Pith. sign in

REVIEW 5 major objections 4 minor 50 references

Detecting Manipulated Contents Using Knowledge-Grounded Inference

T0 review · 5 major / 4 minor · reviewed 2026-08-16 · deepseek-v4-flash

Pith's one-line read Manicod detects zero-day manipulated news by grounding LLM claims in live web retrieval, reaching F1 0.856 without fine-tuning.

desk verdict Useful dataset and a sensible RAG pipeline, but the headline F1 and the 1.9x gains are not established because the prompt was tuned on the test set and baselines were not re-run on the filtered tasks. read the letter →

arxiv 2504.21165 v1 pith:64QYWSVW submitted 2025-04-29 cs.CL cs.SI

classification cs.CLcs.SI
keywords manipulatedcontentdetectionzero-dayfakenewsretrieval-augmentedgenerationlargelanguagemodelsfact-checkingclaimverificationheadlinedatasetknowledge-groundedinference
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

The pith

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The reading

Manicod is a tool for detecting manipulated content: fake news built from a true recent event by a small edit, such as changing a casualty number or negating a headline's sentiment. The paper's central claim is that such zero-day manipulated content, which cannot be known from a model's training cutoff, becomes detectable when the model is fed live web context about the event. The system searches the claim, vectorizes the top three pages with retrieval-augmented generation, and asks an open LLM to find contradictions, altered facts, or numerical exaggerations, then to explain its 'True' or 'False' verdict. On a new dataset of 4,270 manipulated headlines derived from 2,500 real 2024 news headlines, the tool reaches F1 0.856, and it beats existing fact-checkers by up to 1.9x F1 on four public benchmarks. If correct, this points to grounding rather than ever-larger training data as the way to keep up with fast-moving misinformation.

What carries the argument

The load-bearing mechanism is the two-phase grounding loop. In the first phase, the input claim is sent to a mainstream search engine, the top $k=3$ URLs are crawled, and the raw text is chunked, embedded, and stored in a vector database so a small pre-trained LLM can be given relevant context despite token limits. In the second phase, a carefully engineered prompt tells the LLM to reason first and decide last: answer 'False' only when it finds a contradiction, a factual mistake, or altered context such as number, person, location, or date, and answer 'True' when no evidence of manipulation exists; the output must end in exactly the word 'True' or 'False' and include a textual explanation. The dataset-generation pipeline is part of the same machinery: the same LLM produces sentiment reversals and extracts key context slots, while human reviewers replace those slots so the altered headlines are factually false. For context-altered fake news, a correct detection is required to name both the original context and its replacement, making the explanation auditable.

What would settle it

Serve Manicod a true recent headline whose live search results contain a plausible but incorrect figure, such as a casualty count lower than the real one. If the system labels the true headline 'False' because of that contradiction, the retrieved-context-is-truth assumption, not the inference, is carrying the decision. A complementary test: feed a deliberately manipulated headline with only unrelated web results; a genuinely grounded detector should not produce a contradiction-based 'False' verdict.

Watch

Extended reading notes

Core claim

The paper argues that the veracity of recent-event claims is not inferable from parameter knowledge alone; what makes a claim decidable is external, temporally current context. Manicod operationalizes this by retrieving live search results for the claim, vectorizing the top documents into a retrieval store, and prompting an LLM to reason over the retrieved chunks and output an explanation ending in exactly 'True' or 'False'. The decision rule is deliberately asymmetric: the model must answer 'False' when it finds any contradiction, factual mistake, or inconsistent context such as number, quantity, person, or location, and must answer 'True' when it cannot find evidence of manipulation. The ablation supports the central claim: without live retrieval, Llama 3.1 and GPT-4o-mini score much lower on the same recent-news claims, such as 43.4% and 57.9% accuracy on the true headlines versus 65.7% with retrieval. The paper also contributes a dataset of 2,500 true headlines plus 4,270 simulated manipulations produced by sentiment reversal and context alteration, with human review ensuring the altered headlines genuinely contradict ground truth.

Load-bearing premise

The load-bearing premise is the paper's explicit assumption that the knowledge retrieved from the Internet is true: if the top search results are wrong, outdated, or irrelevant, then the 'contradiction' the LLM cites is not evidence that the claim is manipulated, and a 'False' verdict is invalid.

Editorial extensions

If this is right

  • Zero-day manipulated content is detectable without any fine-tuning or task-specific training: the same pre-trained LLM becomes a veracity judge the moment current context is supplied.
  • The ablation implies that for recent events, intrinsic knowledge alone is not enough: direct Llama 3.1 got 43.4% accuracy on true 2024 headlines, and direct GPT-4o-mini got 57.9%, versus 65.7% with retrieval.
  • The pipeline generalizes beyond manipulated news to fabricated and rumor-style claims, beating prior systems on COVID-Scientific, FEVER, RAWFC, and LIAR-RAW with up to 1.9x F1 improvement.
  • An auditable output is part of the detection contract: for context-altered fake news, a correct detection must name the original context and its replacement, not merely say 'False'.
  • The released dataset of 4,270 simulated manipulations, built from 2,500 real 2024 headlines, gives future detectors a common benchmark for zero-day fake news.

Reading between the lines

Editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • A direct extension the paper leaves implicit: the retriever-in-the-loop design should transfer to any claim domain whose ground truth changes faster than model releases, such as election counts, disease advisories, or financial statements, as long as authoritative pages are searchable.
  • The reported asymmetry (93.9% accuracy on sentiment reversals, 91.0% on context alterations, but 65.7% on true headlines) suggests the detector's practical failure mode is false alarms on true but rapidly updated news; one testable fix would be a confidence floor or an 'unverifiable' output when retrieved pages disagree.
  • Since the verdict 'False' requires a contradiction in retrieved context, an attacker who can manipulate the top search results for a narrow event could in principle flip verdicts; measuring this would require a red-team study where the context database is deliberately poisoned and accuracy is re-measured.
  • The authors' observation that exact prompt wording changes behavior implies the reported F1 is partly a property of the prompt, not only of retrieval; an extension would evaluate the same pipeline across prompt variants and LLMs to separate grounding gains from prompt-tuning gains.
Share X Bluesky LinkedIn Reddit HN

Signed reviews

No signed human review yet.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, and a circularity audit.

Referee Report

5 major / 4 minor

Summary. The paper proposes MANICOD, a two-phase pipeline for detecting manipulated news content about recent ('zero-day') events. In Phase 1, the user's claim is sent to a search engine via SerpAPI, the top-k pages are crawled and chunked, and the chunks are embedded with nomic-embed-text into a ChromaDB vector store. In Phase 2, the retrieved chunks are fed as RAG context to Llama 3.1 (8b), which produces a binary veracity decision (True/False) and a natural-language explanation. To evaluate, the authors construct a dataset of 4,270 manipulated headlines derived from 2,500 real news headlines collected from RSS feeds over 20 days in 2024, using sentiment reversal and context alteration. They report an overall F1 of 0.856 on this dataset, an ablation showing large gains over Llama 3.1 and GPT-4o-mini without retrieval, and comparisons on COVID-Scientific, FEVER, LIAR-RAW, and RAWFC where they claim up to 1.9x F1 improvements over prior work.

Significance. If the reported results were trustworthy, MANICOD would be a useful contribution: it targets a real gap (verifying claims about events newer than a model's training cutoff), it is fully automated and explainable, and the ablation in Table 1 does suggest that retrieval helps. The authors also deserve credit for a thoughtfully constructed dataset, for reporting non-conclusive LLM outputs conservatively, and for a candid Limitations section that acknowledges prompt sensitivity and the assumption that retrieved knowledge is true. However, the headline F1 and the benchmark comparisons are not established by the evaluation as described. The prompt was tuned on difficult evaluation cases, the negation test set was generated by the same model family used for detection, and the multi-class benchmarks were filtered and evidence-augmented without re-running the baselines. These are load-bearing threats to the central claims, not merely missing ablations.

major comments (5)
  1. [Section 3 and Section 5.1 (Figure 3)] The prompt template is selected by a 'continuous tuning process' in which the authors 'repeatedly instruct LLMs with hard cases that tend to result in different predictions until we find a prompt that is stable and yields a reasonable performance.' No held-out split or nested validation is described. The reported F1 of 0.856 is therefore an optimistic in-sample estimate: the prompt is effectively fit to the evaluation distribution. To support the zero-day generalization claim, the prompt must be frozen before any test-set interactions, or the evaluation must use a separate validation split for prompt development and a held-out test split for reporting.
  2. [Section 4 and Section 5.1] The negation set Xn is generated by Llama 3.1, the same model family used as the detector. The manual review filters out inapplicable negations (as in C.2), but it cannot remove systematic stylistic or lexical regularities introduced by the generator; the detector may be recognizing artifacts of Llama 3.1's negation style rather than the semantic property of manipulation. This concern is partially acknowledged in C.3. The accuracy gap between Xn (93.9%) and X (65.7%) is consistent with such an artifact effect. I request a cross-generator test set (e.g., negations by a different model or human-authored perturbations) or, at minimum, an analysis of which features drive the Xn decisions.
  3. [Section 5.3 (Table 3)] The comparison on LIAR-RAW and RAWFC is not apples-to-apples. The authors exclude half-true and barely-true labels and directly augment the built-in evidence for MANICOD, yet they compare against published F1 numbers from prior work that used the full label sets and their own evidence pipelines. Baselines were not re-run on the same filtered label subsets or with the same evidence augmentation. Consequently, the reported up-to-1.9x improvement cannot be attributed to the method rather than to the changed evaluation setup. Please re-run all baselines under an identical protocol, or restrict the comparison to published results on exactly the same label set and evidence condition.
  4. [Section 3 and Section 7] The paper states 'To simplify our study, we assume the knowledge retrieved from the Internet is true.' This assumption is load-bearing for zero-day detection, because a False decision is an assertion of contradiction between the claim and the retrieved context. If the retrieved webpages are wrong, outdated, or mutually conflicting (as the authors note can happen), the decision is invalid. The paper does not provide a sensitivity analysis for noisy or contradictory retrieval results. At minimum, the evaluation should quantify how often the top-k retrieved documents agree with the eventual ground truth, and the claims should be scoped accordingly.
  5. [Appendix F (confusion matrix)] The confusion matrix as printed is internally inconsistent with the dataset description in Section 4. The entries imply 4,973 actual positive (fake) examples and 1,797 actual negative (truth) examples, whereas the dataset contains 4,270 manipulated and 2,500 truthful claims. The reported precision (0.795), recall (0.926), and F1 (0.856) cannot be reproduced from the table as printed without an unexplained relabeling of rows or columns. Please correct the table or the surrounding text so the metrics are reproducible.
minor comments (4)
  1. [Section 1] The phrase 'threading the solidarity and harmony of society' appears to be a typo for 'threatening the solidarity and harmony of society.'
  2. [References and Section 5.3] The Snopes reference is titled 'the definitive face-checking site'; this should be 'fact-checking site.'
  3. [Section 5.3] The abstract and Section 5.3 both say 'up to 1.9x' improvement, but the cited LIAR-RAW numbers (0.915 vs 0.314) correspond to a factor of about 2.9. Please reconcile the arithmetic.
  4. [Section 4] The manual dataset review is described as involving three team members, but no inter-annotator agreement statistic or the number of discarded examples is reported. Adding this information would improve confidence in dataset quality.

Circularity Check

1 steps flagged · score 6.0 of 10

The headline F1 on the proposed dataset is an in-sample prompt fit rather than an independent prediction; label filtering in the benchmark comparison is an additional evaluation flaw but not a circular reduction.

  1. fitted input called prediction [Section 3 (Knowledge-Grounded Inference, prompt creation), Section 5 (Experiment Settings and RQ1 results), Appendix B (LLM selection on data collected on 11 Aug 2024)]
    "The creation of prompt template used for MANICOD is a continuous tuning process until we find an optimal balance of true and false predictions, i.e., we repeatedly instruct LLMs with “hard” cases that tend to result in different predictions until we find a prompt that is stable and yields a reasonable performance. The final prompt can be found in Figure 3."

    The final prompt is produced by repeatedly instructing the LLM on “hard” cases from the target data until the true/false predictions are balanced and “reasonable.” Appendix B confirms model-selection experiments used data collected on 11 August 2024, which lies inside the 20-day window of the final 4,270-claim manipulated-content dataset described in Section 4. No held-out validation split is reported anywhere in Section 5.1, so the reported precision (79.5%), recall (92.6%), and F1 (0.856) are the fitted prompt's performance on the same data distribution used for tuning. The headline prediction therefore reduces to an in-sample fit, not a generalization estimate.

full rationale

The paper is an empirical system, not a formal derivation, so circularity can only appear in evaluation. The one concrete reduction is the prompt template: Section 3 describes a continuous tuning process on hard cases until a stable and balanced prompt is found, and Section 5.1 reports the resulting F1=0.856 without any described held-out split. Section 7's Internal Limitations corroborate this by admitting performance “heavily relies on ... a high-quality prompt template that fits the adopted LLM.” The same-generator dependency flagged in Appendix C.3 (the Llama 3.1 model generates the Xn negation set and later detects it) is a real benchmark-ease concern, but the paper's manual review fixes the ground-truth labels independently, and the detector still errs on Xn; I therefore do not treat it as a constructional circularity. Similarly, Table 3 compares against published F1 values computed on unfiltered LIAR-RAW and RAWFC label sets while excluding half-true and barely-true labels from the test set; that can inflate the claimed up-to-1.9x improvement, but it is an invalid comparison rather than a self-referential reduction. The retrieval assumption that online knowledge is true (Section 3) is a stated external limitation, not circularity, because the retrieved context is independent evidence. The external COVID and FEVER benchmarks provide some independent grounding, but they do not cure the primary zero-day claim, whose headline quantitative support reduces to a prompt fit. Overall score: 6.

Assumptions & free parameters 6 free parameters · 5 assumptions · 0 invented entities

The central claim rests on a set of domain assumptions about the reliability of web-retrieved knowledge, the representativeness of two manipulation types, and the treatment of news headlines as ground truth. The numeric hyperparameters (k, chunk size, overlap, retrieved chunks, temperature, repetitions) are hand-chosen or default settings that affect reported performance. No new theoretical entities are introduced.

free parameters (6)
  • k (number of search results) = 3
    Chosen by small-scale pilot tests to balance veracity prediction performance and execution time (Section 5).
  • chunk_size = 100
    Default setting from the LangChain official tutorial (Section 5).
  • overlap = 20
    Default setting from the LangChain official tutorial (Section 5).
  • number of retrieved chunks = 5
    Set to 5 for the RAG retrieval from the vector database (Section 5).
  • temperature = 0.1
    Set to maintain consistency of LLM outputs and reproducibility (Section 5).
  • repetitions for majority vote = 3
    Each claim is tested three times and the majority result is recorded (Section 5).
assumptions (5)
  • domain assumption The knowledge retrieved from the Internet is true.
    Stated explicitly in Section 3 (Online Knowledge Retrieval). The entire contradiction-based inference depends on this assumption.
  • domain assumption Manipulated content is based on true information and can be modeled by sentiment reversal and context alteration.
    Section 2.2 defines the problem scope with these two transformations; the dataset and evaluation only cover these types.
  • domain assumption Search engine results provide sufficiently relevant context for the claim.
    Section 3 uses the top-k Google results as the knowledge source without additional relevance filtering.
  • domain assumption Original news headlines in the dataset are true.
    Section 4 treats the 2,500 collected headlines as ground truth; Section 7 acknowledges some may be false or become outdated.
  • ad hoc to paper Non-conclusive LLM outputs are treated as wrong.
    Section 5 stipulates this conservative stance; it is a modeling choice rather than an externally justified rule.

how reviews work

0 comments
Cite this review

Pith. "Pith review of Detecting Manipulated Contents Using Knowledge-Grounded Inference." pith.science (2026). https://pith.science/paper/64QYWSVW

@misc{pith2026250421165,
  author       = {Pith},
  title        = {Pith review of: Detecting Manipulated Contents Using Knowledge-Grounded Inference},
  year         = {2026},
  howpublished = {\url{https://pith.science/paper/64QYWSVW}},
  note         = {Machine review of arXiv:2504.21165}
}
read the original abstract

The detection of manipulated content, a prevalent form of fake news, has been widely studied in recent years. While existing solutions have been proven effective in fact-checking and analyzing fake news based on historical events, the reliance on either intrinsic knowledge obtained during training or manually curated context hinders them from tackling zero-day manipulated content, which can only be recognized with real-time contextual information. In this work, we propose Manicod, a tool designed for detecting zero-day manipulated content. Manicod first sources contextual information about the input claim from mainstream search engines, and subsequently vectorizes the context for the large language model (LLM) through retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). The LLM-based inference can produce a "truthful" or "manipulated" decision and offer a textual explanation for the decision. To validate the effectiveness of Manicod, we also propose a dataset comprising 4270 pieces of manipulated fake news derived from 2500 recent real-world news headlines. Manicod achieves an overall F1 score of 0.856 on this dataset and outperforms existing methods by up to 1.9x in F1 score on their benchmarks on fact-checking and claim verification.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2504.21165 by the authors.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Two examples on how MANICOD detects and analyzes simulated zero-day manipulated content as of 2024 July 29, with manipulated content in the user queries underlined in red, and key explanations underlined in black. (e.g., events that happened in the real world) but contains subtle fabrications for malicious purposes. Without proper detection and filtering techniques, manipulated content could rapidly disseminate prej… view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. An overview of our disinformation detection framework M [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p005_2.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. The prompt template used in MANICOD with task description, key inference rules, and output instruc￾tions highlighted in red, blue, and green, respectively. Elon Musk denies reported $45 million a month pledge to Trump. Elon Musk confirms reported $45 million a month pledge to Trump. Elon Musk denies reported $45 million a month pledge to Biden. Manual Review & Alteration Raw RSS entries RSS title summary Statement F… view at source ↗
Figures from the paper (2 more)
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: An overview of our dataset creation lines will be manipulated in reality. However, to the best of our knowledge, most existing open-access datasets are either designed for checking trivial facts (Google, 2021) that can be determined using LLM intrinsic knowledge or lim…
Figure 5
Figure 5. Figure 5: Distribution of the 2,500 news collected by [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p008_5.png]

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

50 extracted references · 34 canonical work pages

  1. [1]

    online" 'onlinestring :=

    ENTRY address archivePrefix author booktitle chapter edition editor eid eprint eprinttype howpublished institution journal key month note number organization pages publisher school series title type volume year doi pubmed url lastchecked label extra.label sort.label short.list INTEGERS output.state before.all mid.sentence after.sentence after.block STRING...

  2. [2]

    write newline

    " write newline "" before.all 'output.state := FUNCTION n.dashify 't := "" t empty not t #1 #1 substring "-" = t #1 #2 substring "--" = not "--" * t #2 global.max substring 't := t #1 #1 substring "-" = "-" * t #2 global.max substring 't := while if t #1 #1 substring * t #2 global.max substring 't := if while FUNCTION word.in bbl.in capitalize " " * FUNCT...

  3. [3]

    Haris Alibašić and Jonathan Rose. 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/10999922.2019.1622359 Fake news in context: Truth and untruths . Public Integrity, 21(5):463–468

  4. [4]

    April Xu . 2024. New york post falsely claims chinese man shot trump chinese communities outraged. https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/new-york-post-falsely-claims-chinese-man-shot-trump-chinese-communities-outraged/ar-BB1q5Ea9

  5. [5]

    Pepa Atanasova, Jakob Grue Simonsen, Christina Lioma, and Isabelle Augenstein. 2020. https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2020.acl-main.656 Generating fact checking explanations . In Proceedings of the 58th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, pages 7352--7364. Association for Computational Linguistics

  6. [6]

    Patrice Béchard and Orlando Marquez Ayala. 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.08189 Reducing hallucination in structured outputs via retrieval-augmented generation . Preprint, arXiv:2404.08189

  7. [7]

    Canadian Centre for Cyber Security . 2024. How to Identify Misinformation, Disinformation, and Malinformation (ITSAP.00.300) . https://www.cyber.gc.ca/sites/default/files/misinformation-mesinformation-itsap.00.300-en.pdf. Online; accessed 10 October 2024

  8. [8]

    Canyu Chen and Kai Shu. 2024. https://openreview.net/forum?id=ccxD4mtkTU Can llm-generated misinformation be detected? In The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations

Show all 50 references
  1. [9]

    Tsun-Hin Cheung and Kin-Man Lam. 2023. https://doi.org/10.1109/APSIPAASC58517.2023.10317251 Factllama: Optimizing instruction-following language models with external knowledge for automated fact-checking . In 2023 Asia Pacific Signal and Information Processing Association Annu...

  2. [10]

    Chroma . 2024. Chroma - the open-source embedding database. https://github.com/chroma-core/chroma. Online; accessed 04 September 2024

  3. [11]

    Google . 2021. Fact-checking - covid19-scientific. https://github.com/google/BIG-bench/tree/main/bigbench/benchmark_tasks/fact_checker/covid19_scientific. Online; accessed 04 September 2024

  4. [12]

    Google . 2024. Fact Check Tools - Google Search . https://toolbox.google.com/factcheck/explorer. Online; accessed 07 October 2024

  5. [13]

    Georgios Gravanis, Athena Vakali, Konstantinos Diamantaras, and Panagiotis Karadais. 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2019.03.036 Behind the cues: A benchmarking study for fake news detection . Expert Systems with Applications, 128:201–213

  6. [14]

    Rohit Kumar Kaliyar, Anurag Goswami, and Pratik Narang. 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00521-020-05611-1 Echofaked: improving fake news detection in social media with an efficient deep neural network . Neural Computing and Applications, 33(14):8597–8613

  7. [15]

    Neema Kotonya and Francesca Toni. 2020. https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2020.emnlp-main.623 Explainable automated fact-checking for public health claims . In Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing (EMNLP), pages 7740--7754. Associati...

  8. [16]

    LangChain. 2024. Recursively split by character . https://python.langchain.com/v0.1/docs/modules/data_connection/document_transformers/recursive_text_splitter. Online; accessed 04 September 2024

  9. [17]

    LangChain-AI . 2024. Langchain. https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain. Online; accessed 04 September 2024

  10. [18]

    Nayeon Lee, Yejin Bang, Andrea Madotto, Madian Khabsa, and Pascale Fung. 2021. Towards few-shot fact-checking via perplexity. arXiv preprint arXiv:2103.09535

  11. [19]

    Yi Ju Lu and Cheng Te Li. 2020. Gcan: Graph-aware co-attention networks for explainable fake news detection on social media. In 58th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, ACL 2020, pages 505--514. Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL)

  12. [20]

    Jing Ma, Wei Gao, Shafiq Joty, and Kam-Fai Wong. 2019. Sentence-level evidence embedding for claim verification with hierarchical attention networks. Association for Computational Linguistics

  13. [21]

    Wojciech Mazurczyk, Dongwon Lee, and Andreas Vlachos. 2024. https://doi.org/10.1145/3624721 Disinformation 2.0 in the age of ai: A cybersecurity perspective . Commun. ACM, 67(3):36–39

  14. [22]

    Humza Naveed, Asad Ullah Khan, Shi Qiu, Muhammad Saqib, Saeed Anwar, Muhammad Usman, Naveed Akhtar, Nick Barnes, and Ajmal Mian. 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.06435 A comprehensive overview of large language models . Preprint, arXiv:2307.06435

  15. [23]

    Yixin Nie, Haonan Chen, and Mohit Bansal. 2019. Combining fact extraction and verification with neural semantic matching networks. In Proceedings of the AAAI conference on artificial intelligence, volume 33, pages 6859--6866

  16. [24]

    Cheng Niu, Yang Guan, Yuanhao Wu, Juno Zhu, Juntong Song, Randy Zhong, Kaihua Zhu, Siliang Xu, Shizhe Diao, and Tong Zhang. 2024. https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/2024.acl-demos.25 V era CT scan: Retrieval-augmented fake news detection with justifiable reasoning . In Proceedings of...

  17. [25]

    Nomic . 2024. Introducing Nomic Embed: A Truly Open Embedding Model . https://www.nomic.ai/blog/posts/nomic-embed-text-v1. Online; accessed 04 September 2024

  18. [26]

    Ollama . 2024. Ollama. https://github.com/ollama/ollama. Online; accessed 04 September 2024

  19. [27]

    Long Ouyang, Jeffrey Wu, Xu Jiang, Diogo Almeida, Carroll Wainwright, Pamela Mishkin, Chong Zhang, Sandhini Agarwal, Katarina Slama, Alex Ray, John Schulman, Jacob Hilton, Fraser Kelton, Luke Miller, Maddie Simens, Amanda Askell, Peter Welinder, Paul F Christiano, Jan Leike, a...

  20. [28]

    Kashyap Popat, Subhabrata Mukherjee, Andrew Yates, and Gerhard Weikum. 2018. Declare: Debunking fake news and false claims using evidence-aware deep learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.06416

  21. [29]

    The Washington Post. 2024. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/07/21/joe-biden-drops-out/ Biden makes stunning decision to pull out of 2024 race

  22. [30]

    Reuters Fact Check . 2023. No evidence ‘rna technology’ in chicken feed behind infertility or u.s. egg shortage. https://www.reuters.com/article/fact-check/no-evidence-rna-technology-in-chicken-feed-behind-infertility-or-us-egg-shor-idUSL1N34N1RJ/

  23. [31]

    Leonard Richardson. 2024. Beautiful Soup Documentation . https://beautiful-soup-4.readthedocs.io/. Online; accessed 04 September 2024

  24. [32]

    SerpApi . 2024. SerpApi: Google Search API . https://serpapi.com/. Online; accessed 04 September 2024

  25. [33]

    Kai Shu, Limeng Cui, Suhang Wang, Dongwon Lee, and Huan Liu. 2019. defend: Explainable fake news detection. In Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGKDD international conference on knowledge discovery & data mining, pages 395--405

  26. [34]

    Kurt Shuster, Spencer Poff, Moya Chen, Douwe Kiela, and Jason Weston. 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/2104.07567 Retrieval augmentation reduces hallucination in conversation . Preprint, arXiv:2104.07567

  27. [35]

    Snopes . 2025. Snopes.com | frequently asked questions. https://www.snopes.com/faqs/. Online; accessed 07 October 2024

  28. [36]

    Snopes Media Group . 2024. Snopes.com | the definitive face-checking site. https://www.snopes.com. Online; accessed 07 October 2024

  29. [37]

    N.N. Taleb. 2010. https://books.google.com/books?id=7wMuF4A4XF8C The Black Swan: Second Edition: The Impact of the Highly Improbable Fragility" . Incerto. Random House Publishing Group

  30. [38]

    The Annenberg Public Policy Center . 2024. FackCheck.org - A Project of The Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania . https://www.factcheck.org. Online; accessed 07 October 2024

  31. [39]

    The Poynter Institute . 2024. Fact-checks | PolitiFact . https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/list/. Online; accessed 07 October 2024

  32. [40]

    James Thorne, Andreas Vlachos, Christos Christodoulopoulos, and Arpit Mittal. 2018. https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/N18-1074 FEVER : a large-scale dataset for fact extraction and VER ification . In Proceedings of the 2018 Conference of the North A merican Chapter of the Associatio...

  33. [41]

    The New York Times. 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/international/section/corrections Corrections

  34. [42]

    Bo Wang, Jing Ma, Hongzhan Lin, Zhiwei Yang, Ruichao Yang, Yuan Tian, and Yi Chang. 2024. Explainable fake news detection with large language model via defense among competing wisdom. In Proceedings of the ACM on Web Conference 2024, pages 2452--2463

  35. [43]

    Haoran Wang and Kai Shu. 2023. Explainable claim verification via knowledge-grounded reasoning with large language models. arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.05253

  36. [44]

    William Yang Wang. 2017. https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/P17-2067 ``liar, liar pants on fire'': A new benchmark dataset for fake news detection . In Proceedings of the 55th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 2: Short Papers), pages 422--426, Va...

  37. [45]

    Claire Wardle. 2020. Understanding Information Disorder: Essential Guides. First Draft

  38. [46]

    World Risk Poll . 2020. `fake news' is the number one worry for internet users worldwide. https://wrp.lrfoundation.org.uk/news/fake-news-is-the-number-one-worry-for-internet-users-worldwide. Online; accessed 07 September 2024

  39. [47]

    Lianwei Wu, Yuan Rao, Ling Sun, and Wangbo He. 2021. Evidence inference networks for interpretable claim verification. In Proceedings of the AAAI conference on artificial intelligence, volume 35, pages 14058--14066

  40. [48]

    Fan Yang, Shiva K Pentyala, Sina Mohseni, Mengnan Du, Hao Yuan, Rhema Linder, Eric D Ragan, Shuiwang Ji, and Xia Hu. 2019. Xfake: Explainable fake news detector with visualizations. In The World Wide Web Conference, pages 3600--3604

  41. [49]

    Zhiwei Yang, Jing Ma, Hechang Chen, Hongzhan Lin, Ziyang Luo, and Yi Chang. 2022. A coarse-to-fine cascaded evidence-distillation neural network for explainable fake news detection. In Proceedings of the 29th International Conference on Computational Linguistics, pages 2608--2...

  42. [50]

    Mary Ellen Zurko. 2022. https://doi.org/10.1109/MSEC.2022.3159405 Disinformation and reflections from usable security . IEEE Security & Privacy, 20(3):4--7

Pith tools

Reviewed August 16, 2026 · model on record in the stance chip above.