Are Enterprises Ready for Quantum-Safe Cybersecurity?

Phuc Hao Do; Tran Duc Le; Truong Duy Dinh; Van Dai Pham

REVIEW 4 major objections 4 minor 1 cited by

Are Enterprises Ready for Quantum-Safe Cybersecurity?

T0 review · 4 major / 4 minor · reviewed 2026-08-05 · deepseek-v4-flash

Challenge this review Re-run · record.json Download PDF Read on arXiv ↗

Pith's one-line read This review argues that enterprise readiness for quantum-safe cybersecurity is uneven and generally insufficient, with fewer than 5% of organizations holding formal transition plans and the threat of 'harvest now, decrypt later' already act

desk verdict Competent 2025 survey synthesis, but the headline 5% statistic is a press-release number without methodology; use it as an indicative briefing, not a rigorous measurement. read the letter →

arxiv 2509.01731 v1 pith:JPM4HJMM submitted 2025-09-01 cs.CR

Tran Duc Le , Phuc Hao Do , Truong Duy Dinh , Van Dai Pham This is my paper · ORCID

classification cs.CR

keywords quantum-safecybersecuritypost-quantumcryptographyquantumkeydistributionenterprisereadinesscryptographicagilityharvestnowdecryptlaterthreattimelineSWOTanalysis

verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

The pith

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The reading

This paper asks whether enterprises are actually ready for the collapse of classical public-key cryptography that a large quantum computer would cause. Its answer is a qualified no: the necessary technology exists, but enterprise adoption is far behind. Reviewing the situation from the vantage points of technologists, security executives, and threat actors, and folding the results into a SWOT analysis, the paper finds that fewer than 5% of organizations have a formal quantum-transition plan, that most sectors are still in an exploratory or stalled state, and that many enterprises underestimate the 'harvest now, decrypt later' tactic already being used by sophisticated adversaries. The reason the conclusion matters is that migration is a multi-year, whole-infrastructure effort, so the true deadline is not the arrival of a quantum computer but the moment today's encrypted data loses its protection.

What carries the argument

The paper's organizing machinery is a three-perspective stakeholder analysis — technologist, enterprise decision-maker, and threat actor — synthesized through a SWOT matrix. The SWOT is not decorative: it maps internal strengths and weaknesses (usable post-quantum standards vs. missing roadmaps and skills gaps) against external opportunities and threats (regulatory deadlines, harvest-now-decrypt-later) and thereby converts the three separate narratives into the single conclusion that readiness is uneven and generally insufficient. Inside the threat perspective, the load-bearing mechanism is the 'store now, decrypt later' dynamic, which turns a future quantum-computing risk into a present dat

What would settle it

A representative global survey of chief information security officers, with published methodology, that found more than 20% of enterprises holding formal quantum-transition roadmaps with budgeted post-quantum pilots would falsify the paper's central unpreparedness claim. A second check would be measuring whether large enterprises have completed cryptographic inventories: if most have, the 'long tail of unprepared firms' conclusion loses its quantitative support.

Watch

Extended reading notes

Core claim

On the paper's own terms, the central claim is a readiness gap expressed as a mismatch of three timelines. The technological timeline is essentially ready: standardized post-quantum algorithms exist, initial deployments are running, and quantum key distribution is mature enough for niche links but is not a general replacement for classical cryptography. The adversarial timeline is already active: sophisticated actors are stockpiling encrypted traffic in anticipation of future decryption. The enterprise timeline is the laggard: most organizations lack a roadmap, budget, cryptographic inventories, or the skilled staff needed to migrate, and the sectors that are moving (banking, telecom, govern

Load-bearing premise

The fewer-than-5% figure, which anchors the claim that most enterprises are unprepared, comes from a single industry survey that the paper does not describe in terms of sample size, sampling frame, or confidence, and it is then generalized to enterprises worldwide.

Editorial extensions

If this is right

Data with a long confidentiality shelf life is exposed today: if adversaries are already harvesting encrypted traffic, protecting archives and long-lived records with quantum-safe encryption becomes a present-day task, not a 2030s task.
Post-quantum cryptography is the workhorse of the transition; quantum key distribution remains a specialty tool for high-value point-to-point links, so enterprises should focus migration effort on software-upgradeable public-key systems first.
The multi-year nature of cryptographic migration means organizations that have not started inventories and crypto-agility work by the mid-2020s will likely face a rushed, more costly transition under regulatory or incident pressure.
Regulatory backstops will increasingly turn quantum readiness from a voluntary risk exercise into a compliance obligation, especially for critical infrastructure and financial services.
First movers in banking, telecom, and government will generate the integration lessons and vendor demand that make post-quantum adoption easier for latecomers, but those latecomers still need to plan rather than wait for turnkey fixes.

Reading between the lines

Editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

Editorial extension: if the under-5% roadmap figure is roughly representative, demand for migration tools and trained integrators is likely to arrive as a synchronized shock around regulatory deadlines, so supply-side capacity needs to be built before enterprises feel the push.
Editorial extension: the paper's SWOT implies a testable sector-level prediction — organizations that already run cryptographic inventories for compliance reasons will adopt post-quantum cryptography faster than otherwise similar peers; a survey controlling for existing crypto-governance maturity could check this.
Editorial extension: an outcome the paper leaves underweighted is that cloud and software vendors may 'bake in' post-quantum support by default before most enterprises act, which could spare small organizations the worst of the transition while making vendor supply-chain diligence the new critical dependency.

Share X Bluesky LinkedIn Reddit HN

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, and a circularity audit.

Desk Editor's Note

read the letter

What you should know: this is a competent, current review of enterprise quantum-readiness surveys, but the headline "fewer than 5% of enterprises" is a press-release number with no published methodology, not a measured fact.

The paper does well organizing the material into three perspectives—technologist, CISO/CIO, threat actor—and the SWOT synthesis is a sensible framework. It correctly notes that PQC is the practical path while QKD is niche, and its recommendations (crypto inventory, crypto-agility, phased deployment) line up with NIST and NCSC guidance. For a practitioner wanting a 2025 snapshot, this is useful.

The soft spots are in the numbers. The load-bearing statistic, fewer than 5%, comes from a single ISACA press release with no sample size, sampling frame, or margin of error, and the paper moves from "technology professionals" to "enterprises" without acknowledging the jump. The "expert consensus" on CRQCs in the 2030s is actually one RAND commentary; the paper itself cites earlier and later estimates, so "consensus" is an overstatement. There is also no source-selection methodology—it's a narrative review, which is fine, but the reader should treat the survey percentages as indicative, not precise.

That said, the central qualitative claim—preparedness is uneven and generally insufficient—holds up. Multiple surveys (ISC2, Capgemini, ISACA, Forescout) point in the same direction. So the argument survives, but the paper would be more credible if the abstract and Section 3.1 were softened to acknowledge the limitations of the underlying sources.

Who is this for? CISOs, policy people, and students needing a landscape summary. It is not a research contribution—no new data, no new methods, no falsifiable predictions. The review is honest about its own scope, which counts for something.

Recommendation: I'd send it to peer review at a practitioner- or survey-friendly venue, but the authors should fix the overreach in the abstract and Section 3.1, and ideally report the ISACA methodology caveats. If the target venue is a top research conference, it's a desk reject. Either way, engage with it as a useful briefing, not as an authoritative data source.

Referee Report

4 major / 4 minor

Summary. The paper assesses enterprise readiness for quantum-safe cybersecurity by reviewing three perspectives: technology maturity (PQC and QKD), enterprise organizational readiness, and threat-actor dynamics. It synthesizes recent standards, surveys, and threat intelligence into a SWOT analysis. The central claim is that readiness is uneven and generally insufficient: PQC standards and niche QKD deployments show technical progress, but fewer than 5% of enterprises have formal quantum-transition plans, many underestimate harvest-now/decrypt-later risks, and most sectors remain exploratory or stalled by cost, complexity, and skills gaps. It closes with recommendations: build crypto-agility, create transition roadmaps, prioritize PQC deployment, and upskill teams.

Significance. The paper provides a useful, up-to-date synthesis of a fast-moving topic and correctly distinguishes PQC from QKD in terms of maturity and practical deployability. Its strength is the breadth of recent references and the balanced discussion of technical constraints. However, the paper contributes no original data or systematic methodology; its value is as an organized review. The headline quantitative claim—fewer than 5% of enterprises have formal quantum-transition plans—rests on a single press release and is generalized beyond the surveyed population. Because the paper's urgency argument depends on this number, the evidential weakness is load-bearing. The recommendations are sensible but generic. Overall, the central narrative is defensible if appropriately qualified, but the current presentation overstates confidence in the supporting evidence.

major comments (4)

[Abstract and §3.1] The abstract states that 'fewer than 5% of enterprises have formal quantum-transition plans.' This is attributed to the ISACA 2025 press release [56]. The press release reports two separate statistics: 5% of organizations made quantum threats a 'high business priority' and 5% have a 'defined quantum computing strategy or roadmap.' The surveyed population appears to be technology professionals (likely ISACA members), not a representative sample of global enterprises. The manuscript does not report the sample size, sampling frame, margin of error, or definition of 'roadmap.' The inference from a self-selected professional survey to 'enterprises' is not justified. Please soften the claim to 'surveyed technology professionals' or provide additional independent evidence.
[§4.1 and §6.1] The paper repeatedly invokes 'expert consensus' that a cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) will not appear before the 2030s, citing a RAND commentary [3] and a Cyber Defense Magazine blog post [8]. A single commentary, even by a respected analyst, does not constitute 'expert consensus.' This overstatement underlies the conclusion that '10 years is likely just enough to get ready.' Please either cite a systematic expert elicitation or multiple independent primary assessments, or clearly label this as one prominent expert view with a range of opinions.
[§3.1 and §3.2] The main quantitative support for enterprise unpreparedness uses two sources of differing quality: the ISACA press release [56] and a Capgemini Research Institute report [59] that the reference itself marks as a 'fourth draft.' The manuscript presents these figures (e.g., 41% of organizations not planning to address quantum computing, 37% not discussing it, 51% citing organizational inertia) without discussing sampling or draft status. As these statistics drive the central conclusion, the authors should disclose known limitations of each source and indicate whether the Capgemini findings were updated in a final version.
[Introduction and Section 2-4] The paper has no methodology section describing how sources were selected, how surveys were evaluated for quality, or how conflicting statistics were reconciled. This is particularly important because the paper's conclusions are entirely derived from external reports. A short 'methods and limitations' subsection would allow readers to assess the evidence base and would also clarify that this is a narrative review, not a systematic literature review.

minor comments (4)

[§2.1 and §3.2] Several typographical artifacts appear: 'F ALCON' should be 'FALCON'; 'T echnical Debt' should be 'Technical Debt'; 'c ompanies' should be 'companies' in §3.1; and Figure 1 contains 'uncertfainty' for 'uncertainty.'
[References] Reference [39] is a Wikipedia article; please replace with a primary or peer-reviewed source for the SIKE break. Reference [59] is a draft report with a versioned URL; cite the final version if available and provide an access date consistent with the reference style.
[§4.1] The term 'Y2Q' is introduced without definition; given that it appears only once, either define it on first use or consider removing it.
[Figure 1] The SWOT diagram is schematic and somewhat difficult to parse in its current form. Consider a higher-resolution figure with bullets for each SWOT category.

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged · score 0.0 of 10

No significant circularity: the paper is a synthetic review whose conclusions summarize external sources and surveys, with no derived equations, fitted parameters, or self-citation chain that would make its claims equivalent to its inputs.

full rationale

This paper does not derive equations, fit parameters, or construct a formal model. Its central claims—such as 'fewer than 5% of enterprises have formal quantum-transition plans'—are explicitly attributed to external surveys and reports (e.g., ISACA [56], Capgemini [59]), and the SWOT synthesis is a qualitative integration of those external findings. There is no self-referential derivation, no imported uniqueness theorem, and no ansatz smuggled in via citation. The only arguable weaknesses are evidential (e.g., reliance on a single ISACA press release without published methodology), which pertain to correctness or evidentiary support, not circularity. The paper's conclusion is a summary and interpretation of independent external sources, not a result that is equivalent to its own assumptions by construction. Therefore, the circularity score is 0.

Assumptions & free parameters 0 free parameters · 3 assumptions · 0 invented entities

The paper is a review and introduces no fitted parameters, constants, or invented entities. Its central claim rests on the validity of the cited surveys, expert reports, and threat-intelligence posts.

assumptions (3)

domain assumption The cited surveys (ISACA 2025, Capgemini 2025) are representative of global enterprise readiness and their point estimates are accurate.
Section 3.1 bases the central claim about fewer than 5% having plans on these surveys without reporting methodology or margins of error.
domain assumption A single RAND commentary by Edward Parker constitutes the 'expert consensus' on the CRQC timeline.
Section 4.1 and Section 6.1 rely on this article for the 2030s timeline and the claim that secret CRQC development is practically impossible, but no systematic expert elicitation is cited.
domain assumption The 'harvest now, decrypt later' threat is already active based on reported incidents such as Volt Typhoon.
Section 4.1 uses this inference to argue the threat is present-day, but the evidence is attributed to a single Forescout blog post [61] and an ISACA survey [56].

how reviews work

0 comments

Cite this review

Pith. "Pith review of Are Enterprises Ready for Quantum-Safe Cybersecurity?." pith.science (2026). https://pith.science/paper/JPM4HJMM

@misc{pith2026250901731,
  author       = {Pith},
  title        = {Pith review of: Are Enterprises Ready for Quantum-Safe Cybersecurity?},
  year         = {2026},
  howpublished = {\url{https://pith.science/paper/JPM4HJMM}},
  note         = {Machine review of arXiv:2509.01731}
}

read the original abstract

Quantum computing threatens to undermine classical cryptography by breaking widely deployed encryption and signature schemes. This paper examines enterprise readiness for quantum-safe cybersecurity through three perspectives: (i) the technologist view, assessing the maturity of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) and quantum key distribution (QKD); (ii) the enterprise (CISO/CIO) view, analyzing organizational awareness, risk management, and operational barriers; and (iii) the threat actor view, evaluating the evolving quantum threat and the urgency of migration. Using recent standards (e.g., NIST's 2024 PQC algorithms), industry surveys, and threat intelligence, we synthesize findings via a SWOT analysis to map strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. Results indicate uneven and generally insufficient preparedness: while PQC standards and niche QKD deployments signal technical progress, fewer than 5\% of enterprises have formal quantum-transition plans, and many underestimate "harvest now, decrypt later" risks. Financial, telecom, and government sectors have begun migration, but most industries remain exploratory or stalled by costs, complexity, and skills gaps. Expert consensus places cryptanalytically relevant quantum computers in the 2030s, yet delayed preparation could leave today's data vulnerable for decades. We recommend immediate steps: establishing crypto-agility, creating quantum transition roadmaps, prioritizing PQC deployment in high-value systems, and upskilling cybersecurity teams. A coordinated, proactive approach is essential to secure current and future digital assets in the quantum era.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2509.01731 by the authors.

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Forward citations

Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

Real-Time VPN Traffic over ETSI GS QKD 014 Key Delivery with a LuxQuanta NOVA QKD Platform
quant-ph 2026-07 conditional novelty 4.5 of 10

A user-space VPN on Jetson Xavier NX peers ran eight hours of bidirectional real-time audio/video using keys delivered by LuxQuanta NOVA via ETSI GS QKD 014 with in-band key_ID transport.

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

77 extracted references · 73 canonical work pages · cited by 1 Pith paper

[56]

Despite rising concerns, 95% of organizations lack a quantum computing roadmap, isaca finds,

ISACA, “Despite rising concerns, 95% of organizations lack a quantum computing roadmap, isaca finds,” Press release, ISACA Newsroom, April 2025, accessed: 12 Aug 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.isaca.org/about-us/newsroom/press-releases/ 2025/organizations-lack-a-quantum-computing-roadmap-isaca-finds

work page 2025
[3]

When a quantum computer is able to break our encryption, it won’t be a secret,

E. Parker, “When a quantum computer is able to break our encryption, it won’t be a secret,” Commentary, RAND Corporation (originally published by Lawfare), 23 September 2023, accessed: 12 Aug 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.rand.org/pubs/ commentary/2023/09/when-a-quantum-computer-is-able-to-break-our-encryption.html

work page 2023
[8]

The impact of quantum decryption,

A. Walton, “The impact of quantum decryption,” Blog post, Cyber Defense Magazine (Deep Dive Cyber), June 2025, accessed: 12 Aug 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.cyberdefensemagazine.com/the-impact-of-quantum-decryption/

work page 2025
[59]

Future encrypted: Why post-quantum cryp- tography tops the new cybersecurity agenda (fourth draft),

Capgemini Research Institute, “Future encrypted: Why post-quantum cryp- tography tops the new cybersecurity agenda (fourth draft),” Capgemini Re- search Institute, Research Report (Draft), July 2025, accessed: 12 Aug

work page 2025
[1]

Key exchange in the quantum era: Evaluating a hybrid system of public-key cryptography and physical-layer security,

P. Staat, M. D¨ orpinghaus, A. Sheikholeslami, C. Paar, G. Fcllwcis, and D. Goeckel, “Key exchange in the quantum era: Evaluating a hybrid system of public-key cryptography and physical-layer security,” in 2025 59th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems (CISS) . IEEE, Mar. 2025, p. 1–6

work page 2025
[2]

Modern data encryption,

C. Boyd, “Modern data encryption,” Electronics & Communication Engineering Journal , vol. 5, no. 5, p. 271–278, Oct. 1993

work page 1993
[4]

Status report on the third round of the nist post-quantum cryptography standardization process,

M. Yesina, Y. Ostrianska, and I. Gorbenko, “Status report on the third round of the nist post-quantum cryptography standardization process,” Radiotekhnika, no. 210, p. 75–86, Sep. 2022

work page 2022
[5]

A critical analysis of deployed use cases for quantum key distribution and comparison with post-quantum cryptography,

N. Aquina, B. Cimoli, S. Das, K. H¨ ovelmanns, F. J. Weber, C. Okonkwo, S. Rommel, B. ˇSkori´ c, I. Tafur Monroy, and S. Verschoor, “A critical analysis of deployed use cases for quantum key distribution and comparison with post-quantum cryptography,” EPJ Quan- tum Technology, vol. 12, no. 1, May 2025

work page 2025

Show all 77 references

[6]

Architecting quantum-resistant cybersecurity: A framework for tran- sitioning to post-quantum cryptographic systems,

V. R. K. Adapa, “Architecting quantum-resistant cybersecurity: A framework for tran- sitioning to post-quantum cryptographic systems,” International Journal of Science and Research Archive, vol. 14, no. 1, p. 737–746, Jan. 2025

2025
[7]

Pmmp-pqc migration man- agement process,

N. Von Nethen, A. Wiesmaier, N. Alnahawi, and J. Henrich, “Pmmp-pqc migration man- agement process,” in European Interdisciplinary Cybersecurity Conference, ser. EICC 2024. ACM, Jun. 2024, p. 144–154

2024
[9]

At the cybersecurity frontier: Key strategies and persistent challenges for business leaders,

M. Balzano and G. Marzi, “At the cybersecurity frontier: Key strategies and persistent challenges for business leaders,” Strategic Change, vol. 34, no. 2, p. 181–192, Dec. 2024

2024
[10]

Pattnaik, J

N. Pattnaik, J. R. C. Nurse, S. Turner, G. Mott, J. MacColl, P. Huesch, and J. Sullivan, It’s More Than Just Money: The Real-World Harms from Ransomware Attacks . Springer Nature Switzerland, 2023, p. 261–274

2023
[11]

Quantum-safe cybersecurity talent and job market analysis (2020-21),

C. A. Boulet, O. Kaya, P. MacKinnon, and M. Rowell, “Quantum-safe cybersecurity talent and job market analysis (2020-21),” Quantum-Safe Canada , 2021

2020
[12]

Swot analysis,

D. Leigh, “Swot analysis,” p. 115–140, Nov. 2009

2009
[13]

Quantum readiness toolkit: Building a quantum-secure economy,

World Economic Forum and Deloitte, “Quantum readiness toolkit: Building a quantum-secure economy,” White paper / press release, June 2023, ac- cessed: 12 Aug 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.weforum.org/whitepapers/ quantum-readiness-toolkit-building-a-quantum-secure-economy

2023
[14]

Research on develop- ment progress and test evaluation of post-quantum cryptography,

M. Zhang, J. Wang, J. Lai, M. Dong, Z. Zhu, R. Ma, and J. Yang, “Research on develop- ment progress and test evaluation of post-quantum cryptography,” Entropy, vol. 27, no. 2, p. 212, Feb. 2025

2025
[15]

Journeying through securing digital communication: A comparative analysis from classical to post-quantum cryptography,

A. Deshpande, A. Nalwade, V. Sadashiv Gutte, and D. R. Patil, “Journeying through securing digital communication: A comparative analysis from classical to post-quantum cryptography,” in 2024 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Distributed Sys- tems Security (ICBDS)...

2024
[16]

Post-quantum cryptography: Securing digital communication in the quantum era,

G. S. Mamatha, N. Dimri, and R. Sinha, “Post-quantum cryptography: Securing digital communication in the quantum era,” 2024

2024
[17]

Nist releases first 3 finalized post-quantum encryption standards,

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Nist releases first 3 finalized post-quantum encryption standards,” https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2024/08/ nist-releases-first-3-finalized-post-quantum-encryption-standards, August 2024, accessed: 12 Aug 2025. 24

2024
[18]

Module-lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanism performance measure- ments,

N. Nagy, S. Alnemer, L. M. Alshuhail, H. Alobiad, T. Almulla, F. A. Alrumaihi, N. Ghadra, and M. Nagy, “Module-lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanism performance measure- ments,” Sci, vol. 7, no. 3, p. 91, Jul. 2025

2025
[19]

Crystals - kyber: A cca-secure module-lattice-based kem,

J. Bos, L. Ducas, E. Kiltz, T. Lepoint, V. Lyubashevsky, J. M. Schanck, P. Schwabe, G. Seiler, and D. Stehle, “Crystals - kyber: A cca-secure module-lattice-based kem,” in 2018 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) . IEEE, Apr. 2018, p. 353–367

2018
[20]

Single bit randomness leakage: The vulnerability in post- quantum cryptography standard crystals-dilithium,

B. Liu, J. Zhang, and A. Wang, “Single bit randomness leakage: The vulnerability in post- quantum cryptography standard crystals-dilithium,” in 2025 8th International Conference on Information and Computer Technologies (ICICT) . IEEE, Mar. 2025, p. 43–48

2025
[21]

Arm architecture opti- mizations for line-rate pqc communications,

A. C. Aguilera, I. T. Monroy, J. J. Vegas Olmos, and J. L. Ima˜ na, “Arm architecture opti- mizations for line-rate pqc communications,” in 2025 International Conference on Optical Network Design and Modeling (ONDM) . IEEE, May 2025, p. 1–4

2025
[22]

Exploring post-quantum cryptography: Review and directions for the transition process,

K. Cherkaoui Dekkaki, I. Tasic, and M.-D. Cano, “Exploring post-quantum cryptography: Review and directions for the transition process,” Technologies, vol. 12, no. 12, p. 241, Nov. 2024

2024
[23]

High- efficiency multi-standard polynomial multiplication accelerator on risc-v soc for post- quantum cryptography,

D.-T. Dam, T.-H. Nguyen, T.-H. Tran, D.-H. Le, T.-T. Hoang, and C.-K. Pham, “High- efficiency multi-standard polynomial multiplication accelerator on risc-v soc for post- quantum cryptography,” IEEE Access, vol. 12, p. 195015–195031, 2024

2024
[24]

Crypto- graphic challenges and security in post quantum cryptography migration: A prospective approach,

A. K. Pandey, A. Banati, B. Rajendran, S. D. Sudarsan, and K. K. S. Pandian, “Crypto- graphic challenges and security in post quantum cryptography migration: A prospective approach,” in 2023 IEEE International Conference on Public Key Infrastructure and its Applications (PKIA)...

2023
[25]

A survey on nist se- lected third round candidates for post quantum cryptography,

T. Hasija, K. R. Ramkumar, A. Kaur, S. Mittal, and B. Singh, “A survey on nist se- lected third round candidates for post quantum cryptography,” in 2022 7th International Conference on Communication and Electronics Systems (ICCES) . IEEE, Jun. 2022, p. 737–743

2022
[26]

Security and performance analyses of post-quantum digital signature algorithms and their tls and pki integrations,

M. Raavi, Q. Khan, S. Wuthier, P. Chandramouli, Y. Balytskyi, and S.-Y. Chang, “Security and performance analyses of post-quantum digital signature algorithms and their tls and pki integrations,” Cryptography, vol. 9, no. 2, p. 38, Jun. 2025

2025
[27]

Performance analysis and industry deployment of post-quantum cryptography algorithms,

E. D. Demir, B. Bilgin, and M. C. Onbasli, “Performance analysis and industry deployment of post-quantum cryptography algorithms,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2503.12952 , 2025

2025 arXiv
[28]

K. A. Jackson, C. A. Miller, and D. Wang,Evaluating the Security of CRYSTALS-Dilithium in the Quantum Random Oracle Model . Springer Nature Switzerland, 2024, p. 418–446

2024
[29]

Zheng, H

J. Zheng, H. Zhu, Y. Dong, Z. Song, Z. Zhang, Y. Yang, and Y. Zhao, Faster Post- quantum TLS 1.3 Based on ML-KEM: Implementation and Assessment . Springer Nature Switzerland, 2024, p. 123–143

2024
[30]

Enabling lattice-based post-quantum cryptography on the opentitan platform,

T. Stelzer, F. Oberhansl, J. Schupp, and P. Karl, “Enabling lattice-based post-quantum cryptography on the opentitan platform,” in Proceedings of the 2023 Workshop on Attacks and Solutions in Hardware Security , ser. CCS ’23. ACM, Nov. 2023, p. 51–60

2023
[31]

Optimizing lattice- based post-quantum cryptography codes for high-level synthesis,

A. Guerrieri, G. D. Silva Marques, F. Regazzoni, and A. Upegui, “Optimizing lattice- based post-quantum cryptography codes for high-level synthesis,” in 2022 25th Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design (DSD) . IEEE, Aug. 2022, p. 777–784. 25

2022
[32]

The quantum apocalypse is coming. be very afraid,

A. Katwala, “The quantum apocalypse is coming. be very afraid,” WIRED, March 2025, accessed: 12 Aug 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.wired.com/story/ q-day-apocalypse-quantum-computers-encryption/

2025
[33]

Toward a common understanding of cryptographic agility–a systematic review,

C. N¨ ather, D. Herzinger, J.-P. Stegh¨ ofer, S.-L. Gazdag, E. Hirsch, and D. Loebenberger, “Toward a common understanding of cryptographic agility–a systematic review,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2411.08781, 2024

2024 arXiv
[34]

Software-defined cryptography: A design feature of cryptographic agility,

J. Cho, C. Lee, E. Kim, J. Lee, and B. Cho, “Software-defined cryptography: A design feature of cryptographic agility,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.01808 , 2024

2024 arXiv
[35]

Transition to post- quantum cryptography standards (initial public draft),

D. Moody, R. Perlner, A. Regenscheid, A. Robinson, and D. Cooper, “Transition to post- quantum cryptography standards (initial public draft),” National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Internal Report (IR) 8547 ipd, November 2024, initial public draft; comments due ...

2024
[36]

X. 509 information security certification based on post-quantum cryptogra- phy,

A. C. Chen, “X. 509 information security certification based on post-quantum cryptogra- phy,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.02179 , 2024

2024 arXiv
[37]

Quantum-safe hybrid key exchanges with kem-based authentication,

C. Battarbee, C. Striecks, L. Perret, S. Ramacher, and K. Verhaeghe, “Quantum-safe hybrid key exchanges with kem-based authentication,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2411.04030 , 2024

2024 arXiv
[38]

Securing the future: Hybrid post-quantum cryp- tography,

ALLEGRO Consortium, “Securing the future: Hybrid post-quantum cryp- tography,” Web news post, ALLEGRO project, March 2025, accessed: 12 Aug 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.allegro-he.eu/2025/03/31/ securing-the-future-hybrid-post-quantum-cryptography/

2025
[39]

Post-quantum cryptography,

Wikipedia contributors, “Post-quantum cryptography,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, August 2025, accessed: 12 Aug 2025. [Online]. Available: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Post-quantum cryptography

2025
[40]

A cost-efficient quantum access network with qubit-based synchronization,

C. Huang, Y. Chen, T. Luo, W. He, X. Liu, Z. Zhang, and K. Wei, “A cost-efficient quantum access network with qubit-based synchronization,” Science China Physics, Mechanics & Astronomy, vol. 67, no. 4, Feb. 2024

2024
[41]

Quantum key distribution (qkd) for sym- metric key transfer,

A. Nath, S. Maity, S. Banerjee, and R. Roy, “Quantum key distribution (qkd) for sym- metric key transfer,” International Journal of Scientific Research in Computer Science, Engineering and Information Technology, vol. 10, no. 3, p. 270–280, May 2024

2024
[42]

Secure composition of quantum key distribution and sym- metric key encryption,

K. Dey and R. Safavi-Naini, “Secure composition of quantum key distribution and sym- metric key encryption,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2501.08435 , 2025

2025
[43]

Coexistence of high-bit-rate quantum key distribution and data on optical fiber,

K. A. Patel, J. F. Dynes, I. Choi, A. W. Sharpe, A. R. Dixon, Z. L. Yuan, R. V. Penty, and A. J. Shields, “Coexistence of high-bit-rate quantum key distribution and data on optical fiber,” Physical Review X , vol. 2, no. 4, Nov. 2012

2012
[44]

Quantum key distribution using decoy state protocol,

S. Ali, S. Saharudin, and M. Wahiddin, “Quantum key distribution using decoy state protocol,” American Journal of Engineering and Applied Sciences, vol. 2, no. 4, p. 694–698, Apr. 2009

2009
[45]

Future-proofing data: Assessing the feasibility of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms to mitigate ‘harvest now, decrypt later’ attacks,

A. T. Olutimehin, S. A. Joseph, A. J. Ajayi, O. C. Metibemu, A. Y. Balogun, and O. O. Olaniyi, “Future-proofing data: Assessing the feasibility of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms to mitigate ‘harvest now, decrypt later’ attacks,” Archives of Current Research Internationa...

2025
[46]

The debate over qkd: A rebuttal to the nsa’s objections,

R. Renner and R. Wolf, “The debate over qkd: A rebuttal to the nsa’s objections,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.15116, 2023

2023 arXiv
[47]

Quantum key distribution (qkd) and quantum cryptography (qc),

National Security Agency / Central Security Service (NSA/CSS), “Quantum key distribution (qkd) and quantum cryptography (qc),” Official guidance web page, NSA/CSS, 2025, accessed: 12 Aug 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.nsa.gov/ Cybersecurity/Quantum-Key-Distribution-QKD...

2025
[48]

M. K. Pasupuleti, Scalable Quantum Networks: Entanglement-Driven Secure Communica- tion, Mar. 2025

2025
[49]

The madrid testbed: Qkd sdn control and key management in a production network,

V. Martin, J. P. Brito, L. Ort ´ ız, R. Brito-M´ endez, R. Vicente, J. Saez-Buruaga, A. J. Sebastian, D. G. Aguado, M. I. Garc ´ ıa-Cid, J. Setien, P. Salas, C. Escribano, E. Dopazo, J. Rivas-Moscoso, A. Pastor-Perales, and D. Lopez, “The madrid testbed: Qkd sdn control and ke...

2023
[50]

Integration of qkd at the application layer vs network layer: a markov-chain model,

S. Shokrivahed and G. Verticale, “Integration of qkd at the application layer vs network layer: a markov-chain model,” in 2024 IEEE Future Networks World Forum (FNWF) . IEEE, Oct. 2024, p. 748–753

2024
[51]

An enhanced virtualized control and key management model for qkd networks,

B. Lopez, I. Vidal, F. Valera, and D. R. Lopez, “An enhanced virtualized control and key management model for qkd networks,” IEEE Network , vol. 39, no. 3, p. 165–172, May 2025

2025
[52]

Application and development of qkd-based quantum secure communication,

J. Lai, F. Yao, J. Wang, M. Zhang, F. Li, W. Zhao, and H. Zhang, “Application and development of qkd-based quantum secure communication,” Entropy, vol. 25, no. 4, p. 627, Apr. 2023

2023
[53]

Experimental demon- stration of ddos mitigation over a quantum key distribution (qkd) network using software defined networking (sdn),

E. Hugues-Salas, F. Ntavou, Y. Ou, J. E. Kennard, C. White, D. Gkounis, K. Nikolovgenis, G. Kanellos, C. Erven, A. Lord, R. Nejabati, and D. Simeonidou, “Experimental demon- stration of ddos mitigation over a quantum key distribution (qkd) network using software defined networ...

2018
[54]

Real-time diagnostics on a qkd link via qber time-series analysis,

G. Maragkopoulos, A. Mandilara, T. Nikas, and D. Syvridis, “Real-time diagnostics on a qkd link via qber time-series analysis,” Entropy, vol. 26, no. 11, p. 922, Oct. 2024

2024
[55]

Implementation of a 46-node quantum metropolitan area network,

T.-Y. Chen, X. Jiang, S.-B. Tang, L. Zhou, X. Yuan, H. Zhou, J. Wang, Y. Liu, L.-K. Chen, W.-Y. Liu, H.-F. Zhang, K. Cui, H. Liang, X.-G. Li, Y. Mao, L.-J. Wang, S.- B. Feng, Q. Chen, Q. Zhang, L. Li, N.-L. Liu, C.-Z. Peng, X. Ma, Y. Zhao, and J.-W. Pan, “Implementation of a 4...

2021
[57]

2024 isc2 cybersecurity workforce study,

ISC2, “2024 isc2 cybersecurity workforce study,” Insight article on ISC2 website, October 2024, accessed: 12 Aug 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.isc2.org/Insights/2024/ 10/ISC2-2024-Cybersecurity-Workforce-Study

2024
[58]

No more excuses for procrastinating on quantum preparation,

R. Clyde, “No more excuses for procrastinating on quantum preparation,” Blog post, ISACA Now (News & Trends), April 2025, accessed: 12 Aug 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.isaca.org/resources/news-and-trends/isaca-now-blog/ 2025/no-more-excuses-for-procrastinating-on-qua...

2025
[60]

Kuzminykh, B

I. Kuzminykh, B. Ghita, and S. Shiaeles, Comparative Analysis of Cryptographic Key Man- agement Systems . Springer International Publishing, 2020, p. 80–94

2020
[61]

Future of encryption in a quan- tum cryptography world,

Forescout Research – Vedere Labs, “Future of encryption in a quan- tum cryptography world,” Blog post on Forescout website, 2025, ac- cessed: 12 Aug 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.forescout.com/blog/ the-future-of-encryption-in-a-quantum-cryptography-world/

2025
[62]

New research reveals security budgets only increased 2 points in 2024, while 12% of cisos faced reductions,

IANS Research and Artico Search, “New research reveals security budgets only increased 2 points in 2024, while 12% of cisos faced reductions,” Press release, IANS Research Newsroom, September 2024, accessed: 12 Aug 2025. [Online]. Available: https://tinyurl.com/IANSResearch2024

2024
[63]

Magic: A method for assessing cyber incidents occurrence,

M. Battaglioni, G. Rafaiani, F. Chiaraluce, and M. Baldi, “Magic: A method for assessing cyber incidents occurrence,” IEEE Access, vol. 10, p. 73458–73473, 2022

2022
[64]

Post-quantum cryptography (pqc): how to build resilience while padlocks still work,

N. Curcuru, “Post-quantum cryptography (pqc): how to build resilience while padlocks still work,” Blog post, CyberArk Blog, June 2025, ac- cessed: 12 Aug 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.cyberark.com/resources/ blog/post-quantum-cryptography-pqc-how-to-build-resilience-w...

2025
[65]

Is quantum right for your business?

B. Bartleson, “Is quantum right for your business?” Web article, Strategic Solutions 4U blog, March 2025, updated: 27 April 2025; Accessed: 12 Aug 2025. [Online]. Available: https://strategicsolutions4u.com/is-quantum-right-for-your-business/

2025
[66]

Pinnacleone execbrief — post-quantum cryptography and enterprise risks,

M. Pines, “Pinnacleone execbrief — post-quantum cryptography and enterprise risks,” Blog post, SentinelOne Cybersecurity Blog (PinnacleOne ExecBrief series), August 2024, accessed: 12 Aug 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/ pinnacleone-execbrief-post-q...

2024
[67]

How cisos can use quantum readiness to secure bigger budgets (and fix today’s problems),

M. Ivezic, “How cisos can use quantum readiness to secure bigger budgets (and fix today’s problems),” Web article, PostQuantum.com, July 2025, accessed: 12 Aug 2025. [Online]. Available: https://postquantum.com/post-quantum/quantum-ciso-budget/

2025
[68]

The post-quantum cryptography transition: Making progress, but still a long road ahead,

B. LaMacchia, M. Campagna, and W. Gropp, “The post-quantum cryptography transition: Making progress, but still a long road ahead,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2503.04806 , 2025

2025 arXiv
[69]

A survey of post-quantum cryptography support in cryptographic libraries,

N. Ahmed, L. Zhang, and A. Gangopadhyay, “A survey of post-quantum cryptography support in cryptographic libraries,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2508.16078 , 2025

2025 arXiv
[70]

Strategic roadmap for quantum-resistant security: A frame- work for preparing industries for the quantum threat,

A. K. Bishwas and M. Sen, “Strategic roadmap for quantum-resistant security: A frame- work for preparing industries for the quantum threat,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2411.09995 , 2024

2024 arXiv
[71]

Migrating software systems toward post-quantum cryptography-a systematic literature review,

C. N¨ ather, D. Herzinger, S.-L. Gazdag, J.-P. Stegh¨ ofer, S. Daum, and D. Loebenberger, “Migrating software systems toward post-quantum cryptography-a systematic literature review,” IEEE Access, vol. 12, p. 132107–132126, 2024

2024
[72]

Post-quantum cryptography for secure banking transactions,

T. O. Ogundola, “Post-quantum cryptography for secure banking transactions,” Interna- tional Journal of Scientific Research and Modern Technology , p. 40–42, Jul. 2025. 28

2025
[73]

Making existing software quantum safe: A case study on ibm db2,

L. Zhang, A. Miranskyy, W. Rjaibi, G. Stager, M. Gray, and J. Peck, “Making existing software quantum safe: A case study on ibm db2,” Information and Software Technology , vol. 161, p. 107249, Sep. 2023

2023
[74]

Quantum advantage and the y2k bug: A com- parison,

L. Zhang, A. Miranskyy, and W. Rjaibi, “Quantum advantage and the y2k bug: A com- parison,” IEEE Software, vol. 38, no. 2, p. 80–87, Mar. 2021

2021
[75]

A security assessment tool for quantum threat analysis,

B. Halak, C. S. Csete, E. Joyce, J. Papaioannou, A. Pires, J. Soma, B. Gokkaya, and M. Murphy, “A security assessment tool for quantum threat analysis,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.13523, 2024

2024 arXiv
[76]

M. Dima, M. Dulea, A. Dima, M. Stoica, and M. Udre, Quantum Encrypted Data Transfers in GRID . InTech, Feb. 2011. 29

2011
[2025]

Available: https://www.capgemini.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/ CRI PQC Research-draft 4th-draft 10072025.pdf

[Online]. Available: https://www.capgemini.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/ CRI PQC Research-draft 4th-draft 10072025.pdf

2025

Pith tools

Reviewed August 5, 2026 · model on record in the stance chip above.

[1] [56]

Despite rising concerns, 95% of organizations lack a quantum computing roadmap, isaca finds,

ISACA, “Despite rising concerns, 95% of organizations lack a quantum computing roadmap, isaca finds,” Press release, ISACA Newsroom, April 2025, accessed: 12 Aug 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.isaca.org/about-us/newsroom/press-releases/ 2025/organizations-lack-a-quantum-computing-roadmap-isaca-finds

work page 2025

[2] [3]

When a quantum computer is able to break our encryption, it won’t be a secret,

E. Parker, “When a quantum computer is able to break our encryption, it won’t be a secret,” Commentary, RAND Corporation (originally published by Lawfare), 23 September 2023, accessed: 12 Aug 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.rand.org/pubs/ commentary/2023/09/when-a-quantum-computer-is-able-to-break-our-encryption.html

work page 2023

[3] [8]

The impact of quantum decryption,

A. Walton, “The impact of quantum decryption,” Blog post, Cyber Defense Magazine (Deep Dive Cyber), June 2025, accessed: 12 Aug 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.cyberdefensemagazine.com/the-impact-of-quantum-decryption/

work page 2025

[4] [59]

Future encrypted: Why post-quantum cryp- tography tops the new cybersecurity agenda (fourth draft),

Capgemini Research Institute, “Future encrypted: Why post-quantum cryp- tography tops the new cybersecurity agenda (fourth draft),” Capgemini Re- search Institute, Research Report (Draft), July 2025, accessed: 12 Aug

work page 2025

[5] [1]

Key exchange in the quantum era: Evaluating a hybrid system of public-key cryptography and physical-layer security,

P. Staat, M. D¨ orpinghaus, A. Sheikholeslami, C. Paar, G. Fcllwcis, and D. Goeckel, “Key exchange in the quantum era: Evaluating a hybrid system of public-key cryptography and physical-layer security,” in 2025 59th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems (CISS) . IEEE, Mar. 2025, p. 1–6

work page 2025

[6] [2]

Modern data encryption,

C. Boyd, “Modern data encryption,” Electronics & Communication Engineering Journal , vol. 5, no. 5, p. 271–278, Oct. 1993

work page 1993

[7] [4]

Status report on the third round of the nist post-quantum cryptography standardization process,

M. Yesina, Y. Ostrianska, and I. Gorbenko, “Status report on the third round of the nist post-quantum cryptography standardization process,” Radiotekhnika, no. 210, p. 75–86, Sep. 2022

work page 2022

[8] [5]

A critical analysis of deployed use cases for quantum key distribution and comparison with post-quantum cryptography,

N. Aquina, B. Cimoli, S. Das, K. H¨ ovelmanns, F. J. Weber, C. Okonkwo, S. Rommel, B. ˇSkori´ c, I. Tafur Monroy, and S. Verschoor, “A critical analysis of deployed use cases for quantum key distribution and comparison with post-quantum cryptography,” EPJ Quan- tum Technology, vol. 12, no. 1, May 2025

work page 2025