Pulsed laser attack at 1061 nm potentially compromises quantum key distribution

Alexey Wolf; Anastasiya Ponosova; Anqi Huang; Daniil Trefilov; Daria Ruzhitskaya; Irina Zhluktova; Vadim Makarov; Vladimir Kamynin; Vladimir Tsvetkov

arxiv: 2506.19091 · v3 · submitted 2025-06-23 · 🪐 quant-ph

Pulsed laser attack at 1061 nm potentially compromises quantum key distribution

Anastasiya Ponosova , Irina Zhluktova , Daria Ruzhitskaya , Daniil Trefilov , Anqi Huang , Alexey Wolf , Vladimir Kamynin , Vladimir Tsvetkov

show 1 more author

Vadim Makarov

This is my paper

Pith reviewed 2026-05-19 07:20 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 🪐 quant-ph

keywords quantum key distributionlaser damage attackfiber-optic isolatoroptical isolation degradationQKD securitypulsed laser injection1550 nm components1061 nm attack

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The pith

Exposing 1550-nm fiber-optic isolators to 1061-nm sub-nanosecond pulses permanently degrades their isolation at the operating wavelength.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper establishes that 1061-nm pulsed laser light at average powers up to 1.16 W can permanently reduce the isolation performance of standard 1550-nm fiber-optic isolators while leaving their forward transmission relatively intact. In quantum key distribution, isolators are meant to block stray light from entering sensitive detectors and sources, so this degradation opens a path for light-injection attacks that could compromise the secrecy of the generated keys. One tested sample also showed temporary isolation below its specified minimum under lower-power picosecond pulses, indicating that the threat appears across different pulse regimes. The work therefore argues that existing security analyses for QKD must incorporate these particular attack parameters to remain valid.

Core claim

Exposing 1550-nm fiber-optic isolators to 1061-nm sub-nanosecond pulsed illumination with 1.16 W average power permanently degrades their isolation at 1550 nm, while their forward transparency is less affected. One experimental sample was exposed to 17-mW average power picosecond attacking pulses that temporarily reduced its isolation below the specified guaranteed minimum value. This indicates a potential security threat in these attacking laser regimes that need to be addressed by improving security analysis for various light-injection attacks.

What carries the argument

1061-nm sub-nanosecond pulsed laser exposure applied to 1550-nm fiber-optic isolators, which induces selective permanent damage to backward isolation while sparing forward transmission.

If this is right

QKD security proofs must now include analysis of high-power pulsed light at wavelengths outside the 1550-nm band.
Component qualification for QKD systems should add pulsed-laser resilience tests at non-operating wavelengths.
Temporary isolation drops under lower-power picosecond pulses can already breach guaranteed specifications during an attack.
Forward transmission remaining largely intact means the isolator may still appear functional to routine checks while its protective function is compromised.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

Hardware vendors may need to develop or certify isolators specifically rated against off-band pulsed-laser exposure.
Similar vulnerabilities could exist in other passive fiber components such as circulators or filters used in QKD setups.
Field-deployed systems might require periodic re-testing or additional wavelength-filtering stages to detect and mitigate such attacks.

Load-bearing premise

The observed drop in isolation is caused by the 1061-nm pulsed light rather than temperature, handling, or measurement effects, and the tested isolators are representative of those installed in operational QKD systems.

What would settle it

Repeated before-and-after isolation measurements on fresh isolator samples exposed only to controlled temperature and handling but never to 1061-nm pulses, checking whether isolation remains unchanged.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2506.19091 by Alexey Wolf, Anastasiya Ponosova, Anqi Huang, Daniil Trefilov, Daria Ruzhitskaya, Irina Zhluktova, Vadim Makarov, Vladimir Kamynin, Vladimir Tsvetkov.

**Figure 1.** Figure 1: FIG. 1. Pulsed laser schemes, output spectra, and pulse shapes. (a) Single-YDFA scheme. (b) Dual-YDFA scheme. (c) Pulse [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p002_1.png] view at source ↗

**Figure 2.** Figure 2: FIG. 2. Experimental setup. (a) Measurement of inser [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p003_2.png] view at source ↗

**Figure 4.** Figure 4: FIG. 4. Isolation recovery of sample 2 after illumination [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p004_4.png] view at source ↗

**Figure 3.** Figure 3: FIG. 3. Isolation decrease and insertion loss of the tested [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p004_3.png] view at source ↗

read the original abstract

Quantum key distribution systems offer cryptographic security, provided that all their components are thoroughly characterised. However, certain components might be vulnerable to a laser-damage attack, particularly when attacked at previously untested laser parameters. Here, we show that exposing 1550-nm fiber-optic isolators to 1061-nm sub-nanosecond pulsed illumination with 1.16 W average power permanently degrades their isolation at 1550 nm, while their forward transparency is less affected. One experimental sample was exposed to 17-mW average power picosecond attacking pulses that temporarily reduced its isolation below the specified guaranteed minimum value. This indicates a potential security threat in these attacking laser regimes that need to be addressed by improving security analysis for various light-injection attacks.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Desk Editor's Note private letter to a colleague

The paper reports a new parameter set for laser-induced degradation in 1550 nm isolators under 1061 nm sub-ns pulses, but the abstract leaves causation and reproducibility unclear.

read the letter

The core observation is that 1061 nm sub-nanosecond pulses at 1.16 W average power permanently reduce isolation in commercial 1550 nm fiber isolators while forward transmission holds up better. A separate test at 17 mW with picosecond pulses produced a temporary drop below the rated minimum. This specific wavelength, pulse duration, and power combination on standard isolators has not been reported before, so the result adds a concrete data point to the list of physical attacks that QKD security analyses should consider. The experiment itself is direct and the practical implication for deployed systems is clear from the abstract alone. What the work does well is identify an untested regime and show that the damage is asymmetric, which matters for how one models light-injection threats. The soft spot is the lack of reported controls, sample size, or statistics. Without those, it is difficult to separate the laser exposure from temperature drift, handling, or measurement effects, exactly as the stress-test note flags. If the full paper includes blind protocols or untreated control samples, that would tighten the claim considerably. This is aimed at the QKD hardware and certification community rather than theorists. A reader who builds or audits real systems would find it worth checking against their own components. It deserves peer review because the finding is operationally relevant and the experimental approach is the right one to pursue, even if the current write-up needs more detail on reproducibility to hold up under scrutiny.

Referee Report

2 major / 2 minor

Summary. The manuscript reports experimental results indicating that 1550-nm fiber-optic isolators exposed to 1061-nm sub-nanosecond pulsed illumination at 1.16 W average power experience permanent degradation of isolation at 1550 nm, with forward transparency less affected. Exposure of one sample to 17 mW average power picosecond pulses temporarily reduces isolation below the specified minimum, pointing to a potential security threat for QKD systems from light-injection attacks at these parameters.

Significance. If substantiated, the findings highlight a previously uncharacterized vulnerability in a standard QKD component (optical isolators) to pulsed laser attack at 1061 nm. This could inform improved security analyses for light-injection attacks and motivate broader component testing across wavelength and pulse regimes. The work provides direct experimental observation rather than derived predictions.

major comments (2)

[Abstract and Results] The central claim of laser-induced permanent degradation at 1.16 W (and temporary drop at 17 mW) requires that the effect is caused by the 1061 nm exposure. The abstract and results description provide no mention of control samples subjected to identical fiber handling, temperature monitoring, and measurement protocols without illumination, leaving open the possibility of confounding factors such as thermal drift or mechanical stress.
[Abstract and Results] No information is given on the number of samples tested for the 1.16 W case, statistical analysis, error bars, or reproducibility metrics. With the security implication resting on the effect being representative of field-deployed isolators, these omissions make the evidential support for the claim only partial.

minor comments (2)

[Abstract] Clarify whether the single sample exposed at 17 mW is presented as representative or as a specific case, and state the isolation specification value used for comparison.
[Introduction] Add a brief discussion of how the 1061 nm wavelength was selected relative to prior laser-damage studies on isolators or other QKD components.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

2 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for their constructive comments on our manuscript. We address the major comments point by point below and have incorporated revisions to address the concerns raised.

read point-by-point responses

Referee: [Abstract and Results] The central claim of laser-induced permanent degradation at 1.16 W (and temporary drop at 17 mW) requires that the effect is caused by the 1061 nm exposure. The abstract and results description provide no mention of control samples subjected to identical fiber handling, temperature monitoring, and measurement protocols without illumination, leaving open the possibility of confounding factors such as thermal drift or mechanical stress.

Authors: We agree that it is important to rule out confounding factors to substantiate that the degradation is caused by the 1061 nm exposure. In the revised version of the manuscript, we will add information on control samples that were handled and measured under identical conditions without laser illumination. These controls confirmed no degradation occurred, and temperature was monitored to remain within stable ranges. This will be added to both the abstract and the results section. revision: yes
Referee: [Abstract and Results] No information is given on the number of samples tested for the 1.16 W case, statistical analysis, error bars, or reproducibility metrics. With the security implication resting on the effect being representative of field-deployed isolators, these omissions make the evidential support for the claim only partial.

Authors: We acknowledge that additional details on sample numbers and analysis would improve the strength of the claims. The revised manuscript will include the number of samples tested for the 1.16 W exposure, error bars on the data, and a discussion of reproducibility. While our study was primarily exploratory, these additions will better support the potential security threat to QKD systems. revision: yes

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

Purely experimental paper with no derivations or self-referential predictions

full rationale

The manuscript reports direct experimental observations of isolation degradation in 1550-nm fiber-optic isolators under 1061-nm pulsed laser exposure. No equations, fitted parameters, predictions derived from inputs, or load-bearing self-citations appear in the provided abstract or described structure. The central claim rests on measured transmission changes rather than any derivation chain that reduces to its own assumptions by construction. This is a standard non-finding for experimental work that does not invoke first-principles modeling or statistical predictions.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 1 axioms · 0 invented entities

The central claim rests on the assumption that standard optical component behavior applies and that the experimental conditions accurately simulate real-world attack scenarios; no free parameters or new entities are introduced.

axioms (1)

domain assumption Fiber-optic isolators exhibit wavelength-dependent isolation that can be altered by high-intensity illumination outside their design band.
Invoked implicitly when interpreting the measured change in isolation at 1550 nm after 1061 nm exposure.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5687 in / 1237 out tokens · 30959 ms · 2026-05-19T07:20:33.481819+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

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H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and K. Tamaki, Secure quantum key distribution, Nat. Photonics 8, 595 (2014)

work page 2014

[2] [2]

Gisin, G

N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, Quan- tum cryptography, Rev. Mod. Phys. 74, 145 (2002)

work page 2002

[3] [3]

Lo and H

H.-K. Lo and H. F. Chau, Unconditional security of quan- tum key distribution over arbitrarily long distances, Sci- ence 283, 2050 (1999)

work page 2050

[4] [4]

P. W. Shor and J. Preskill., Simple proof of security of the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441 (2000)

work page 2000

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Koashi, Simple security proof of quantum key dis- tribution based on complementarity, New J

M. Koashi, Simple security proof of quantum key dis- tribution based on complementarity, New J. Phys. 11, 045018 (2009)

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Vakhitov, V

A. Vakhitov, V. Makarov, and D. R. Hjelme, Large pulse attack as a method of conventional optical eavesdropping in quantum cryptography, J. Mod. Opt. 48, 2023 (2001)

work page 2023

[7] [7]

Gisin, S

N. Gisin, S. Fasel, B. Kraus, H. Zbinden, and G. Ri- bordy, Trojan-horse attacks on quantum-key-distribution systems, Phys. Rev. A 73, 022320 (2006)

work page 2006

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Makarov, A

V. Makarov, A. Anisimov, and J. Skaar, Effects of de- tector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryp- tosystems, Phys. Rev. A 74, 022313 (2006), erratum ibid. 78, 019905 (2008)

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C.-H. F. Fung, B. Qi, K. Tamaki, and H.-K. Lo, Phase- remapping attack in practical quantum-key-distribution systems, Phys. Rev. A 75, 032314 (2007)

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A. N. Bugge, S. Sauge, A. M. M. Ghazali, J. Skaar, L. Ly- dersen, and V. Makarov, Laser damage helps the eaves- dropper in quantum cryptography, Phys. Rev. Lett. 112, 070503 (2014)

work page 2014

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Lucamarini, I

M. Lucamarini, I. Choi, M. B. Ward, J. F. Dynes, Z. L. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, Practical security bounds against the Trojan-horse attack in quantum key distri- bution, Phys. Rev. X 5, 031030 (2015)

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[12] [12]

Huang, ´A

A. Huang, ´A. Navarrete, S.-H. Sun, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Curty, and V. Makarov, Laser-seeding attack in quantum key distribution, Phys. Rev. Appl. 12, 064043 (2019)

work page 2019

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Sun and A

S. Sun and A. Huang, A review of security evaluation of practical quantum key distribution system, Entropy 24, 260 (2022)

work page 2022

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Makarov, A

V. Makarov, A. Abrikosov, P. Chaiwongkhot, A. K. Fe- dorov, A. Huang, E. Kiktenko, M. Petrov, A. Ponosova, D. Ruzhitskaya, A. Tayduganov, D. Trefilov, and K. Za- itsev, Preparing a commercial quantum key distribu- tion system for certification against implementation loop- holes, Phys. Rev. Appl. 22, 044076 (2024)

work page 2024

[15] [15]

Makarov, J.-P

V. Makarov, J.-P. Bourgoin, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Gagn´ e, T. Jennewein, S. Kaiser, R. Kashyap, M. Legr´ e, C. M., and S. Sajeed, Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage, Phys. Rev. A 94, 030302 (2016)

work page 2016

[16] [16]

Huang, R

A. Huang, R. Li, V. Egorov, S. Tchouragoulov, K. Ku- mar, and V. Makarov, Laser damage attack against opti- cal attenuators in quantum key distribution, Phys. Rev. Appl. 13, 034017 (2020)

work page 2020

[17] [17]

D. D. Ruzhitskaya, I. V. Zhluktova, M. A. Petrov, K. A. Zaitsev, P. P. Acheva, N. A. Zunikov, A. V. Shilko, D. Aktas, F. Johlinger, D. O. Trefilov, A. A. Ponosova, V. A. Kamynin, and V. Makarov, Vulnerabilities in the quantum key distribution system induced under a pulsed laser attack, Sci. Tech. J. Inf. Technol. Mech. Opt. 21, 837 (2021)

work page 2021

[18] [18]

Ponosova, D

A. Ponosova, D. Ruzhitskaya, P. Chaiwongkhot, V. Egorov, V. Makarov, and A. Huang, Protecting fiber- optic quantum key distribution sources against light- injection attacks, PRX Quantum 3, 040307 (2022)

work page 2022

[19] [19]

Bugai, A

K. Bugai, A. Zyzykin, D. Bulavkin, S. Bogdanov, I. Sushchev, and D. Dvoretskiy, Laser damage attack on a simple optical attenuator widely used in fiber-based QKD systems, in Proc. 2022 International Conference Laser Optics (ICLO) (IEEE, 2022) p. 393

work page 2022

[20] [20]

Q. Peng, B. Gao, K. Zaitsev, D. Wang, J. Ding, Y. Liu, Q. Liao, Y. Guo, A. Huang, and J. Wu, Security bound- aries of an optical-power limiter for protecting quantum- key-distribution systems, Phys. Rev. Appl. 21, 014026 (2024)

work page 2024

[21] [21]

A. R. Dixon, J. F. Dynes, M. Lucamarini, B. Fr¨ ohlich, A. W. Sharpe, A. Plews, W. Tam, Z.-L. Yuan, Y. Tanizawa, H. Sato, S. Kawamura, M. Fujiwara, M. Sasaki, and A. J. Shields, Quantum key distribution with hacking countermeasures and long term field trial, Sci. Rep. 7, 1978 (2017)

work page 1978

[22] [22]

Ruzhitskaya, I

D. Ruzhitskaya, I. Zhluktova, A. Ponosova, D. Tre- filov, P. Chaiwongkhot, A. Huang, V. Kamynin, and V. Makarov, Resilience of quantum key distribution 6 source against laser-damage attack by a variety of lasers, in Proc. 2023 Conference on Lasers and Electro-Optics Europe & European Quantum Electronics Conference (CLEO/Europe-EQEC) (IEEE, 2023) p. 481

work page 2023

[23] [23]

X. Kang, P. Ye, S. Wang, G.-W. Zhang, Z. Wang, J.- L.Chen, Z. Yin, D.-Y. He, W. Chen, G.-Y. Fan-Yuan, G.-C. Guo, and Z.-F. Han, Effect of femtosecond-pulse- injection silicon photonic modulators on the security of quantum key distribution, Phys. Rev. Appl. 23, 021014 (2025)

work page 2025

[24] [24]

Tsypkin, E

A. Tsypkin, E. Oparin, A. Gaidash, M. Guselnikov, A. Ismagilov, B. Nasedkin, S. Kozlov, and A. Kozubov, Study of vulnerabilities of quantum key distribution sys- tems under high-intensity laser attack, in Yenisei Pho- tonics 2024 All-Russian Scientific Conference with In- ternational Participation. Theses of reports (in Russian), Vol. 2 (IF SB RAS, 2024) ...

work page 2024

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