Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains | Paper Citation Record

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This paper cites 2011 Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2011 Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction

Reference 1

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Observation 99365366-de63-4efe-ab6c-5c090a1e6c8a · outbound

This paper cites 1992 An Experimental Study of the Cen - tipede Game.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1992 An Experimental Study of the Cen - tipede Game

Reference 2

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This paper cites 2014 Social heuristics shape intuitive coop - eration.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2014 Social heuristics shape intuitive coop - eration

Reference 3

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This paper cites 2004 Cultural Diﬀerences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2004 Cultural Diﬀerences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis

Reference 4

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This paper cites 2008 The two-person beauty contest.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2008 The two-person beauty contest

Reference 5

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Observation e79f4cd3-f2e8-4430-bc05-82b37bc9f3ce · outbound

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Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains Unresolved cited work

Reference 6

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This paper cites 2007 Chimpanzees Are Ratio- nal Maximizers in an Ultimatum Game.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2007 Chimpanzees Are Ratio- nal Maximizers in an Ultimatum Game

Reference 7

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This paper cites 2001 Rationality in medical decision making: a review of the literature on doctors’ decision-making biases.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2001 Rationality in medical decision making: a review of the literature on doctors’ decision-making biases

Reference 8

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Observation f3069f2b-1b47-432c-be11-cb5d1f50b623 · outbound

This paper cites 2015 Cognitive and Motivational Biases in Decision and Risk Analysis.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2015 Cognitive and Motivational Biases in Decision and Risk Analysis

Reference 9

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Observation 0dd4c5cf-bf2d-40ad-b30b-6d1f8760c9a9 · outbound

This paper cites 2013 On ev olu- tionary explanations of cognitive biases.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2013 On ev olu- tionary explanations of cognitive biases

Reference 10

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Observation 5215bb6c-75f9-4f1e-a4fc-3222672cabe0 · outbound

This paper cites 2011 Deceit and self-deception: fooling yourself the better to fool others.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2011 Deceit and self-deception: fooling yourself the better to fool others

Reference 11

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:31.481059Z

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Observation 012b20f7-cfd7-4ebd-a632-dba345cd0e27 · outbound

This paper cites 2011 The evolution and psychol- ogy of self-deception.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2011 The evolution and psychol- ogy of self-deception

Reference 12

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Observation 57a8c497-707d-44a3-8049-bad3da7620d4 · outbound

This paper cites 20 20 Theory of mind and decision science: Towards a typology of tasks and computational models.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 20 20 Theory of mind and decision science: Towards a typology of tasks and computational models

Reference 13

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Observation edccc18d-221f-40cb-8b7f-9f7f85b8f9b3 · outbound

This paper cites 2009 The evolution of misbelief.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2009 The evolution of misbelief

Reference 14

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Observation d24827e1-5920-4743-ab3c-b709d6a645a3 · outbound

This paper cites 2024 Evolut ion of a theory of mind.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2024 Evolut ion of a theory of mind

Reference 15

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Observation 8d59fcf4-4114-44c0-889a-5b9afc6da3ff · outbound

This paper cites 2004 A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2004 A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games

Reference 16

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Observation ef87996f-56c0-4bb9-a475-55ef9a22a008 · outbound

This paper cites 1973 The Logic of Animal Conﬂict.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1973 The Logic of Animal Conﬂict

Reference 17

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Observation 9cce0d91-0e28-4a28-b0ba-7f8198eecabd · outbound

This paper cites 1982 Evolution and the Theory of Games.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1982 Evolution and the Theory of Games

Reference 18

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Observation af1b39ba-7e70-4d85-a940-5bc186ccb3dc · outbound

This paper cites 2010 The calculus of selﬁshness.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2010 The calculus of selﬁshness

Reference 19

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Observation ba0a80c6-418a-4bca-a3b3-ec4b2daf15e8 · outbound

This paper cites 2023 EGTtoo ls: Evolutionary game dynamics in Python.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2023 EGTtoo ls: Evolutionary game dynamics in Python

Reference 20

Resolution: metadata mismatch; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:30.977211Z

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Observation 0aa2be75-8fed-428b-9661-510af2b7ad3a · outbound

This paper cites 1993 Evolution of Smartn Players.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1993 Evolution of Smartn Players

Reference 21

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Observation 69879928-9371-41bd-8e53-e4949ab45ba1 · outbound

This paper cites 2012 Level-k analysis of experimental c en- tipede games.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2012 Level-k analysis of experimental c en- tipede games

Reference 22

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:31.435878Z

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Observation ebfca467-5736-454f-bc5f-f8eb57311d5e · outbound

This paper cites 2022 Deep and shallow thinking in the long run.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2022 Deep and shallow thinking in the long run

Reference 23

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.947863Z

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Observation 0e01c60d-b825-40ce-8ec0-ae6590fef682 · outbound

This paper cites 1997 Rationality and Bounded Rationality.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1997 Rationality and Bounded Rationality

Reference 24

Resolution: verified exact; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:30.798569Z

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Observation 0e76b383-2504-40c1-adab-5ff49fa68a62 · outbound

This paper cites 1981 Games of perfect information, predator y pricing and the chain-store paradox.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1981 Games of perfect information, predator y pricing and the chain-store paradox

Reference 25

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.933029Z

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Observation 27f055c5-2725-46b5-8f43-1c06c3fb094c · outbound

This paper cites 2003 Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2003 Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game

Reference 26

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.916836Z

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Observation 0120f6f4-4d9c-41a0-abe2-204eb7a6c933 · outbound

This paper cites 2004 Population Learning of Co- operative Behavior in a Three-Person Centipede Game.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2004 Population Learning of Co- operative Behavior in a Three-Person Centipede Game

Reference 27

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.901738Z

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Observation 03901f81-0e5b-4ef1-a3a5-0dd866a374be · outbound

This paper cites 1996 An experimental study of constant-sum centipede games.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1996 An experimental study of constant-sum centipede games

Reference 28

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Observation 052d5876-f4b9-43e0-9950-2eec44b8c6b8 · outbound

This paper cites 2009 Field Centipedes.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2009 Field Centipedes

Reference 29

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Observation 9d8d87e0-d5ac-49d0-873f-68c181abfc1d · outbound

This paper cites 2012 Evolutionary dynamics in ﬁnite popu- lations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observe d in the centipede game.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2012 Evolutionary dynamics in ﬁnite popu- lations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observe d in the centipede game

Reference 30

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.855961Z

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Observation d0242942-63dd-4f95-a7dc-b18943c26448 · outbound

This paper cites 1995 Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1995 Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games

Reference 31

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Observation d7267058-832f-4b1f-adc1-b01dae771ae6 · outbound

This paper cites 1998 Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1998 Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games

Reference 32

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Observation 75886377-5b82-4486-b4a8-8795de6af334 · outbound

This paper cites 2022 Altruism and Ambiguity in the Centipede game.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2022 Altruism and Ambiguity in the Centipede game

Reference 33

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.829747Z

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Observation 93e1339c-a89f-40a6-a66b-28bbeaf40def · outbound

This paper cites 2016 Exploring cooperation and competition in the Centipede game through verbal protocol an alysis.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2016 Exploring cooperation and competition in the Centipede game through verbal protocol an alysis

Reference 34

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Observation 512e2e3a-7f9b-480b-860f-bd581440c4ad · outbound

This paper cites 2019 Preferences-dependent learning in t he cen- tipede game: The persistence of mistrust.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2019 Preferences-dependent learning in t he cen- tipede game: The persistence of mistrust

Reference 35

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Observation ad2b7da4-24dc-4e3f-b315-64532777cf62 · outbound

This paper cites 2014 The evolution of decision rules in complex environments.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2014 The evolution of decision rules in complex environments

Reference 36

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Observation fcf7e33d-1125-4f42-9c17-1010868f8977 · outbound

This paper cites 1974 Judgment under Uncertainty: H euristics and Biases: Biases in judgments reveal some heuristics of thinking u nder uncertainty.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1974 Judgment under Uncertainty: H euristics and Biases: Biases in judgments reveal some heuristics of thinking u nder uncertainty

Reference 37

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Observation 772202a5-9743-4aa6-84f0-621b354140b9 · outbound

This paper cites 2013 How much does it help t o know what she knows you know? An agent-based simulation study.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2013 How much does it help t o know what she knows you know? An agent-based simulation study

Reference 38

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.784286Z

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Observation b0253379-dfc4-40f0-87a6-6838d9651ec8 · outbound

This paper cites 2014 Theory of Mind: Did Evolu- tion Fool Us?.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2014 Theory of Mind: Did Evolu- tion Fool Us?

Reference 39

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.769431Z

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Observation 3f9b625e-869a-41ac-bddf-0d8dfa7ecc59 · outbound

This paper cites 1994 The Traveler’s Dilemma: Paradoxes of Rationality in Game Theory.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1994 The Traveler’s Dilemma: Paradoxes of Rationality in Game Theory

Reference 40

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:31.421174Z

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Observation 9add62ec-73b5-407b-beb7-5fdce2e01b45 · outbound

This paper cites 1999 Stochastic game theory: For playing g ames, not just for doing theory.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1999 Stochastic game theory: For playing g ames, not just for doing theory

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Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.754680Z

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Observation 855c90de-0435-4820-990a-09df860a8764 · outbound

This paper cites 2004 A model of noisy introspection.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2004 A model of noisy introspection

Reference 42

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.740391Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-15T06:32:42.880941+00:00.

Observation 6cc61462-5924-4ddd-b135-2774941dc298 · outbound

This paper cites 2013 From extortion to generosity, ev olution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2013 From extortion to generosity, ev olution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma

Reference 43

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.726168Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-15T06:32:42.880941+00:00.

Observation 3e0ebd11-d98f-43a6-9e8f-c78e527d8b24 · outbound

This paper cites 1998 Hawk-dove game and com- petition dynamics.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1998 Hawk-dove game and com- petition dynamics

Reference 44

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.711468Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

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Observation ba27d153-9814-4a18-9be9-fded11867645 · outbound

This paper cites 1983 Replicator dynamics.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1983 Replicator dynamics

Reference 45

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:31.405531Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

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Observation 63a66457-7b70-41b8-aaa2-4684eb09a795 · outbound

This paper cites 2014 The replicator equation and other gam e dy- namics.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2014 The replicator equation and other gam e dy- namics

Reference 46

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:31.390888Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-15T06:32:42.880941+00:00.

Observation e1a487c9-e9ce-45f9-9bf6-43fbdd7452dd · outbound

This paper cites 2006 Five rules for the evolution of cooperation.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2006 Five rules for the evolution of cooperation

Reference 47

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:31.375387Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

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Observation eee75559-26a1-4964-9e43-5545fc4325a2 · outbound

This paper cites 2007 Transforming the dilemma.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2007 Transforming the dilemma

Reference 48

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:31.360639Z

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No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-15T06:32:42.880941+00:00.

Observation 59782cf6-b1d2-4348-9327-8b6731e73bf3 · outbound

This paper cites 2015 Three steps ahead: Three steps ahead.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2015 Three steps ahead: Three steps ahead

Reference 49

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.695516Z

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Observation 7ff7ce64-60cb-46b6-a9f6-16c6240dfbbe · outbound

This paper cites 2003 Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational a nd Bound- edly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2003 Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational a nd Bound- edly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions

Reference 50

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.681112Z

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Observation 18770c3e-ce49-412e-b398-31ad65879492 · outbound

This paper cites 2012 Neural correlates of wis h- ful thinking.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2012 Neural correlates of wis h- ful thinking

Reference 51

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.666164Z

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No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-15T06:32:42.880941+00:00.

Observation b7424f42-bd8b-416d-81de-e6d8d0511956 · outbound

This paper cites 2014 A bounded rationality acc ount of wishful thinking.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2014 A bounded rationality acc ount of wishful thinking

Reference 52

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:31.345267Z

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Observation e4e6f903-3211-4f6f-88ee-157b5f9a8753 · outbound

This paper cites Gravitational quadrupole deformation and the tidal deformability for stellar systems: (The number of) Love for undergraduates.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains Gravitational quadrupole deformation and the tidal deformability for stellar systems: (The number of) Love for undergraduates

Reference 53

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.347247Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation d50af370-bca1-4efa-aaec-4153673e1c4e · outbound

This paper cites 2010 How prevalent is wishful thinking? Misattribu- tion of arousal causes optimism and pessimism in subjective prob- abilities.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2010 How prevalent is wishful thinking? Misattribu- tion of arousal causes optimism and pessimism in subjective prob- abilities

Reference 54

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.650858Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-15T06:32:42.880941+00:00.

Observation 68639391-03ba-44da-99be-9ce7a1c0a469 · outbound

This paper cites 1998 Defensive Pessimism and Optimism: The Bitter- Sweet Inﬂuence of Mood on Performance and Prefactual and Counterfactual Thinking.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1998 Defensive Pessimism and Optimism: The Bitter- Sweet Inﬂuence of Mood on Performance and Prefactual and Counterfactual Thinking

Reference 55

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.633731Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-15T06:32:42.880941+00:00.

Observation 445704c0-1584-435e-987d-382c811b111c · outbound

This paper cites 2011 Agitated Honey bees Exhibit Pessimistic Cognitive Biases.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2011 Agitated Honey bees Exhibit Pessimistic Cognitive Biases

Reference 56

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.618015Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-15T06:32:42.880941+00:00.

Observation 9bc9203a-ba18-44f7-83de-f71ca5ba57fa · outbound

This paper cites 2009 Wishful Thinking about the Future : Does Desire Impact Optimism?.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2009 Wishful Thinking about the Future : Does Desire Impact Optimism?

Reference 57

Resolution: verified exact; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:30.473977Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-15T06:32:42.880941+00:00.

Observation 1e879b27-b097-4e2d-a446-f9cf70da8fd4 · outbound

This paper cites 2007 The inﬂuence of outcome de- sirability on optimism.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2007 The inﬂuence of outcome de- sirability on optimism

Reference 58

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.603628Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-15T06:32:42.880941+00:00.

Observation 616f094a-2fd3-48f5-ba23-fecd67ee97eb · outbound

This paper cites 1999 On the Evolution of Attitudes towa rds Risk in Winner-Take-All Games.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1999 On the Evolution of Attitudes towa rds Risk in Winner-Take-All Games

Reference 59

Resolution: verified exact; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:30.398831Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-15T06:32:42.880941+00:00.

Observation 03485551-9318-4ea4-8858-6bb4450171ad · outbound

This paper cites 2025 Why do children pass in the centipede g ame? Cognitive limitations v.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2025 Why do children pass in the centipede g ame? Cognitive limitations v

Reference 60

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.588520Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-15T06:32:42.880941+00:00.

Observation 79b0a1db-72f7-49de-8707-0018a50ac630 · outbound

This paper cites 2011 The evolution of overconﬁdence.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2011 The evolution of overconﬁdence

Reference 61

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.573550Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-15T06:32:42.880941+00:00.

Observation f0952ca1-1952-4e2e-b674-0da7f381e70a · outbound

This paper cites 2024 Learning to Resolve So cial Dilemmas: A Survey.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2024 Learning to Resolve So cial Dilemmas: A Survey

Reference 62

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.389688Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation c0016ad3-7f1b-4ecf-b3e7-e79ecc1ae699 · outbound

This paper cites 2006 Imitation processes with small mu tations.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2006 Imitation processes with small mu tations

Reference 63

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.394008Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 25ce1c48-9900-414e-b760-c4145ba590aa · outbound

This paper cites 2006 Stochastic dynam- ics of invasion and ﬁxation.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2006 Stochastic dynam- ics of invasion and ﬁxation

Reference 64

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.398417Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation a833cc7d-69a5-4ba4-8313-6e35aec4d82b · outbound

This paper cites 2019 Computation and S imu- lation of Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finite Populations.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2019 Computation and S imu- lation of Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finite Populations

Reference 65

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.528376Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-15T06:32:42.880941+00:00.

Observation b45a68d0-2a8e-4523-8164-c09ce4d845e7 · outbound

This paper cites 2025 MarcoSaponara/centipede-bias: First pub lic release.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2025 MarcoSaponara/centipede-bias: First pub lic release

Reference 66

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.512516Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-15T06:32:42.880941+00:00.

Observation dc499575-4511-4629-9b04-43c145284530 · outbound

This paper cites 1994 Trust and commitment in the United States and Japan.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 1994 Trust and commitment in the United States and Japan

Reference 67

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.496674Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-15T06:32:42.880941+00:00.

Observation 903f27a8-1c55-40e2-88de-4f3a764f437c · outbound

This paper cites 2018 Commitment-enhancing tools in Centipede games: Evidencing European–Japanese diﬀerences in trust and cooperation.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2018 Commitment-enhancing tools in Centipede games: Evidencing European–Japanese diﬀerences in trust and cooperation

Reference 68

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.480743Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-15T06:32:42.880941+00:00.

Observation 3b16d17b-bc47-4000-822e-abc91f619285 · outbound

This paper cites 2016 Cooperation in re- peated interactions: A systematic review of Centipede game exper i- ments, 1992–2016.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2016 Cooperation in re- peated interactions: A systematic review of Centipede game exper i- ments, 1992–2016

Reference 69

Resolution: verified exact; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:30.290345Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-15T06:32:42.880941+00:00.

Observation c7f5b1ef-9c7b-4f97-aba0-ca26c2c60a1f · outbound

This paper cites 2017 Co - operation and Trust in Japanese and British Samples: Evidence From Incomplete Information Games.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains 2017 Co - operation and Trust in Japanese and British Samples: Evidence From Incomplete Information Games

Reference 70

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.465204Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-15T06:32:42.880941+00:00.

Observation 76155786-cbb9-4c40-a66f-63b2ad9d20ce · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains Unresolved cited work

Reference 566

Resolution: verified exact; doi, observed 2026-08-05T14:54:29.962655Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-15T06:32:42.880941+00:00.

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