Digital Sovereigns Big Tech and Nation-State Influence

Michael Bollerman

REVIEW 5 major objections 5 minor 10 references

Digital Sovereigns Big Tech and Nation-State Influence

T0 review · 5 major / 5 minor · reviewed 2026-08-07 · deepseek-v4-flash

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Pith's one-line read Large technology companies have taken on the defining characteristics of nation-states—sovereignty, territory, population, and governance—and exercise de facto rule over billions of users, so the thesis argues democratic institutions must…

desk verdict A competent but derivative master's thesis whose central analogy is undone by its own section 1.4; not a research contribution. read the letter →

arxiv 2507.21066 v1 pith:LKLBBEFI submitted 2025-06-01 cs.CY

Michael Bollerman This is my paper

classification cs.CY

keywords digitalsovereigntyBigTechquasi-nation-statesplatformpoweranalogyantitrustenforcementsurveillancecapitalismglobalgovernance

verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

The pith

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The reading

The thesis argues that a handful of technology companies—Apple, Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, Microsoft, NVIDIA, TSMC, and others—have outgrown the role of service providers and now exercise power that resembles state sovereignty: they set rules for billions of users, control critical digital infrastructure, shape public discourse, and influence legal frameworks across borders. Market capitalizations in the trillions rival the gross domestic products of most nations, and leading platforms count more users than any single country has people. If the claim is right, core functions of governance have migrated into private hands without democratic accountability, which the thesis treats as a threat to democratic institutions, economic equality, and privacy. The evidence assembled is qualitative and illustrative—corporate disclosures, antitrust cases, market data, and well-known episodes of platform power—rather than a new empirical study. The paper closes with a policy agenda, antitrust enforcement combined with privacy, consumer-protection, corporate-governance, copyright, trade, labor, and industrial policy, aimed at restoring the balance between democratic institutions and corporate power.

What carries the argument

The load-bearing device is the four-part analogy of statehood—sovereignty, territory, population, and governance—each redefined for the digital realm and asserted in §4.1 as a trait the largest platforms actually possess. Sovereignty becomes de facto rule-making over digital domains; territory becomes cloud infrastructure and platform ecosystems that transcend national borders; population becomes the user base; governance becomes terms of service, algorithmic moderation, and appeal mechanisms. Two auxiliary concepts carry the rest of the argument: 'digital sovereignty,' which the paper repurposes to describe both the unprecedented control Big Tech has gained over global affairs and the state's counter-efforts to reclaim control, and 'platform power,' the gatekeeper influence platforms exert over markets, speech, and information. The recurring quantitative evidence—market caps compared to national GDPs, active-user counts compared to national populations, and lobbying spending—is what converts the analogy from metaphor into a comparative claim about measurable scale.

What would settle it

A concrete test is a sustained, high-stakes confrontation between a state and a platform over a core sovereign function—China expelling Google, India banning TikTok, or the FBI circumventing Apple's encryption in the San Bernardino case, which the paper itself recounts. In each case the state ultimately prevailed: the platform exited, complied, or was bypassed. If that pattern holds across all such confrontations, then platform 'sovereignty' is revocable at state pleasure and the claimed parity with nation-states fails; the analogy survives only if some platform demonstrably withstands a determined state's effort to shut it down or seize its data.

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Extended reading notes

Core claim

On the paper's own terms, the central claim appears in §4.1: the world's largest technology companies 'demonstrate many of the defining characteristics of nation-states: sovereignty, territory, population, and governance.' The argument maps each trait onto corporate reality—de facto sovereignty in the ability to set global rules for data, speech, and commerce; digital territory in cloud platforms and app-store ecosystems these firms control and police; population in user bases of three billion and more; and governance in terms of service, content moderation, and quasi-judicial bodies such as Meta's Oversight Board. The thesis assembles economic, political, social, and technological evidence for the mapping, including market-capitalization comparisons with national GDPs, lobbying expenditures, surveillance-capitalism analysis, the Arab Spring and election-interference episodes, and the historical precedent of chartered monopolies. It concedes in §1.4 that these companies lack physical territory, coercive authority, and formal political sovereignty, but it maintains that their de facto influence over billions of people and critical digital infrastructure is the power democratic institutions must counter. The author's proposed response is a coordinated, whole-of-government regulatory program in which competition policy is the central lever, combined with privacy, consumer-protection, corporate-governance, copyright, trade, labor, and industrial policy.

Load-bearing premise

The whole argument rests on the analogy that turns users into a 'population,' platform rules into 'laws,' and digital infrastructure into 'territory'—yet the thesis concedes in §1.4 that these firms hold no physical territory, no coercive authority, and no formal political sovereignty, so if the analogy fails, the quasi-statehood claim collapses.

Editorial extensions

If this is right

If platforms genuinely govern, then decisions over speech, data, and critical infrastructure affecting billions are made by private hierarchies with no electoral accountability, so democratic governance is weakened regardless of what any single country does.
Antitrust alone will not answer the problem: the paper's conclusion argues for a whole-of-government response spanning privacy, consumer protection, corporate governance, copyright, trade, labor, and industrial policy.
Nation-states will keep fighting for 'digital sovereignty'—through GDPR-style privacy regimes, data-localization laws, and platform regulations such as the EU's Digital Markets Act and Digital Services Act—making control of data the central axis of international conflict.
The comparisons the thesis draws imply that these firms hold structural leverage over most individual states: only a handful of countries outrank a top tech company economically, and no country matches a leading platform's user base.
Two futures bracket the analysis: states reassert control through coordinated regulation, or the firms consolidate further into a de facto corporate-governance model; the thesis treats the choice as open and urgent.

Reading between the lines

Editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

The paper states the analogy but stops short of its sharpest legal consequence: if platforms are quasi-sovereign, then platform failures—data breaches, arbitrary moderation, algorithmic manipulation—should be actionable as governance failures, meaning human-rights or due-process harms, rather than as consumer or contract grievances, which would open new grounds for standing and remedy.
The four categories imply a testable 'de facto sovereignty' measure for platforms—user count, rule-enforcement rate, infrastructure criticality, and dispute-resolution authority—that could be tracked year over year; the paper supplies the categories but no such metric.
The concessions in §1.4 (no physical territory, no coercive force, no formal political sovereignty) point to a sharper framing than the paper adopts: the real object of concern may be governance without sovereignty, meaning rule-making power that carries none of statehood's responsibilities, which would make accountability reform the practical target rather than recognition as states.
If the historical parallel with chartered monopolies and the great trusts holds, corporate sovereignty is cyclical: concentrated private power has repeatedly triggered re-regulation, so the likelier long-run outcome is a new regulatory settlement rather than permanent corporate statehood.

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Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, and a circularity audit.

Desk Editor's Note

read the letter

Colleague,

Quick take: this is a master's thesis that surveys the familiar argument that big tech companies behave like nation-states. It is a competent synthesis but not a research contribution. The decisive problem is internal: §1.4 concedes that tech firms lack territorial control, coercive power, and political recognition—the usual constitutive features of statehood—while §4.1 and §7.1 assert that they demonstrate sovereignty, territory, population, and governance as defining characteristics. That equivocation is load-bearing and it sinks the central claim. The analogy is doing all the work, but the paper itself frames it as a categorical claim.

Credit where due: the thesis is well read. It pulls together Zuboff, Bratton, Gillespie, Srnicek, and others, and it assembles a useful catalog of examples: market cap comparisons, lobbying expenditures, content moderation, antitrust cases, the Apple–FBI dispute, TikTok censorship. For someone brand new to the topic, it could serve as a broad map of the literature. The historical comparisons with the East India Company and the South Sea Company are reasonable and clearly drawn.

But the soft spots are more than minor. The methodology section (§2.2) explicitly promises expert interviews that never show up. The "four lenses" are a list of topics rather than an analytical design. The evidence is anecdotal and selected to fit the metaphor; no dataset or systematic comparison is offered. Some factual statements are imprecise (market cap vs. GDP is a category error without adjustments). The writing is repetitive and would benefit from heavy editing. And the conclusion is a list of policy desiderata, not a derivation from the argument.

The net result: the paper does not advance beyond the existing scholarship it cites. It is a workmanlike student thesis, not a research preprint. The central claim is not falsifiable because there are no criteria for what would count as a quasi-nation-state.

Who is this for? A curious general reader, or an undergraduate starting a paper on platform power. Not for a researcher or policymaker looking for new analysis.

My recommendation: desk reject. No peer-review round needed. If the author wants to turn this into a research article, they need to decide whether the state analogy is literal or metaphorical, build a defensible criteria set, and support it with systematic evidence. As it stands, the thesis defeats its own argument in §1.4.

Referee Report

5 major / 5 minor

Summary. This thesis (arXiv:2507.21066) argues that large technology corporations such as Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Meta, Microsoft, NVIDIA, and TSMC have become 'quasi-nation-states' or 'nation-state equivalents' by virtue of their economic resources, control over digital infrastructure and user data, content-moderation rule-making, lobbying, and influence on public discourse. It proposes a multi-lens methodology (economic, political, social, technological), presents case studies and figures on market capitalization, lobbying expenditures, and social-media user counts, and concludes with a 'whole-of-government' competition-policy agenda. The central claim is that these firms 'demonstrate many of the defining characteristics of nation-states: sovereignty, territory, population, and governance' (§4.1).

Significance. If the central claim were established, the paper would speak to an important debate in international relations and digital governance about whether private platforms exercise state-like authority over billions of users. The manuscript has some strengths: it is transparent about several limitations, especially in §1.4 and §3.4; it engages with recognized scholarship on platform governance, surveillance capitalism, and sovereignty (e.g., Zuboff, Gillespie, Klonick, Krasner); and it reports concrete quantitative anchors such as Facebook's monthly active users and U.S. lobbying expenditures. However, the load-bearing analogy between corporations and states is never operationalized, and the paper's own Section 1.4 explicitly concedes the absence of territory, coercive authority, and political recognition. The evidence presented supports a claim about corporate influence, not a claim of statehood or sovereignty. The significance of the topic does not compensate for the absence of a defensible analytical framework.

major comments (5)

[§1.4 vs. §4.1] The central claim is internally inconsistent. Section 4.1 asserts that tech companies 'demonstrate many of the defining characteristics of nation-states: sovereignty, territory, population, and governance,' but Section 1.4 states that these companies 'do not have territorial control, a defining feature of sovereignty,' 'cannot exert coercive power in the traditional sense,' and 'lack political authority or recognition as independent entities in international relations.' Territory and coercive authority are constitutive on standard definitions of statehood, including the Montevideo criteria and Weber's monopoly on legitimate violence. The paper neither redefines 'sovereignty' nor supplies criteria under which a 'quasi-nation-state' can be identified. As written, the analogy is unfalsifiable: any large membership organization with rules and a user base would qualify. The paper needs an explicit, testable definition of the quasi-state threshold and a discussion of what evidence would count against it.
[§2.2] The methodology section promises 'Corporate Reports, Legal Cases, Expert Interviews' as data sources, but no expert interviews appear anywhere in the manuscript, and the bibliography contains no interview transcripts or interviewee attributions. This is a significant gap between the stated method and the executed research. Either the interviews must be reported and analyzed, or the methodology section must be revised to describe the document-based case-study approach actually used.
[§6.1, Figures 3 and 4] The economic comparison repeatedly equates a company's stock-market capitalization with a country's GDP (e.g., 'Apple ... market capitalization of over $3 trillion ... wealthier than the GDP of many mid-sized countries'). Market capitalization is a stock measure of equity value, while GDP is a flow measure of annual output; comparing the two does not establish that a firm's economic power is comparable in kind to a state's. The figures derived from popular visualizations (HowMuch, Visual Capitalist) do not correct this category error. This weakens the empirical foundation for the 'economic sovereignty' claim.
[§4.1, §4.4, §6.2] The governance analogy is not operationalized. The paper equates Terms of Service with laws, the Oversight Board with a judiciary, and user bases with populations, but it offers no institutional analysis of how corporate rules bind users in a way analogous to state law. Section 1.4 itself notes that users can leave platforms and that firms rely on state legal systems for enforcement. Without a mechanism-based account of corporate governance and a clear distinction from ordinary contractual governance, statements such as 'tech companies act like governments' remain metaphorical rather than analytical.
[§3.4 and §7.1] The gap analysis acknowledges that corporate secrecy, data limitations, and jurisdictional differences hinder research, but the conclusion in §7.1 nonetheless asserts that Big Tech functions as 'nation-state equivalents.' This leap is not supported by the evidence assembled in the paper, which consists mostly of anecdotal case studies, news reports, and selected statistics. The conclusion would be more defensible if reframed as a claim about the growing influence of private actors on global governance, but as written it exceeds what the evidence can bear.

minor comments (5)

[§2.2] The statement that the Patriot Act 'expired in 2015' is imprecise: the USA Freedom Act reauthorized and modified most of its surveillance provisions. This factual nuance matters for the historical narrative.
[§1.7] There is a typo: 'the ability to influence' is written as 'he ability to influence.' Similar typos appear elsewhere, including 'Tawain' in §6.1 and 'What's App' in §6.2.1.
[§2.1] The phrase 'There are end amounts of Annual Reports' is unclear; the intended meaning appears to be that many SEC filings and reports are available.
[Figures] The manuscript references Figures 1–5, but the full text as provided does not include the actual chart images or data tables; the captions and footnotes are present, but the reader cannot verify the visual claims. If the submission is meant to be self-contained, the figures need to be embedded with sources and axis labels.
[Conclusion] The phrase 'Frankenstein-like monsters' in the abstract and the extended Frankenstein analogy in §1.4 are stylistically out of place for a research article and could be trimmed to a brief framing device.

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged · score 0.0 of 10

No significant circularity: the thesis's state-analogy claim rests on external evidence, and its own §1.4 concession blocks a purely definitional derivation.

full rationale

This thesis is an interpretive policy argument, not a derivation chain, and none of the circularity patterns apply. It fits no parameter to data and then 'predicts' that same data; it makes no load-bearing self-citation; and it does not import a uniqueness theorem or ansatz from the authors' prior work. The supporting evidence—market capitalizations, monthly active Facebook users, lobbying expenditures, antitrust cases, and EU/US regulatory actions—is external and independently checkable. The central claim that large tech companies resemble quasi-nation-states is advanced through an analogy, and §4.1 does stipulatively relabel user bases as 'populations' and cloud infrastructure as 'digital territories.' However, that framing is not smuggled in as an unacknowledged equivalence: §1.4 explicitly concedes that tech companies 'do not have territorial control, a defining feature of sovereignty,' cannot exert coercive power, and 'lack political authority or recognition as independent entities in international relations.' Because the paper itself acknowledges the standard criteria and still argues by analogy, the conclusion is an interpretive claim with independent empirical content rather than a circular restatement of its definitions. The §1.4 concession is a substantive weakness in the thesis's central analogy, but it is a correctness risk, not a circularity. Accordingly, the circularity score is 0.

Assumptions & free parameters 0 free parameters · 3 assumptions · 0 invented entities

The thesis rests on analogical premises rather than formal derivation. It treats corporate market power, platform rules, and user bases as state-like attributes without operationalizing these comparisons, and it relies on secondary data without error margins.

assumptions (3)

domain assumption The Westphalian notion of sovereignty is an appropriate benchmark for comparing corporations and states.
Used implicitly throughout the theoretical framework to argue that tech companies possess quasi-sovereignty. Section 4.1.
domain assumption Market capitalization is a valid proxy for national economic power in comparisons with GDP.
Used in §6.1 and Figures 3-4 to equate company market cap with country GDP.
domain assumption Platform policies and content moderation are equivalent to state governance and legislation.
Used in §4.1 and §6.2 to argue Meta's Oversight Board resembles a supreme court and community standards resemble laws.

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Cite this review

Pith. "Pith review of Digital Sovereigns Big Tech and Nation-State Influence." pith.science (2026). https://pith.science/paper/LKLBBEFI

@misc{pith2026250721066,
  author       = {Pith},
  title        = {Pith review of: Digital Sovereigns Big Tech and Nation-State Influence},
  year         = {2026},
  howpublished = {\url{https://pith.science/paper/LKLBBEFI}},
  note         = {Machine review of arXiv:2507.21066}
}

read the original abstract

Technology companies have gained unprecedented power and influence in recent years, resembling quasi-nation-states globally. Corporations with trillion-dollar market capitalizations are no longer just providers of digital services; they now wield immense economic power, influence global infrastructure, and significantly impact political and social dynamics. This thesis examines how these corporations have transcended traditional business models, adopting characteristics typically associated with sovereign states. They now enforce regulations, shape public discourse, and influence legal frameworks in various countries. This shift presents unique challenges, including the undermining of democratic governance, the exacerbation of economic inequalities, and the enabling of unregulated data exploitation and privacy violations. The study will examine critical instances of tech companies acting as quasi-governmental bodies and assess the risks associated with unchecked corporate influence in global governance. Ultimately, the thesis aims to propose policy frameworks and regulatory interventions to curb the overreach of tech giants, restoring the balance between democratic institutions and corporate power and ensuring that the digital future aligns with the public good rather than creating Frankenstein-like monsters.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2507.21066 by the authors.

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Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

10 extracted references · 10 canonical work pages

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Algorithmic content moderation: Technical and political challenges in the automation of platform governance

https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/. 80 Gillespie, Tarleton. Custodians of the Internet: Platforms, content moderation, and the hidden decisions that shape social media. Yale University Press, 2018. 38 moderators and algorithms interpret and enforce these policies, deciding what content is acceptab...

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Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy

Theoretical Framework 4.1 State-like Characteristics: Sovereignty, Territory, Population, and Governance The concept of nation-states as independent entities has evolved in today's global landscape, especially with the emergence of powerful multinational technology corporations. Companies like Google, Amazon, Apple, and Meta have gone beyond their corpora...

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Historical Development of Nation-States and Technology Companies 5.1 History of Nation-States: The Evolution of Sovereignty and Governance The concept of the nation-state, as understood today, is a relatively recent development in the long history of human governance. Its evolution has been marked by profound transformations in political, social, and econ...

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Brand Tribalism &Ndash; Consumer Tribal Behavior on Brand Loyalty

Economic Power and Market Sovereignty 6.1 Global Economic Influence: Tech Giants vs. Nation-States' GDP Contributions today and in history The most obvious parallel between large tech companies and nation-states is their vast economic power. Apple, for example, reached a market capitalization of over $3 trillion in 2022, 125 Francis, Abey. 2024. “Brand Tr...

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https://medium.com/bc-digest/the-xerox-thieves-steve-jobs-bill-gates-6e1b36fc1ec4. 115 Perry, Alex. 2019. “What Google, Amazon, and Apple Were Doing 20 Years Ago.” Mashable, August 30, 2019. https://mashable.com/article/apple-amazon-google-1999-then- now?test_uuid=01iI2GpryXngy77uIpA3Y4B&test_variant=a. 51 connecting billions of people and redefining how ...

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Big Tech: Impact, Dominance and Anti-Competitive Practices - PWOnlyIAS

Conclusion 7.1 Summary of Findings: Big Tech's Function as Nation-State Equivalents We can choose between allowing powerful corporations to pursue their interests or shaping markets to ensure that technology benefits the public and is controlled democratically by citizens rather than corporations. Competition policy is the most effective tool for reshapin...

work page arXiv 2024
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US Revokes Licences for Supply of Chips to China’s Huawei

https://www.techradar.com/news/huawei-ban. 99 “US Revokes Licences for Supply of Chips to China’s Huawei.” May 8, 2024. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/cf965960-b083-49ee-bae1-6ce95fe872a3. 44 4.5.1 Figure 2, Lobbying expenses of the leading internet companies in the United States in 2023 (in million U.S. dollars) 100 Corporate governance stru...

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Visualizing Top 20 Most Valuable Companies of All Time

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https://www.politico.eu/article/big-tech-companies-face-potential-eu-lobbying-ban/. 95 Zuboff, Shoshana. "The age of surveillance capitalism." In Social theory re-wired,. Routledge, 2023. 96 Cadwalladr, Carole, and Emma Graham-Harrison. "Revealed: 50 million Facebook profiles ...

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Pith tools

Reviewed August 7, 2026 · model on record in the stance chip above.

[1] [3]

Algorithmic content moderation: Technical and political challenges in the automation of platform governance

https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/. 80 Gillespie, Tarleton. Custodians of the Internet: Platforms, content moderation, and the hidden decisions that shape social media. Yale University Press, 2018. 38 moderators and algorithms interpret and enforce these policies, deciding what content is acceptab...

work page arXiv 2020

[2] [4]

Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy

Theoretical Framework 4.1 State-like Characteristics: Sovereignty, Territory, Population, and Governance The concept of nation-states as independent entities has evolved in today's global landscape, especially with the emergence of powerful multinational technology corporations. Companies like Google, Amazon, Apple, and Meta have gone beyond their corpora...

work page 1999

[3] [5]

Coercion, capital, and European states, AD 990–1990

Historical Development of Nation-States and Technology Companies 5.1 History of Nation-States: The Evolution of Sovereignty and Governance The concept of the nation-state, as understood today, is a relatively recent development in the long history of human governance. Its evolution has been marked by profound transformations in political, social, and econ...

work page 2001

[4] [6]

Brand Tribalism &Ndash; Consumer Tribal Behavior on Brand Loyalty

Economic Power and Market Sovereignty 6.1 Global Economic Influence: Tech Giants vs. Nation-States' GDP Contributions today and in history The most obvious parallel between large tech companies and nation-states is their vast economic power. Apple, for example, reached a market capitalization of over $3 trillion in 2022, 125 Francis, Abey. 2024. “Brand Tr...

work page 2019

[5] [7]

What Google, Amazon, and Apple Were Doing 20 Years Ago

https://medium.com/bc-digest/the-xerox-thieves-steve-jobs-bill-gates-6e1b36fc1ec4. 115 Perry, Alex. 2019. “What Google, Amazon, and Apple Were Doing 20 Years Ago.” Mashable, August 30, 2019. https://mashable.com/article/apple-amazon-google-1999-then- now?test_uuid=01iI2GpryXngy77uIpA3Y4B&test_variant=a. 51 connecting billions of people and redefining how ...

work page 2007

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Big Tech: Impact, Dominance and Anti-Competitive Practices - PWOnlyIAS

Conclusion 7.1 Summary of Findings: Big Tech's Function as Nation-State Equivalents We can choose between allowing powerful corporations to pursue their interests or shaping markets to ensure that technology benefits the public and is controlled democratically by citizens rather than corporations. Competition policy is the most effective tool for reshapin...

work page arXiv 2024

[7] [2019]

US Revokes Licences for Supply of Chips to China’s Huawei

https://www.techradar.com/news/huawei-ban. 99 “US Revokes Licences for Supply of Chips to China’s Huawei.” May 8, 2024. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/cf965960-b083-49ee-bae1-6ce95fe872a3. 44 4.5.1 Figure 2, Lobbying expenses of the leading internet companies in the United States in 2023 (in million U.S. dollars) 100 Corporate governance stru...

work page arXiv 2012

[8] [2021]

Visualizing Top 20 Most Valuable Companies of All Time

https://www.visualcapitalist.com/the-tech-giants-worth-compared-economies-countries/. 61 and Amazon in order adjusted to today’s market capitalization in trillions are The Dutch East India Company, $8.28, The Mississippi Company, $6.58, and The South Sea Company, $4.5 all historical notorious monopolies.The only current company that hovers near the top te...

work page 2017