Gong, “An a uditable conﬁdentiality protocol for blockchain transactions,” Available at SSRN 4345556, 2023

2023
[23]

Solidus: Conﬁdential distributed ledger transactions via pvorm,

E. Cecchetti, F. Zhang, Y . Ji, A. Kosba, A. Juels, and E. S hi, “Solidus: Conﬁdential distributed ledger transactions via pvorm,” i n Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communicatio ns Security, 2017, pp. 701–717

2017
[24]

{zkLedger}:{Privacy- Preserving} auditing for distributed ledgers,

N. Narula, W. V asquez, and M. Virza, “ {zkLedger}:{Privacy- Preserving} auditing for distributed ledgers,” in 15th USENIX symposium on networked systems design and implementation (NSDI 18) , 2018, pp. 65–80

2018
[25]

Privacy-preserving audit able token payments in a permissioned blockchain system,

E. Androulaki, J. Camenisch, A. D. Caro, M. Dubovitskay a, K. Elkhiyaoui, and B. Tackmann, “Privacy-preserving audit able token payments in a permissioned blockchain system,” in Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies , 2020, pp. 255–267

2020
[28]

Sybil-resistant mixing for bitcoin,

G. Bissias, A. P . Ozisik, B. N. Levine, and M. Liberatore , “Sybil-resistant mixing for bitcoin,” in Proceedings of the 13th W orkshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society , 2014, pp. 149–158

2014
[29]

Blackbytes,

Obyte, “Blackbytes,” 2016. [Online]. Available: https://obyte.org/platform/blackbytes

2016
[32]

Iota: multisig explained,

A.B. Mushi, “Iota: multisig explained,” 2018, accessed: 17.04.2024. [Online]. Available: https://medium.com/@abmushi/iota-multisig-explained-bca334d250a2

2018
[33]

Coinshufﬂe : Practical decentralized coin mixing for bitcoin,

T. Rufﬁng, P . Moreno-Sanchez, and A. Kate, “Coinshufﬂe : Practical decentralized coin mixing for bitcoin,” in Computer Security - ESORICS 2014, M. Kutyłowski and J. V aidya, Eds. Cham: Springer Internati onal Publishing, 2014, pp. 345–364

2014
[35]

Nano: A feeless distributed cryptocurre ncy network,

C. LeMahieu, “Nano: A feeless distributed cryptocurre ncy network,” https://nano. org/en/whitepaper, vol. 16, p. 17, 2018

2018
[36]

Vite: A high performance asyn chronous decentralized application platform,

C. Liu, D. Wang, and M. Wu, “Vite: A high performance asyn chronous decentralized application platform,” White Paper, 2018

2018
[37]

Fundamentals: Aleph zero and its dag implemen tation,

A. Zero, “Fundamentals: Aleph zero and its dag implemen tation,” 2021. [Online]. Available: https://alephzero .org/blog/aleph-zero-dag/

2021
[38]

A snarkos,

E. Labs, “A snarkos,” 2021. [Online]. Available: https://equilibrium.co/projects/SnarkOS

2021
[39]

The hashgraph protocol: Efﬁcien t asynchronous bft for high-throughput distributed ledgers,

L. Baird and A. Luykx, “The hashgraph protocol: Efﬁcien t asynchronous bft for high-throughput distributed ledgers,” in COINS. IEEE, 2020, pp. 1–7

2020
[40]

Guardian v2. 0: the next generation of esg ma rketplaces built. hedera,

D. Norkin, “Guardian v2. 0: the next generation of esg ma rketplaces built. hedera,” 2022

2022
[41]

Exploring interoperability and scala bility in dag-based distributed ledger technologies: A case study of relay impl ementation,

P . Greitbauer, “Exploring interoperability and scala bility in dag-based distributed ledger technologies: A case study of relay impl ementation,” Ph.D. dissertation, Wien, 2023

2023
[42]

The coordicide,

S. Popov, H. Moog, D. Camargo, A. Capossele, V . Dimitrov , A. Gal, A. Greve, B. Kusmierz, S. Mueller, A. Penzkofer et al., “The coordicide,” Accessed Jan , vol. 12, no. 18, pp. 1–30, 2020

2020
[43]

How to leak a secr et,

R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and Y . Tauman, “How to leak a secr et,” in Advances in Cryptology — ASIACRYPT 2001 , C. Boyd, Ed. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2001, pp. 552–565

2001
[44]

Chaum, Blind Signature System

D. Chaum, Blind Signature System . Boston, MA: Springer US, 1984, pp. 153–153. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-4730-9 14

1984 doi
[45]

Jointgraph: A dag-based efﬁcient consensus algorithm for consortium bl ockchains,

F. Xiang, W. Huaimin, S. Peichang, O. Xue, and Z. Xunhui, “Jointgraph: A dag-based efﬁcient consensus algorithm for consortium bl ockchains,” Software: Practice and Experience , 2021

2021
[46]

Caper: a cross - application permissioned blockchain,

M. J. Amiri, D. Agrawal, and A. E. Abbadi, “Caper: a cross - application permissioned blockchain,” Proceedings of the VLDB Endow- ment, vol. 12, no. 11, pp. 1385–1398, 2019

2019
[47]

Cdag: A serialized blockdag for permis- sioned blockchain,

H. Gupta and D. Janakiram, “Cdag: A serialized blockdag for permis- sioned blockchain,” preprint arXiv:1910.08547, 2019

1910 arXiv
[49]

Byteball: A decentralized system for st orage and transfer of value,

A. Churyumov, “Byteball: A decentralized system for st orage and transfer of value,” URL https://byteball. org/Byteball. pdf , p. 11, 2016

2016
[50]

Maximal extractable va lue (mev) protection on a dag,

D. Malkhi and P . Szalachowski, “Maximal extractable va lue (mev) protection on a dag,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2208.00940 , 2022

2022 arXiv
[51]

Programmable privacy for the evm,

Zama, “Programmable privacy for the evm,” 20123, onlin e accessed: 29.04.2024. [Online]. Available: https://www .zama.ai/fhevm

2024
[54]

Dhebp - dero homomorphic encryption blockchain protocol,

Dero, “Dhebp - dero homomorphic encryption blockchain protocol,”
[55]

Broadcast anonymous routing (bar): scalable real-time anonymous com munica- tion,

P . Kotzanikolaou, G. Chatzisofroniou, and M. Burmeste r, “Broadcast anonymous routing (bar): scalable real-time anonymous com munica- tion,” International Journal of Information Security , vol. 16, pp. 313– 326, 2017

2017
[56]

C ryptography from anonymity,

Y . Ishai, E. Kushilevitz, R. Ostrovsky, and A. Sahai, “C ryptography from anonymity,” in FOCS. IEEE, 2006, pp. 239–248

2006
[57]

A public key cryptosystem and a signature s cheme based on discrete logarithms,

T. ElGamal, “A public key cryptosystem and a signature s cheme based on discrete logarithms,” IEEE transactions on information theory , vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 469–472, 1985

1985
[59]

Intel sgx explained,

V . Costan and S. Devadas, “Intel sgx explained,” Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2016

2016
[60]

Bitcoin over tor isn’t a good idea,

A. Biryukov and I. Pustogarov, “Bitcoin over tor isn’t a good idea,” in 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy , 2015, pp. 122–134

2015
[63]

Demystifying arm trustzone: A c omprehensive survey,

S. Pinto and N. Santos, “Demystifying arm trustzone: A c omprehensive survey,” ACM computing surveys (CSUR) , vol. 51, no. 6, pp. 1–36, 2019

2019
[64]

Teegraph: A blockch ain consensus algorithm based on tee and dag for data sharing in i ot,

X. Fu, H. Wang, P . Shi, and X. Zhang, “Teegraph: A blockch ain consensus algorithm based on tee and dag for data sharing in i ot,” Journal of Systems Architecture , vol. 122, p. 102344, 2022

2022
[66]

Nar- whal and tusk: a dag-based mempool and efﬁcient bft consensu s,

G. Danezis, L. Kokoris-Kogias, A. Sonnino, and A. Spieg elman, “Nar- whal and tusk: a dag-based mempool and efﬁcient bft consensu s,” in Proceedings of the Seventeenth European Conference on Comp uter Systems, 2022, pp. 34–50

2022
[67]

Bullshark: Dag bft protocols made practical,

A. Spiegelman, N. Giridharan, A. Sonnino, and L. Kokori s-Kogias, “Bullshark: Dag bft protocols made practical,” in Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2022, pp. 2705–2718

2022
[2020]

Available: https://dero .io

[Online]. Available: https://dero .io

Pith tools

Reviewed August 16, 2026 · model on record in the stance chip above.

[1] [26]

A Tip for IOTA Privacy: IOTA Light Node Deanonymization via Tip Selection

H. Y ang, S. Lee, and S. Kim, “A tip for iota privacy: Iota l ight node deanonymization via tip selection,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.11171 , 2024

work page Pith review arXiv 2024

[2] [27]

Improving the anonymity of the iota crypto currency,

L. Tennant, “Improving the anonymity of the iota crypto currency,” Univ. Cambridge, Cambridge, UK, Tech. Rep , pp. 10–09, 2017

work page 2017

[3] [30]

The tangle,

S. Popov, “The tangle,” White paper , vol. 1, no. 3, p. 30, 2018

work page 2018

[4] [31]

Privacy a ware iota ledger: Decentralized mixing and unlinkable iota transact ions,

U. Sarfraz, M. Alam, S. Zeadally, and A. Khan, “Privacy a ware iota ledger: Decentralized mixing and unlinkable iota transact ions,” Com- puter Networks , vol. 148, pp. 361–372, 2019

work page 2019

[5] [34]

Anonymization of transactions in distributed ledger technologies,

R. Werner, S. Lawrenz, and A. Rausch, “Anonymization of transactions in distributed ledger technologies,” in ADAPTIVE, 2020

work page 2020

[6] [52]

Dlattice: A permission-les s blockchain based on dpos-ba-dag consensus for data tokenization,

T. Zhou, X. Li, and H. Zhao, “Dlattice: A permission-les s blockchain based on dpos-ba-dag consensus for data tokenization,” IEEE Access , vol. 7, pp. 39 273–39 287, 2019

work page 2019

[7] [53]

A private blockdag using homomorphic encrypti on with smart contract support,

Xelis, “A private blockdag using homomorphic encrypti on with smart contract support,” 2024. [Online]. Available: https://xe lis.io

work page 2024

[8] [58]

Nano [35], Vite [36], CDAG [47], Caper [46] Trusted Execution Environment Conﬁdentiality In performance [61], [62] Tusk [63], Bullshark [64], Fino [48]

work page

[9] [48]

Hashgraph [39], Caper [46], Jointgraph [45], CDAG [47] Encryption Conﬁdentiality In conﬂict resolution [39], [48], [49] Nano [35], Vite [36], DLattice [50], Caper [46] Homomorphic Encryption Conﬁdentiality In performance – – Anonymous Broadcast Unlinkability Anonymity In attack vectors In anonymization

work page

[10] [61]

Mact: A multi -channel anonymous consensus based on tor,

X. Li, Z. Zheng, P . Cheng, J. Li, and L. Y ou, “Mact: A multi -channel anonymous consensus based on tor,” W orld Wide W eb, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 1005–1029, 2023

work page 2023

[11] [62]

Teedag: a high-throughput distribu ted ledger based on tee and directed acyclic graph,

X. Lu and C. Jiang, “Teedag: a high-throughput distribu ted ledger based on tee and directed acyclic graph,” Electronics, vol. 12, no. 11, p. 2393, 2023

work page 2023