Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Paying for Failure in Expert Advice

As of 18 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 12 of 12 outbound references and 3 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2508.19707.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2508.19707 v5

Coverage vector

measured 12 of 12 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-05T15:40:16.064881Z

measured 15 of 15 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00

measured 3 of 3 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-05T15:42:16.690719Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: pith, observed 2026-08-05T12:47:22.249940Z

Reference resolution

12 of 12 outbound references displayed

verified exact2
verified fuzzy8
unresolved2
parse uncertain0
malformed identifier0
metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation 11c044c3-db59-467a-b0a6-57002a871db9 · outbound

This paper cites Conflicts of Interest, Information Provision, and Competition in the Financial Services Industry,.

Paying for Failure in Expert Advice Conflicts of Interest, Information Provision, and Competition in the Financial Services Industry,

Reference 1

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T15:40:16.335940Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

Observation f221a1b6-9c4a-4134-ac8d-2a25a54b40cb · outbound

This paper cites Strategic Experimentation,.

Paying for Failure in Expert Advice Strategic Experimentation,

Reference 2

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T15:40:16.316614Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

Observation a1fb5cc4-27bd-4e65-877b-c40d6ab7a831 · outbound

This paper cites Strategic Information Transmission,.

Paying for Failure in Expert Advice Strategic Information Transmission,

Reference 3

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T15:40:16.298320Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

Observation 6745f19b-1234-4fe5-8ff9-ea29bdd16da0 · outbound

This paper cites Strictly Proper Scoring Rules, Prediction, and Estimation,.

Paying for Failure in Expert Advice Strictly Proper Scoring Rules, Prediction, and Estimation,

Reference 4

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T15:40:16.279118Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

Observation df1d32ce-36a0-41f0-99d4-cc000b0a01c7 · outbound

This paper cites Financial Advice,.

Paying for Failure in Expert Advice Financial Advice,

Reference 5

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T15:40:16.258619Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

Observation 5af519d8-8a63-4dbd-80f1-61e700dff6f9 · outbound

This paper cites Bayesian Persuasion,.

Paying for Failure in Expert Advice Bayesian Persuasion,

Reference 6

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T15:40:16.241187Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

Observation e3562c0f-191a-4c37-a8a2-199b6d4173be · outbound

This paper cites Strategic Experimentation with Poisson Bandits,.

Paying for Failure in Expert Advice Strategic Experimentation with Poisson Bandits,

Reference 7

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T15:40:16.223902Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

Observation 988fa107-8a33-4f9b-856c-46a59fb74fc5 · outbound

This paper cites Eliciting Properties of Probability Distributions,.

Paying for Failure in Expert Advice Eliciting Properties of Probability Distributions,

Reference 8

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T15:40:16.206910Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

Observation dce98a75-b27b-4ec4-904c-62b885d2379a · outbound

This paper cites Informational Inertia and Staggered Prices.

Paying for Failure in Expert Advice Informational Inertia and Staggered Prices

Reference 9

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-05T15:40:16.188009Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

Observation 01b708d6-0796-491c-819e-3ea6297e2b71 · outbound

This paper cites Two Motives for Verification in Information Cascades.

Paying for Failure in Expert Advice Two Motives for Verification in Information Cascades

Reference 10

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-05T15:40:16.052644Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 3aa3c8e3-c456-4851-8d58-d281bacdeb25 · outbound

This paper cites Contrarian Incentives and Costly Social Learning.

Paying for Failure in Expert Advice Contrarian Incentives and Costly Social Learning

Reference 11

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-05T15:40:16.137419Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

Observation ae161ea7-8709-4654-8ab8-90ceff0ac7d9 · outbound

This paper cites Endogenous Vindication: Reputation and Effort in Expert Advice.

Paying for Failure in Expert Advice Endogenous Vindication: Reputation and Effort in Expert Advice

Reference 12

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-05T15:40:16.064881Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Pith citing papers

Observation 8493a8ed-6757-4ad0-b92c-334ac512d3a8 · inbound

Endogenous Vindication: Reputation and Effort in Expert Advice cites this paper.

Endogenous Vindication: Reputation and Effort in Expert Advice Paying for Failure in Expert Advice

Reference 16

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-05T15:42:16.690719Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 40fcd3f6-5c38-4c4f-b1e5-28904a45b665 · inbound

Contrarian Incentives and Costly Social Learning cites this paper.

Contrarian Incentives and Costly Social Learning Paying for Failure in Expert Advice

Reference 24

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-05T14:30:00.821850Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 4bf67ac5-8c93-48f6-ab0f-cde1ef1a1dff · inbound

Designing Silence: Peer Feedback under Reputational Concerns cites this paper.

Designing Silence: Peer Feedback under Reputational Concerns Paying for Failure in Expert Advice

Reference 16

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-05T12:47:22.349829Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.