pith. sign in

arxiv: 2512.15641 · v2 · submitted 2025-12-16 · 💻 cs.CR

ComMark: Covert and Robust Black-Box Model Watermarking with Compressed Samples

Pith reviewed 2026-05-16 22:21 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💻 cs.CR
keywords model watermarkingblack-box watermarkingfrequency domaincovertnessrobustnesscompressed samplesintellectual propertydeep learning security
0
0 comments X

The pith

ComMark embeds watermarks in black-box models by compressing samples through frequency-domain high-frequency filtering to achieve both covertness and robustness.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

Deep learning models are valuable assets vulnerable to theft, creating demand for practical black-box watermarking that hides ownership marks while resisting removal. Existing methods often sacrifice either covertness or robustness. ComMark generates watermark samples via frequency-domain transformations that filter out high-frequency information, producing compressed versions less prone to detection. It further trains with these samples under simulated attack scenarios and adds a similarity loss to strengthen resistance against tampering. Evaluations across image, speech, text, and video tasks show improved performance on both properties compared to prior approaches.

Core claim

ComMark introduces a black-box model watermarking framework that uses frequency-domain transformations to generate compressed watermark samples by filtering high-frequency information, combined with simulated attack scenarios and a similarity loss during training, to deliver state-of-the-art covertness and robustness across diverse datasets and architectures.

What carries the argument

Frequency-domain transformations that filter high-frequency information to produce compressed watermark samples, augmented by simulated attacks and similarity loss during training.

Load-bearing premise

That filtering high-frequency information from watermark samples and training against simulated attacks will preserve model utility while making the watermark resistant to both detection and real-world removal attempts.

What would settle it

An experiment showing that an unsimulated attack such as targeted fine-tuning or high-frequency perturbation removes the watermark while model accuracy on the original task stays high would falsify the robustness claim.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2512.15641 by Juan Cao, Xiaojun Chen, Xiaoyan Gu, Yunfei Yang, Yu Zhou, Zhendong Zhao.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: Examples of watermark samples from existing black-box [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p001_1.png] view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Figure 2: The effect of visual differences in the spatial domain [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p002_2.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Figure 3: An overview of our ComMark method. the training process and embeds the watermark before de￾ployment. Given unknown future attacks, the goal is to craft a watermark that is effective, imperceptible, and ro￾bust. Verification is conducted in a black-box setting, where the defender only accesses the model’s predictions via an API controlled by the adversary. 3.2. Overview Our method, illustrated in [PITH_FUL… view at source ↗
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: Comparison of robustness against watermark removal attacks. (On CIFAR10) [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p006_4.png] view at source ↗
Figure 5
Figure 5. Figure 5: Comparison of robustness against watermark evasion attacks. (On CIFAR10) [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p006_5.png] view at source ↗
Figure 6
Figure 6. Figure 6: Visual comparison of covertness of different watermarking methods. (On CIFAR10) [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p007_6.png] view at source ↗
Figure 7
Figure 7. Figure 7: Visualization of t-SNE in the feature space of models with (w/) and without (w/o) similarity loss [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p008_7.png] view at source ↗
Figure 8
Figure 8. Figure 8: Comparison of robustness against watermark removal attacks. (On GTSRB) [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p013_8.png] view at source ↗
Figure 9
Figure 9. Figure 9: Comparison of robustness against watermark removal attacks. (On CIFAR100) [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p013_9.png] view at source ↗
Figure 10
Figure 10. Figure 10: Comparison of robustness against watermark removal attacks. (On VGGFace) [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p014_10.png] view at source ↗
Figure 11
Figure 11. Figure 11: Resistance to false watermark triggering conditions. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p014_11.png] view at source ↗
Figure 12
Figure 12. Figure 12: Resistance to watermark ambiguity attacks. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p014_12.png] view at source ↗
Figure 13
Figure 13. Figure 13: Generalized robustness of our watermarking method against model pruning attacks on various deep learning tasks. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p015_13.png] view at source ↗
Figure 14
Figure 14. Figure 14: The change in model performance with (w) and without (w/o) similarity loss [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p017_14.png] view at source ↗
Figure 15
Figure 15. Figure 15: The effect of different watermark sample rates. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p017_15.png] view at source ↗
Figure 16
Figure 16. Figure 16: The effect of different compression quality factors. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p018_16.png] view at source ↗
Figure 17
Figure 17. Figure 17: Visual comparison of covertness of different watermarking methods. (On GTSRB, CIFAR100 and VGGFace) [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p018_17.png] view at source ↗
Figure 18
Figure 18. Figure 18: Comparison of robustness against watermark evasion attacks. (On GTSRB) [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p019_18.png] view at source ↗
Figure 19
Figure 19. Figure 19: Comparison of robustness against watermark evasion attacks. (On CIFAR100) [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p020_19.png] view at source ↗
Figure 20
Figure 20. Figure 20: Comparison of robustness against watermark evasion attacks. (On VGGFace) [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p021_20.png] view at source ↗
read the original abstract

The rapid advancement of deep learning has turned models into highly valuable assets due to their reliance on massive data and costly training processes. However, these models are increasingly vulnerable to leakage and theft, highlighting the critical need for robust intellectual property protection. Model watermarking has emerged as an effective solution, with black-box watermarking gaining significant attention for its practicality and flexibility. Nonetheless, existing black-box methods often fail to better balance covertness (hiding the watermark to prevent detection and forgery) and robustness (ensuring the watermark resists removal)-two essential properties for real-world copyright verification. In this paper, we propose ComMark, a novel black-box model watermarking framework that leverages frequency-domain transformations to generate compressed, covert, and attack-resistant watermark samples by filtering out high-frequency information. To further enhance watermark robustness, our method incorporates simulated attack scenarios and a similarity loss during training. Comprehensive evaluations across diverse datasets and architectures demonstrate that ComMark achieves state-of-the-art performance in both covertness and robustness. Furthermore, we extend its applicability beyond image recognition to tasks including speech recognition, sentiment analysis, image generation, image captioning, and video recognition, underscoring its versatility and broad applicability.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

3 major / 2 minor

Summary. The paper proposes ComMark, a black-box model watermarking framework that leverages frequency-domain transformations to generate compressed watermark samples by filtering high-frequency information. Simulated attack scenarios and a similarity loss are incorporated during training to enhance robustness. Evaluations across diverse datasets, architectures, and tasks (image recognition, speech recognition, sentiment analysis, image generation, image captioning, video recognition) claim state-of-the-art performance in both covertness and robustness.

Significance. If the empirical results hold under broader testing, the work could advance practical IP protection for deep learning models by improving the covertness-robustness trade-off and demonstrating applicability beyond image tasks. The frequency-domain compression plus attack simulation approach offers a concrete direction for black-box watermarking, provided the simulations prove representative.

major comments (3)
  1. [§4] §4 (Experiments): Robustness is demonstrated only against the specific simulated attacks used in training; no results are reported for adaptive or unsimulated removal strategies such as model extraction, quantization-aware fine-tuning, or unseen pruning, which directly undermines the SOTA robustness claim.
  2. [§3.2] §3.2 (Method): The frequency-domain high-frequency filtering is presented as preserving model utility, but no ablation on cutoff thresholds or their quantitative effect on task accuracy is provided, leaving the central utility-robustness balance unverified.
  3. [Table 3] Table 3 (Results): Performance metrics lack error bars, standard deviations, or statistical significance tests against baselines, making it impossible to confirm the claimed improvements are reliable rather than artifacts of specific seeds or post-hoc tuning.
minor comments (2)
  1. [§3] Notation for the similarity loss is introduced without an explicit equation reference in the main text, requiring cross-reference to the appendix for full understanding.
  2. [Figure 2] Figure 2 caption does not specify the exact frequency filter parameters used in the visualized samples.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

3 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for the constructive feedback on our manuscript. We address each major comment point by point below, proposing revisions to strengthen the work where appropriate.

read point-by-point responses
  1. Referee: [§4] §4 (Experiments): Robustness is demonstrated only against the specific simulated attacks used in training; no results are reported for adaptive or unsimulated removal strategies such as model extraction, quantization-aware fine-tuning, or unseen pruning, which directly undermines the SOTA robustness claim.

    Authors: We thank the referee for this observation. Our training incorporates simulated attacks to promote robustness against known removal strategies, consistent with standard practices in the watermarking literature. To better substantiate the robustness claims, we will add new experiments in the revised manuscript evaluating performance under adaptive attacks, including model extraction, quantization-aware fine-tuning, and unseen pruning, with corresponding detection rates reported. revision: yes

  2. Referee: [§3.2] §3.2 (Method): The frequency-domain high-frequency filtering is presented as preserving model utility, but no ablation on cutoff thresholds or their quantitative effect on task accuracy is provided, leaving the central utility-robustness balance unverified.

    Authors: We agree that a quantitative ablation on cutoff thresholds is needed to verify the utility-robustness trade-off. In the revised manuscript, we will include an ablation study across multiple cutoff frequencies for each task modality, reporting the resulting changes in task accuracy alongside watermark robustness metrics. revision: yes

  3. Referee: [Table 3] Table 3 (Results): Performance metrics lack error bars, standard deviations, or statistical significance tests against baselines, making it impossible to confirm the claimed improvements are reliable rather than artifacts of specific seeds or post-hoc tuning.

    Authors: We acknowledge the importance of statistical validation. We will rerun key experiments over multiple random seeds, add error bars and standard deviations to Table 3 and other result tables, and include statistical significance tests (e.g., t-tests) comparing ComMark against baselines in the revised manuscript. revision: yes

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No significant circularity; claims rest on empirical evaluation rather than self-referential derivations

full rationale

The paper introduces ComMark as a black-box watermarking method that applies frequency-domain filtering to create compressed samples, incorporates simulated attacks and a similarity loss during training, and reports SOTA covertness/robustness via evaluations on multiple datasets, architectures, and tasks (image recognition, speech, sentiment, generation, captioning, video). No equations, derivations, or parameter-fitting steps are described that reduce by construction to the inputs (e.g., no fitted parameters renamed as predictions, no self-definitional loops, no load-bearing self-citations of uniqueness theorems). The robustness claim is supported by explicit simulation during training and cross-task testing, which is an independent empirical procedure rather than a tautology. This is the expected outcome for a method paper whose central assertions are falsifiable via external benchmarks.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 1 axioms · 0 invented entities

Review based on abstract only; full paper may contain additional fitted parameters or assumptions around attack simulation and frequency thresholds.

axioms (1)
  • domain assumption High-frequency filtering can separate watermark signals from model decision boundaries without destroying utility.
    Central mechanism stated in abstract for generating covert samples.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5522 in / 1049 out tokens · 26513 ms · 2026-05-16T22:21:34.733050+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

83 extracted references · 83 canonical work pages · 4 internal anchors

  1. [1]

    Turning your weakness into a strength: Watermarking deep neural networks by backdooring

    Yossi Adi, Carsten Baum, Moustapha Cisse, Benny Pinkas, and Joseph Keshet. Turning your weakness into a strength: Watermarking deep neural networks by backdooring. In27th USENIX security symposium (USENIX Security 18), pages 1615–1631, 2018. 1, 2, 5

  2. [2]

    Discrete cosine transform.IEEE transactions on Computers, 100(1): 90–93, 2006

    Nasir Ahmed, T Natarajan, and Kamisetty R Rao. Discrete cosine transform.IEEE transactions on Computers, 100(1): 90–93, 2006. 3

  3. [3]

    News-topic-classification.https:// github

    Ronit Akhariya. News-topic-classification.https:// github . com / Ronit33 / agnews - pytorch - lstm,

  4. [4]

    The jpeg image compression algorithm.Int

    Muzhir Shaban Al-Ani and Fouad Hammadi Awad. The jpeg image compression algorithm.Int. J. Adv. Eng. Technol, 6 (3):1055–1062, 2013. 2

  5. [5]

    Survey on deep neural networks in speech and vision systems.Neuro- computing, 417:302–321, 2020

    Mahbubul Alam, Manar D Samad, Lasitha Vidyaratne, Alexander Glandon, and Khan M Iftekharuddin. Survey on deep neural networks in speech and vision systems.Neuro- computing, 417:302–321, 2020. 1

  6. [6]

    A new approach for optical colored image compression using the jpeg standards.Signal Processing, 87(4):569–583, 2007

    Abdulsalam Alkholidi, Ayman Alfalou, and Habib Hamam. A new approach for optical colored image compression using the jpeg standards.Signal Processing, 87(4):569–583, 2007. 2

  7. [7]

    Extended models and tools for high-performance part-of-speech

    Masayuki Asahara and Yuji Matsumoto. Extended models and tools for high-performance part-of-speech. InCOLING 2000 Volume 1: The 18th International Conference on Com- putational Linguistics, 2000. 5

  8. [8]

    Source code.https://github.com/ yangyunfei16/ComMark, 2025

    The Authors. Source code.https://github.com/ yangyunfei16/ComMark, 2025. 2

  9. [9]

    The art of losing to win: Using lossy image compression to improve data loading in deep learning pipelines

    Lennart Behme, Saravanan Thirumuruganathan, Alireza Rezaei Mahdiraji, Jorge-Arnulfo Quian ´e-Ruiz, and V olker Markl. The art of losing to win: Using lossy image compression to improve data loading in deep learning pipelines. In2023 IEEE 39th International Conference on Data Engineering (ICDE), pages 936–949. IEEE, 2023. 2

  10. [10]

    Lost in compression: the impact of lossy image compression on variable size object detection within infrared imagery

    Neelanjan Bhowmik, Jack W Barker, Yona Falinie A Gaus, and Toby P Breckon. Lost in compression: the impact of lossy image compression on variable size object detection within infrared imagery. InProceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, pages 369–378, 2022. 2

  11. [11]

    A systematic review on model wa- termarking for neural networks.Frontiers in big Data, 4: 729663, 2021

    Franziska Boenisch. A systematic review on model wa- termarking for neural networks.Frontiers in big Data, 4: 729663, 2021. 1

  12. [12]

    Mp3 and aac explained

    Karlheinz Brandenburg. Mp3 and aac explained. InAudio Engineering Society Conference: 17th International Confer- ence: High-Quality Audio Coding. Audio Engineering Soci- ety, 1999. 5

  13. [13]

    Lof: identifying density-based local outliers

    Markus M Breunig, Hans-Peter Kriegel, Raymond T Ng, and J¨org Sander. Lof: identifying density-based local outliers. In SIGMOD, 2000. 2

  14. [14]

    Make lossy compression meaningful for low-light images

    Shilv Cai, Liqun Chen, Sheng Zhong, Luxin Yan, Jiahuan Zhou, and Xu Zou. Make lossy compression meaningful for low-light images. InProceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 8236–8245, 2024. 2

  15. [15]

    A survey of ai-generated content (aigc).ACM Computing Surveys, 57(5):1–38, 2025

    Yihan Cao, Siyu Li, Yixin Liu, Zhiling Yan, Yutong Dai, Philip Yu, and Lichao Sun. A survey of ai-generated content (aigc).ACM Computing Surveys, 57(5):1–38, 2025. 1

  16. [16]

    A steganographic method based upon jpeg and quantization ta- ble modification.Information Sciences, 141(1-2):123–138,

    Chin-Chen Chang, Tung-Shou Chen, and Lou-Zo Chung. A steganographic method based upon jpeg and quantization ta- ble modification.Information Sciences, 141(1-2):123–138,

  17. [17]

    Deepmarks: A secure fingerprinting framework for digital rights management of deep learning models

    Huili Chen, Bita Darvish Rouhani, Cheng Fu, Jishen Zhao, and Farinaz Koushanfar. Deepmarks: A secure fingerprinting framework for digital rights management of deep learning models. InProceedings of the 2019 on International Con- ference on Multimedia Retrieval, pages 105–113, 2019. 2

  18. [18]

    End-to-end autonomous driving: Challenges and frontiers.IEEE Transactions on Pat- tern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 2024

    Li Chen, Penghao Wu, Kashyap Chitta, Bernhard Jaeger, An- dreas Geiger, and Hongyang Li. End-to-end autonomous driving: Challenges and frontiers.IEEE Transactions on Pat- tern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 2024. 1

  19. [19]

    Lossy image compression in a preclinical multimodal imaging study.Journal of Digital Imaging, 36 (4):1826–1850, 2023

    Francisco F Cunha, Valentin Bl ¨uml, Lydia M Zopf, Andreas Walter, Michael Wagner, Wolfgang J Weninger, Lucas A Thomaz, Lu´ıs MN Tavora, Luis A da Silva Cruz, and Ser- gio MM Faria. Lossy image compression in a preclinical multimodal imaging study.Journal of Digital Imaging, 36 (4):1826–1850, 2023. 2

  20. [20]

    Very deep convolutional neural networks for raw wave- forms

    Wei Dai, Chia Dai, Shuhui Qu, Juncheng Li, and Samarjit Das. Very deep convolutional neural networks for raw wave- forms. InICASSP, 2017. 4

  21. [21]

    Conditional backdoor attack via jpeg com- pression

    Qiuyu Duan, Zhongyun Hua, Qing Liao, Yushu Zhang, and Leo Yu Zhang. Conditional backdoor attack via jpeg com- pression. InProceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artifi- cial Intelligence, pages 19823–19831, 2024. 2

  22. [22]

    Image-caption.https://github

    Benjamin Dwumah. Image-caption.https://github. com / Ben74x / Image - Captioning - on - MSCoco - Dataset, 2022. 5

  23. [23]

    Dimensional- ity reduction by learning an invariant mapping

    Raia Hadsell, Sumit Chopra, and Yann LeCun. Dimensional- ity reduction by learning an invariant mapping. In2006 IEEE computer society conference on computer vision and pattern recognition (CVPR’06), pages 1735–1742. IEEE, 2006. 4

  24. [24]

    Deep residual learning for image recognition

    Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing Ren, and Jian Sun. Deep residual learning for image recognition. InProceed- ings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern recognition, pages 770–778, 2016. 5

  25. [25]

    Distilling the Knowledge in a Neural Network

    Geoffrey Hinton, Oriol Vinyals, and Jeff Dean. Distill- ing the knowledge in a neural network.arXiv preprint arXiv:1503.02531, 2015. 6, 1

  26. [26]

    A stealthy and robust backdoor attack via frequency domain transform.World Wide Web, 26(5):2767– 2783, 2023

    Ruitao Hou, Teng Huang, Hongyang Yan, Lishan Ke, and Weixuan Tang. A stealthy and robust backdoor attack via frequency domain transform.World Wide Web, 26(5):2767– 2783, 2023. 2

  27. [27]

    Scope of va- lidity of psnr in image/video quality assessment.Electronics letters, 44(13):800–801, 2008

    Quan Huynh-Thu and Mohammed Ghanbari. Scope of va- lidity of psnr in image/video quality assessment.Electronics letters, 44(13):800–801, 2008. 5

  28. [28]

    Entangled watermarks as a defense against model extraction

    Hengrui Jia, Christopher A Choquette-Choo, Varun Chan- drasekaran, and Nicolas Papernot. Entangled watermarks as a defense against model extraction. In30th USENIX security symposium (USENIX Security 21), pages 1937–1954, 2021. 1, 6

  29. [29]

    Margin-based neural network watermark- ing

    Byungjoo Kim, Suyoung Lee, Seanie Lee, Sooel Son, and Sung Ju Hwang. Margin-based neural network watermark- ing. InInternational Conference on Machine Learning, pages 16696–16711. PMLR, 2023. 1, 2, 5

  30. [30]

    Efficient frequency domain-based trans- formers for high-quality image deblurring

    Lingshun Kong, Jiangxin Dong, Jianjun Ge, Mingqiang Li, and Jinshan Pan. Efficient frequency domain-based trans- formers for high-quality image deblurring. InProceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pat- tern Recognition, pages 5886–5895, 2023. 2

  31. [31]

    Using jpeg quantization tables to identify imagery processed by software.digital investigation, 5:S21– S25, 2008

    Jesse D Kornblum. Using jpeg quantization tables to identify imagery processed by software.digital investigation, 5:S21– S25, 2008. 4

  32. [32]

    Learning multiple layers of features from tiny images

    Alex Krizhevsky, Geoffrey Hinton, et al. Learning multiple layers of features from tiny images. 2009. 5

  33. [33]

    Toward a privacy-preserving face recog- nition system: A survey of leakages and solutions.ACM Computing Surveys, 57(6):1–38, 2025

    Lamyanba Laishram, Muhammad Shaheryar, Jong Taek Lee, and Soon Ki Jung. Toward a privacy-preserving face recog- nition system: A survey of leakages and solutions.ACM Computing Surveys, 57(6):1–38, 2025. 1

  34. [34]

    Plmmark: a secure and robust black-box watermarking framework for pre-trained language models

    Peixuan Li, Pengzhou Cheng, Fangqi Li, Wei Du, Haodong Zhao, and Gongshen Liu. Plmmark: a secure and robust black-box watermarking framework for pre-trained language models. InProceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 14991–14999, 2023. 2

  35. [35]

    How to prove your model belongs to you: A blind-watermark based framework to protect intellectual property of dnn

    Zheng Li, Chengyu Hu, Yang Zhang, and Shanqing Guo. How to prove your model belongs to you: A blind-watermark based framework to protect intellectual property of dnn. In Proceedings of the 35th annual computer security applica- tions conference, pages 126–137, 2019. 1, 2, 5

  36. [36]

    Microsoft coco: Common objects in context

    Tsung-Yi Lin, Michael Maire, Serge Belongie, James Hays, Pietro Perona, Deva Ramanan, Piotr Doll´ar, and C Lawrence Zitnick. Microsoft coco: Common objects in context. In ECCV, 2014. 5

  37. [37]

    Isolation forest

    Fei Tony Liu, Kai Ming Ting, and Zhi-Hua Zhou. Isolation forest. InICDM, 2008. 2

  38. [38]

    Fre- quency domain model augmentation for adversarial attack

    Yuyang Long, Qilong Zhang, Boheng Zeng, Lianli Gao, Xianglong Liu, Jian Zhang, and Jingkuan Song. Fre- quency domain model augmentation for adversarial attack. InEuropean conference on computer vision, pages 549–566. Springer, 2022. 2

  39. [39]

    Sok: How robust is image classification deep neu- ral network watermarking? InS&P, 2022

    Nils Lukas, Edward Jiang, Xinda Li, and Florian Ker- schbaum. Sok: How robust is image classification deep neu- ral network watermarking? InS&P, 2022. 7, 2

  40. [40]

    Ssl-wm: A black-box watermarking ap- proach for encoders pre-trained by self-supervised learning

    Peizhuo Lv, Pan Li, Shenchen Zhu, Shengzhi Zhang, Kai Chen, Ruigang Liang, Chang Yue, Fan Xiang, Yuling Cai, Hualong Ma, et al. Ssl-wm: A black-box watermarking ap- proach for encoders pre-trained by self-supervised learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:2209.03563, 2022. 2

  41. [41]

    A robustness- assured white-box watermark in neural networks.IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 20(6): 5214–5229, 2023

    Peizhuo Lv, Pan Li, Shengzhi Zhang, Kai Chen, Ruigang Liang, Hualong Ma, Yue Zhao, and Yingjiu Li. A robustness- assured white-box watermark in neural networks.IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 20(6): 5214–5229, 2023. 1

  42. [42]

    Mea-defender: a robust watermark against model extraction attack

    Peizhuo Lv, Hualong Ma, Kai Chen, Jiachen Zhou, Shengzhi Zhang, Ruigang Liang, Shenchen Zhu, Pan Li, and Yingjun Zhang. Mea-defender: a robust watermark against model extraction attack. In2024 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pages 2515–2533. IEEE, 2024. 1, 2, 5, 6, 3

  43. [43]

    Learning word vec- tors for sentiment analysis

    Andrew Maas, Raymond E Daly, Peter T Pham, Dan Huang, Andrew Y Ng, and Christopher Potts. Learning word vec- tors for sentiment analysis. InProceedings of the 49th an- nual meeting of the association for computational linguis- tics: Human language technologies, pages 142–150, 2011. 5

  44. [44]

    Audio-scene-classification.https : / / github.com/caomi8888/pytorch- for- Audio- Classification, 2024

    Cao Mi. Audio-scene-classification.https : / / github.com/caomi8888/pytorch- for- Audio- Classification, 2024. 5

  45. [45]

    Robust watermarking of neu- ral network with exponential weighting

    Ryota Namba and Jun Sakuma. Robust watermarking of neu- ral network with exponential weighting. InProceedings of the 2019 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Commu- nications Security, pages 228–240, 2019. 2

  46. [46]

    Fedcrmw: Federated model ownership verification with compression-resistant model wa- termarking.Expert Systems with Applications, 249:123776,

    Hewang Nie and Songfeng Lu. Fedcrmw: Federated model ownership verification with compression-resistant model wa- termarking.Expert Systems with Applications, 249:123776,

  47. [47]

    Deep model intellectual property protection with compression-resistant model watermarking.IEEE Transac- tions on Artificial Intelligence, 5(7):3362–3373, 2024

    Hewang Nie, Songfeng Lu, Junjun Wu, and Jianxin Zhu. Deep model intellectual property protection with compression-resistant model watermarking.IEEE Transac- tions on Artificial Intelligence, 5(7):3362–3373, 2024. 1

  48. [48]

    Knockoff nets: Stealing functionality of black-box models

    Tribhuvanesh Orekondy, Bernt Schiele, and Mario Fritz. Knockoff nets: Stealing functionality of black-box models. InProceedings of the IEEE/CVF conference on computer vi- sion and pattern recognition, pages 4954–4963, 2019. 6, 1

  49. [49]

    Modelshield: Adaptive and robust wa- termark against model extraction attack.IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 2025

    Kaiyi Pang, Tao Qi, Chuhan Wu, Minhao Bai, Minghu Jiang, and Yongfeng Huang. Modelshield: Adaptive and robust wa- termark against model extraction attack.IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 2025. 2

  50. [50]

    Practi- cal black-box attacks against machine learning

    Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Ian Goodfellow, Somesh Jha, Z Berkay Celik, and Ananthram Swami. Practi- cal black-box attacks against machine learning. InProceed- ings of the 2017 ACM on Asia conference on computer and communications security, pages 506–519, 2017. 6, 1

  51. [51]

    Deep face recognition

    Omkar Parkhi, Andrea Vedaldi, and Andrew Zisserman. Deep face recognition. InBMVC 2015-Proceedings of the British Machine Vision Conference 2015. British Machine Vision Association, 2015. 5

  52. [52]

    Language models are unsu- pervised multitask learners.OpenAI blog, 2019

    Alec Radford, Jeffrey Wu, Rewon Child, David Luan, Dario Amodei, Ilya Sutskever, et al. Language models are unsu- pervised multitask learners.OpenAI blog, 2019. 5

  53. [53]

    264 and MPEG-4 video compression: video coding for next-generation multimedia

    Iain E Richardson.H. 264 and MPEG-4 video compression: video coding for next-generation multimedia. John Wiley & Sons, 2004. 5

  54. [54]

    A dataset and taxonomy for urban sound research

    Justin Salamon, Christopher Jacoby, and Juan Pablo Bello. A dataset and taxonomy for urban sound research. InPro- ceedings of the 22nd ACM international conference on Mul- timedia, pages 1041–1044, 2014. 5

  55. [55]

    Explaining deep neural networks and beyond: A review of methods and applications.Proceedings of the IEEE, 109(3): 247–278, 2021

    Wojciech Samek, Gr ´egoire Montavon, Sebastian La- puschkin, Christopher J Anders, and Klaus-Robert M ¨uller. Explaining deep neural networks and beyond: A review of methods and applications.Proceedings of the IEEE, 109(3): 247–278, 2021. 1

  56. [56]

    UCF101: A Dataset of 101 Human Actions Classes From Videos in The Wild

    Khurram Soomro, Amir Roshan Zamir, and Mubarak Shah. Ucf101: A dataset of 101 human actions classes from videos in the wild.arXiv preprint arXiv:1212.0402, 2012. 5

  57. [57]

    Image-generation.https : / / github

    Taarun Srinivas. Image-generation.https : / / github . com / Taarun - Srinivas / Fashion - MNIST- classification- using- autoencoders,

  58. [58]

    The german traffic sign recognition bench- mark: a multi-class classification competition

    Johannes Stallkamp, Marc Schlipsing, Jan Salmen, and Christian Igel. The german traffic sign recognition bench- mark: a multi-class classification competition. InThe 2011 international joint conference on neural networks, pages 1453–1460. IEEE, 2011. 4

  59. [59]

    Efficient processing of deep neural networks: A tutorial and survey.Proceedings of the IEEE, 105(12):2295–2329, 2017

    Vivienne Sze, Yu-Hsin Chen, Tien-Ju Yang, and Joel S Emer. Efficient processing of deep neural networks: A tutorial and survey.Proceedings of the IEEE, 105(12):2295–2329, 2017. 1

  60. [60]

    Deep neural network watermarking against model extraction attack

    Jingxuan Tan, Nan Zhong, Zhenxing Qian, Xinpeng Zhang, and Sheng Li. Deep neural network watermarking against model extraction attack. InProceedings of the 31st ACM international conference on multimedia, pages 1588–1597,

  61. [61]

    Exposing model theft: A robust and transferable watermark for thwarting model extraction attacks

    Ruixiang Tang, Hongye Jin, Mengnan Du, Curtis Wiging- ton, Rajiv Jain, and Xia Hu. Exposing model theft: A robust and transferable watermark for thwarting model extraction attacks. InProceedings of the 32nd ACM International Con- ference on Information and Knowledge Management, pages 4315–4319, 2023. 6

  62. [62]

    Embedding watermarks into deep neural networks

    Yusuke Uchida, Yuki Nagai, Shigeyuki Sakazawa, and Shin’ichi Satoh. Embedding watermarks into deep neural networks. InProceedings of the 2017 ACM on international conference on multimedia retrieval, pages 269–277, 2017. 2

  63. [63]

    Visualizing data using t-sne.JMLR, 2008

    Laurens Van der Maaten and Geoffrey Hinton. Visualizing data using t-sne.JMLR, 2008. 8

  64. [64]

    The jpeg still picture compression stan- dard.Communications of the ACM, 34(4):30–44, 1991

    Gregory K Wallace. The jpeg still picture compression stan- dard.Communications of the ACM, 34(4):30–44, 1991. 2, 5

  65. [65]

    A comprehensive survey on robust image watermarking.Neurocomputing, 488:226–247, 2022

    Wenbo Wan, Jun Wang, Yunming Zhang, Jing Li, Hui Yu, and Jiande Sun. A comprehensive survey on robust image watermarking.Neurocomputing, 488:226–247, 2022. 1

  66. [66]

    Riga: Covert and robust white-box watermarking of deep neural networks

    Tianhao Wang and Florian Kerschbaum. Riga: Covert and robust white-box watermarking of deep neural networks. In Proceedings of the web conference 2021, pages 993–1004,

  67. [67]

    Image quality assessment: from error visibility to structural similarity.IEEE transactions on image processing, 13(4):600–612, 2004

    Zhou Wang, Alan C Bovik, Hamid R Sheikh, and Eero P Si- moncelli. Image quality assessment: from error visibility to structural similarity.IEEE transactions on image processing, 13(4):600–612, 2004. 5

  68. [68]

    Speech Commands: A Dataset for Limited-Vocabulary Speech Recognition

    Pete Warden. Speech commands: A dataset for limited- vocabulary speech recognition.arXiv:1804.03209, 2018. 4

  69. [69]

    Robust watermarking against arbitrary scaling and cropping attacks

    Shaowu Wu, Wei Lu, Xiaolin Yin, and Rui Yang. Robust watermarking against arbitrary scaling and cropping attacks. Signal Processing, 226:109655, 2025. 2

  70. [70]

    Invisible dnn watermarking against model ex- traction attack.IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics, 2024

    Zuping Xi, Zuomin Qu, Wei Lu, Xiangyang Luo, and Xi- aochun Cao. Invisible dnn watermarking against model ex- traction attack.IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics, 2024. 1

  71. [71]

    Fashion-MNIST: a Novel Image Dataset for Benchmarking Machine Learning Algorithms

    Han Xiao, Kashif Rasul, and Roland V ollgraf. Fashion- mnist: a novel image dataset for benchmarking machine learning algorithms.arXiv:1708.07747, 2017. 5

  72. [72]

    Rethink- ing{White-Box}watermarks on deep learning models un- der neural structural obfuscation

    Yifan Yan, Xudong Pan, Mi Zhang, and Min Yang. Rethink- ing{White-Box}watermarks on deep learning models un- der neural structural obfuscation. In32nd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 23), pages 2347–2364, 2023. 1

  73. [73]

    Everyone can attack: Repurpose lossy compression as a natural backdoor attack.arXiv preprint arXiv:2308.16684,

    Sze Jue Yang, Quang Nguyen, Chee Seng Chan, and Khoa D Doan. Everyone can attack: Repurpose lossy compression as a natural backdoor attack.arXiv preprint arXiv:2308.16684,

  74. [74]

    In- visible backdoor attacks using data poisoning in frequency domain

    Chang Yue, Peizhuo Lv, Ruigang Liang, and Kai Chen. In- visible backdoor attacks using data poisoning in frequency domain. InECAI 2023, pages 2954–2961. IOS Press, 2023. 2

  75. [75]

    Video-action-recognition.https : / / github

    Jianfeng Zhang. Video-action-recognition.https : / / github . com / jfzhang95 / pytorch - video - recognition, 2018. 5

  76. [76]

    Protecting intel- lectual property of deep neural networks with watermarking

    Jialong Zhang, Zhongshu Gu, Jiyong Jang, Hui Wu, Marc Ph Stoecklin, Heqing Huang, and Ian Molloy. Protecting intel- lectual property of deep neural networks with watermarking. InProceedings of the 2018 on Asia conference on computer and communications security, pages 159–172, 2018. 1, 2, 5

  77. [77]

    Model watermarking for image processing networks

    Jie Zhang, Dongdong Chen, Jing Liao, Han Fang, Weim- ing Zhang, Wenbo Zhou, Hao Cui, and Nenghai Yu. Model watermarking for image processing networks. InProceed- ings of the AAAI conference on artificial intelligence, pages 12805–12812, 2020. 1

  78. [78]

    Deep model in- tellectual property protection via deep watermarking.IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 44(8):4005–4020, 2021

    Jie Zhang, Dongdong Chen, Jing Liao, Weiming Zhang, Huamin Feng, Gang Hua, and Nenghai Yu. Deep model in- tellectual property protection via deep watermarking.IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 44(8):4005–4020, 2021. 1

  79. [79]

    The unreasonable effectiveness of deep features as a perceptual metric

    Richard Zhang, Phillip Isola, Alexei A Efros, Eli Shecht- man, and Oliver Wang. The unreasonable effectiveness of deep features as a perceptual metric. InProceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern recogni- tion, pages 586–595, 2018. 5

  80. [80]

    Character- level convolutional networks for text classification.NeurIPS,

    Xiang Zhang, Junbo Zhao, and Yann LeCun. Character- level convolutional networks for text classification.NeurIPS,

Showing first 80 references.