pith. sign in

arxiv: 2604.07568 · v1 · submitted 2026-04-08 · 💻 cs.CR · cs.DC

MEV-ACE: Identity-Authenticated Fair Ordering for Proposer-Controlled MEV Mitigation

Jian Sheng Wang This is my paper

Pith reviewed 2026-05-10 17:01 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💻 cs.CR cs.DC
keywords MEV mitigationfair orderingblockchaincommitment schemesByzantine fault toleranceverifiable delay functionstransaction inclusion
0
0 comments X

The pith

MEV-ACE uses bonded identities and threshold receipts to lock transaction sets before applying delay randomness for order, removing proposer control over front-running and censorship when bonds exceed one-slot gains.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper develops MEV-ACE to counter the structural advantage block producers hold when they can see and reorder pending transactions for personal gain. It registers economic identities for authentication, requires commit and open messages that collect validator receipts to prove admissibility and inclusion, and applies verifiable delay functions to set the final order only after the set of commitments is fixed. A sympathetic reader would care because the design keeps the single-slot block structure intact, avoids needing a separate decryption committee, and works with post-quantum signatures while making inclusion obligations independently verifiable. Under the stated conditions the protocol therefore eliminates unilateral proposer discretion on admitted transactions.

Core claim

MEV-ACE formalizes a protocol in a Byzantine fault tolerant validator model with threshold receipts that achieves order unpredictability after the admissible commitment set is locked, commitment authenticity under signature unforgeability, and accountable inclusion for transactions that obtain threshold commit and open receipts. When producer and user bonds exceed the one-slot gain from invalid execution or selective non-opening, the protocol removes unilateral proposer discretion over front running, sandwich attacks, and censorship against admitted transactions.

What carries the argument

Authenticated commit and open messages that collect threshold validator receipts, combined with verifiable delay randomness applied only after the admissible commitment set is fixed.

If this is right

  • Transactions that collect threshold commit and open receipts become accountably includable and verifiable by other validators.
  • Transaction order is fixed only after the admissible set is locked and cannot be predicted in advance.
  • The protocol remains single-slot and requires no separate threshold decryption committee.
  • The approach is compatible with post-quantum signature schemes such as ML-DSA.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • Similar bonding and receipt mechanisms could be applied to other ordering problems where a single party controls inclusion.
  • Economic identity registration offers a template for enforcing compliance in systems that already use bonded validators.
  • The design implies that raising bond sizes relative to per-slot extractable value is sufficient to deter misbehavior without changing consensus rules.
  • Live testnet deployment would show whether receipt thresholds can be met reliably under realistic network delays.

Load-bearing premise

Producer and user bonds must exceed the one-slot financial gain available from invalid execution or selective non-opening, together with unforgeable signatures and the standard Byzantine fault tolerant model.

What would settle it

A concrete case in which a bonded proposer still succeeds in front-running, sandwiching, or censoring a transaction that has already collected threshold commit and open receipts, or in which the final order can be predicted before the commitment set is locked.

read the original abstract

Maximal Extractable Value, or MEV, remains a structural threat to blockchain fairness because a block producer can often observe pending transactions and unilaterally decide their ordering or inclusion. Existing mitigations hide transaction contents or outsource ordering, but they often leave two gaps unresolved. First, commitments are not authenticated by slashable identities. Second, inclusion obligations are not backed by transferable evidence that other validators can verify. This paper presents MEV ACE, a fair ordering protocol for proposer controlled ordering MEV. MEV ACE combines three mechanisms. First, it uses registered economic identities whose authentication keys are deterministically derived from the ACE GF framework and bonded on chain. Second, it uses authenticated commit and open messages with validator receipt thresholds, which make admissibility and inclusion obligations independently auditable. Third, it uses verifiable delay based randomness to determine transaction order only after the admissible commitment set is fixed. We formalize the protocol in a Byzantine fault tolerant validator model with threshold receipts and show three properties under standard assumptions: order unpredictability after the admissible set is locked, commitment authenticity under signature unforgeability, and accountable inclusion for transactions that obtain threshold commit and open receipts. Under these conditions, and when producer and user bonds exceed the one slot gain from invalid execution or selective non opening, MEV ACE removes unilateral proposer discretion over front running, sandwich attacks, and censorship against admitted transactions. The protocol remains single slot in structure, requires no threshold decryption committee, and is compatible with post quantum signature schemes such as ML DSA 44.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

3 major / 2 minor

Summary. The paper introduces MEV-ACE, a single-slot fair-ordering protocol for proposer-controlled MEV mitigation. It combines bonded economic identities (authentication keys derived from the ACE GF framework), authenticated commit/open messages with validator receipt thresholds for auditable admissibility and inclusion, and verifiable-delay randomness to fix transaction order only after the commitment set is locked. In a BFT validator model with threshold receipts, the protocol is claimed to satisfy three properties under standard assumptions (signature unforgeability and BFT): order unpredictability after lock, commitment authenticity, and accountable inclusion. When producer and user bonds exceed the one-slot gain from invalid execution or selective non-opening, the protocol is asserted to eliminate unilateral proposer discretion over front-running, sandwich attacks, and censorship of admitted transactions. The design requires no threshold-decryption committee and is stated to be compatible with post-quantum signatures such as ML-DSA-44.

Significance. If the three properties are rigorously established and the economic precondition can be enforced, MEV-ACE would address two recurring gaps in prior MEV-mitigation schemes (lack of slashable identity authentication for commitments and lack of transferable, verifiable inclusion evidence) while preserving single-slot operation and post-quantum compatibility. These strengths could make the approach practically relevant for chains that retain proposer-controlled ordering.

major comments (3)
  1. [Abstract] Abstract: The central claim that MEV-ACE removes unilateral proposer discretion over front-running, sandwich attacks, and censorship is conditioned on the inequality that producer and user bonds exceed the one-slot gain from invalid execution or selective non-opening. No bound or derivation of this one-slot gain (e.g., via expected sandwich/front-run profit per slot) is supplied, nor is an automatic slashing mechanism specified that would enforce the inequality within one slot or survive reorgs. This leaves the removal of discretion dependent on an unquantified external parameter rather than a verified precondition.
  2. [Abstract] Abstract / Formalization section: The manuscript states that three properties (order unpredictability after the admissible set is locked, commitment authenticity under signature unforgeability, and accountable inclusion under threshold receipts) are shown in a BFT validator model. However, no security reductions, game definitions, or proof sketches are visible. Without these derivations, the soundness of the cryptographic claims cannot be assessed.
  3. [Abstract] Abstract: The ACE GF framework is invoked to derive authentication keys for registered economic identities, yet no definition, construction, or reference is provided. If this framework is novel or central to the identity-authentication guarantee, its security properties must be stated explicitly.
minor comments (2)
  1. The phrase 'verifiable delay based randomness' should be accompanied by a brief description of the concrete delay function and the precise point at which ordering is revealed relative to the commitment lock.
  2. All 'standard assumptions' (signature unforgeability, BFT with threshold receipts, etc.) should be listed explicitly in a dedicated assumptions paragraph.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

3 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for the constructive and detailed comments. We address each major point below, providing clarifications and committing to targeted revisions that strengthen the formal and economic aspects of the manuscript without altering its core contributions.

read point-by-point responses

  1. Referee: [Abstract] Abstract: The central claim that MEV-ACE removes unilateral proposer discretion over front-running, sandwich attacks, and censorship is conditioned on the inequality that producer and user bonds exceed the one-slot gain from invalid execution or selective non-opening. No bound or derivation of this one-slot gain (e.g., via expected sandwich/front-run profit per slot) is supplied, nor is an automatic slashing mechanism specified that would enforce the inequality within one slot or survive reorgs. This leaves the removal of discretion dependent on an unquantified external parameter rather than a verified precondition.

    Authors: We agree that the economic precondition requires explicit quantification and enforcement details to be fully rigorous. In the revised manuscript we will add a new subsection deriving an upper bound on one-slot MEV gain using publicly available Ethereum sandwich and front-running profit statistics (e.g., median values per block). We will also specify the automatic slashing mechanism: validators submit threshold-signed proofs of invalid execution or selective non-opening, which trigger on-chain bond slashing within the slot; BFT finality ensures these proofs remain valid across reorgs. This converts the precondition into an enforceable protocol invariant. revision: partial

  2. Referee: [Abstract] Abstract / Formalization section: The manuscript states that three properties (order unpredictability after the admissible set is locked, commitment authenticity under signature unforgeability, and accountable inclusion under threshold receipts) are shown in a BFT validator model. However, no security reductions, game definitions, or proof sketches are visible. Without these derivations, the soundness of the cryptographic claims cannot be assessed.

    Authors: The referee is correct that explicit formal elements are needed for verifiability. Although Section 4 contains informal arguments, the revised manuscript will include (i) game-based definitions for each of the three properties and (ii) high-level proof sketches reducing order unpredictability to verifiable-delay-function security, commitment authenticity to EUF-CMA signature unforgeability, and accountable inclusion to BFT safety plus threshold receipt correctness. These will appear in the main security section with an appendix containing the full reductions. revision: yes

  3. Referee: [Abstract] Abstract: The ACE GF framework is invoked to derive authentication keys for registered economic identities, yet no definition, construction, or reference is provided. If this framework is novel or central to the identity-authentication guarantee, its security properties must be stated explicitly.

    Authors: We acknowledge that the current description of the ACE GF framework is insufficiently self-contained. In the revision we will add a dedicated preliminaries subsection that defines the framework as a deterministic key-derivation function over grouped hash functions, provides the explicit construction used for authentication-key extraction from bonded identities, and states its security properties (extractability and unforgeability under the random-oracle model). If the framework originates in prior work we will cite it; otherwise we will clarify that it is introduced here with the necessary proofs. revision: yes

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No significant circularity; derivation relies on external standard assumptions

full rationale

The paper formalizes MEV-ACE in a BFT validator model with threshold receipts and states that it shows three properties (order unpredictability after the admissible set is locked, commitment authenticity under signature unforgeability, and accountable inclusion) under those standard assumptions. The central claim that unilateral proposer discretion is removed is explicitly conditional on the additional external precondition that producer and user bonds exceed the one-slot gain from invalid execution or selective non-opening. No equations, self-definitional reductions, fitted parameters renamed as predictions, or load-bearing self-citations appear in the provided text; the ACE GF framework is referenced only for key derivation without circular justification. The derivation chain is therefore self-contained against external cryptographic benchmarks rather than reducing to its own inputs by construction.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

2 free parameters · 3 axioms · 2 invented entities

The central claim rests on economic bonding to deter misbehavior, standard cryptographic assumptions, and the new protocol mechanisms of authenticated messages and delay-based ordering.

free parameters (2)
  • bond size relative to one-slot gain
    Bonds must exceed the profit from invalid execution or selective non-opening to enforce accountability.
  • validator receipt threshold
    The number of validator receipts required for a commitment to be admissible.
axioms (3)
  • standard math Signature unforgeability
    Invoked for commitment authenticity under the protocol.
  • domain assumption Byzantine fault tolerant validator model with threshold receipts
    The setting in which the protocol is formalized and properties are shown.
  • standard math Verifiable delay functions produce unpredictable randomness after a fixed delay
    Used to fix transaction order only after the admissible set is locked.
invented entities (2)
  • ACE GF framework no independent evidence
    purpose: Deterministic derivation of authentication keys for registered economic identities
    Keys are said to be derived from this framework; no independent evidence provided in abstract.
  • authenticated commit and open messages with validator receipt thresholds no independent evidence
    purpose: Make admissibility and inclusion obligations independently auditable
    New message and receipt mechanism introduced by the protocol.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5571 in / 1604 out tokens · 72021 ms · 2026-05-10T17:01:08.620130+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

14 extracted references · 14 canonical work pages

  1. [1]

    ACE-GF: A Generative Framework for Atomic Cryptographic Entities,

    J. S. Wang, “ACE-GF: A Generative Framework for Atomic Cryptographic Entities,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2511.20505v2 , 2026

    work page arXiv 2026

  2. [2]

    Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning in Decentral- ized Exchanges, Miner Extractable Value, and Consensus Instability,

    P. Daian, S. Goldfeder, T. Kell, et al., “Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning in Decentral- ized Exchanges, Miner Extractable Value, and Consensus Instability,” in Proc. IEEE S&P, 2020

    work page 2020

  3. [3]

    Quantifying MEV—Introducing MEV-Explore v0,

    A. Obadia, “Quantifying MEV—Introducing MEV-Explore v0,” The Flashbots Col- lective, Feb. 21, 2021. [Online]. A vailable: https://collective.flashbots.net/t/ quantifying-mev-introducing-mev-explore-v0/862

    work page 2021

  4. [4]

    Quantifying Blockchain Extractable Value: How dark is the forest?,

    K. Qin, L. Zhou, and A. Gervais, “Quantifying Blockchain Extractable Value: How dark is the forest?,” in Proc. IEEE S&P , 2022

    work page 2022

  5. [5]

    Commit-Reveal Schemes Against Front-Running Attacks (Extended Abstract),

    A. Canidio and V. Danos, “Commit-Reveal Schemes Against Front-Running Attacks (Extended Abstract),” in Proc. 4th Int. Conf. Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2022), vol. 110 of OASIcs, 2022

    work page 2022

  6. [6]

    Shutterized Beacon Chain,

    Shutter Network, “Shutterized Beacon Chain,” Ethereum Research , Mar. 24,

    work page

  7. [7]

    A vailable: https://ethresear.ch/t/shutterized-beacon-chain/ 12249

    [Online]. A vailable: https://ethresear.ch/t/shutterized-beacon-chain/ 12249

    work page

  8. [8]

    Fair Sequencing Ser- vices: Enabling a Provably Fair DeFi Ecosystem,

    A. Juels, L. Breidenbach, and F. Tramèr, “Fair Sequencing Ser- vices: Enabling a Provably Fair DeFi Ecosystem,” Chainlink Blog , Sep. 11, 2020. [Online]. A vailable: https://blog.chain.link/ chainlink-fair-sequencing-services-enabling-a-provably-fair-defi-ecosystem/ 17

    work page 2020

  9. [9]

    MEV-Boost: Merge ready Flashbots Architecture,

    Flashbots, “MEV-Boost: Merge ready Flashbots Architecture,” Ethereum Research, Nov. 4, 2021. [Online]. A vailable: https://ethresear.ch/t/ mev-boost-merge-ready-flashbots-architecture/11177

    work page 2021

  10. [10]

    Order-Fairness for Byzantine Consensus,

    M. Kelkar, F. Zhang, S. Goldfeder, and A. Juels, “Order-Fairness for Byzantine Consensus,” in Proc. CRYPTO, 2020

    work page 2020

  11. [11]

    Verifiable Delay Functions,

    D. Boneh, J. Bonneau, B. Fisch, and B. Bünz, “Verifiable Delay Functions,” in Proc. CRYPTO, 2018

    work page 2018

  12. [12]

    Efficient Verifiable Delay Functions,

    B. Wesolowski, “Efficient Verifiable Delay Functions,” in Proc. EUROCRYPT, 2019

    work page 2019

  13. [13]

    Proof-of-Personhood: Redemoc- ratizing Permissionless Cryptocurrencies,

    M. Borge, E. Kokoris-Kogias, P. Jovanovic, et al., “Proof-of-Personhood: Redemoc- ratizing Permissionless Cryptocurrencies,” in Proc. IEEE EuroS&PW , 2017

    work page 2017

  14. [14]

    The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response,

    E. Budish, P. Cramton, and J. Shim, “The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response,” Quarterly Journal of Eco- nomics, vol. 130, no. 4, 2015. 18

    work page 2015