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arxiv: 2604.11681 · v1 · submitted 2026-04-13 · 💻 cs.CR · cs.ET

AmBox: Device-to-Blockchain Ambient Sensing for Food Traceability

Jo\~ao Miguel Guerreiro Fernandes , Samih Eisa , Miguel L. Pardal This is my paper

Pith reviewed 2026-05-10 15:06 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💻 cs.CR cs.ET
keywords blockchainfood traceabilityambient sensingsupply chainIoT sensorsHyperledger Fabricdata integrity
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The pith

AmBox links ambient sensors directly to blockchain for verifiable food supply chain data.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper presents AmBox as a system that connects environmental sensors to a blockchain network to collect temperature, humidity, and similar data across the food supply chain. It handles sensor setup and operation while embedding business context, allowing either standalone devices or a distributed network of nodes and motes. A working prototype built on Raspberry Pi and ESP32 hardware writes readings straight into Hyperledger Fabric. The authors show that this produces timely records that stakeholders can trust because the data resists tampering once recorded. If the approach holds, supply chains would gain transparency without relying on as many trusted third parties to vouch for the readings.

Core claim

AmBox achieves device-to-blockchain ambient sensing by commissioning sensors through a Hyperledger Fabric network and writing their readings directly onto the ledger, supporting both single-node and distributed node-mote deployments while preserving the business context of each measurement.

What carries the argument

The AmBox device-to-blockchain link, which uses Raspberry Pi and ESP32 hardware to commission sensors and record their ambient readings on Hyperledger Fabric without intermediate data handlers.

Load-bearing premise

That the hardware and Hyperledger Fabric integration will keep sensor data intact and trustworthy once it reaches the blockchain in actual, multi-stakeholder supply chains.

What would settle it

A test that inserts a tampered temperature reading into the AmBox prototype ledger and checks whether the blockchain still accepts it as valid without detection.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2604.11681 by Jo\~ao Miguel Guerreiro Fernandes, Miguel L. Pardal, Samih Eisa.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: AmBox system architecture Two types of devices operate at this layer: • AmBox Node: The Node is the primary device in the system. It collects sensor data, performs local processing, stores data during offline periods, and submits signed records to the blockchain. A Node can operate independently or act as a hub for multiple Motes. It supports offline operation, digital signatures, and energy-efficient comm… view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Figure 2: Multi-device deployment with AmBox Nodes and Motes [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p006_2.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Figure 3: AmBox lifecycle When a decommissioning command is issued, the device terminates active monitoring and transitions to a heartbeat-only stage, in which it periodically reports its status to the operator infrastructure, enabling verification of proper shutdown and traceability of device usage. 5 System Features This section describes the key functional and non-functional features of the AmBox system. These fe… view at source ↗
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: AmBox Node hardware setup [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p008_4.png] view at source ↗
Figure 5
Figure 5. Figure 5: AmBox Mote hardware setup (top and side views) [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p008_5.png] view at source ↗
Figure 6
Figure 6. Figure 6: AmBox communication sequence second phase assessed system performance through controlled experiments measuring sensor accuracy, communication latency, and energy consumption. 7.1 Phase 1: Scenario-Based Validation Two deployment configurations were evaluated: a standalone setup using a single AmBox Node and a distributed setup combining a Node with one or more AmBox Motes. 7.1.1 Setup 1: Single-Device Depl… view at source ↗
Figure 7
Figure 7. Figure 7: Temperature measurements over a 5-hour period [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p012_7.png] view at source ↗
Figure 8
Figure 8. Figure 8: Battery discharge profiles of AmBox Node and Mote [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p013_8.png] view at source ↗
read the original abstract

From production to consumption, ensuring food quality and traceability depends on reliable monitoring of environmental conditions across the supply chain. Ambient sensing devices can collect relevant data such as temperature and humidity, but ensuring its integrity among stakeholders remains a challenge. This work presents AmBox, a system that enables device-to-blockchain ambient sensing for food traceability. AmBox connects sensors to a blockchain, ensuring secure, verifiable, and tamper-resistant data collection with minimal intermediaries. It manages sensor commissioning and operation with the adequate business context. AmBox can operate with standalone nodes or within a distributed node-mote architecture, allowing flexible deployment at different points along the supply chain. A prototype using Raspberry Pi and ESP32 hardware can record sensor data directly on Hyperledger Fabric. Experimental results show that AmBox provides timely and reliable data that can increase transparency and trust between the supply chain stakeholders.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

3 major / 2 minor

Summary. The manuscript presents AmBox, a system for device-to-blockchain ambient sensing in food traceability. It integrates sensors (Raspberry Pi and ESP32 hardware) with Hyperledger Fabric to enable direct recording of environmental data such as temperature and humidity. The architecture supports sensor commissioning and operation in either standalone nodes or a distributed node-mote setup, with the central claim that this delivers secure, verifiable, and tamper-resistant data collection with minimal intermediaries. A prototype is described that records sensor data on the blockchain, and experimental results are asserted to show timely and reliable operation that increases transparency and trust among supply-chain stakeholders.

Significance. If the security and integrity claims are substantiated, the work could provide a concrete hardware-software integration pattern for IoT-blockchain applications in supply-chain monitoring, reducing reliance on trusted intermediaries while supporting flexible deployment. The prototype demonstrates practical feasibility of direct sensor-to-ledger recording under the described Hyperledger Fabric setup. The absence of quantitative security evaluation, however, confines the contribution primarily to an architectural description rather than a validated security solution.

major comments (3)
  1. [Abstract] Abstract: the claims of 'tamper-resistant data collection' and 'timely and reliable data' are stated without any quantitative metrics, latency figures, error analysis, or security evaluation results.
  2. [System Architecture] System Architecture section: the architecture necessarily includes local sensor polling, possible buffering, and network transmission to the Fabric ledger (via SDK channel), yet no threat model is provided to analyze attack surfaces such as physical access to the mote, MITM on the communication link, or commissioning-key compromise.
  3. [Experimental Results] Experimental Results / Prototype section: only benign-condition operation is demonstrated; no adversarial testing, red-team evaluation, or formal security argument is supplied to support the tamper-resistance claim under realistic supply-chain tampering scenarios.
minor comments (2)
  1. [System Architecture] The description of the distributed node-mote architecture would be clearer with an additional data-flow diagram or pseudocode.
  2. [Related Work] Ensure the related-work section cites recent blockchain-IoT supply-chain papers for proper positioning.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

3 responses · 1 unresolved

We thank the referee for the constructive feedback and the recommendation for major revision. We address each major comment below, agreeing where the manuscript requires strengthening and providing clarifications on the scope of our architectural and prototype-focused contribution.

read point-by-point responses

  1. Referee: [Abstract] Abstract: the claims of 'tamper-resistant data collection' and 'timely and reliable data' are stated without any quantitative metrics, latency figures, error analysis, or security evaluation results.

    Authors: We accept this point. The abstract currently makes unqualified claims that exceed the quantitative support provided in the experimental section. In the revised version we will qualify the language to state that the system enables tamper-resistant recording through direct blockchain integration, with prototype results demonstrating operational feasibility including measured data-recording latency and reliability under normal conditions. Specific latency figures and success rates from the existing experiments will be referenced or briefly included to ground the claims. revision: yes

  2. Referee: [System Architecture] System Architecture section: the architecture necessarily includes local sensor polling, possible buffering, and network transmission to the Fabric ledger (via SDK channel), yet no threat model is provided to analyze attack surfaces such as physical access to the mote, MITM on the communication link, or commissioning-key compromise.

    Authors: We agree that an explicit threat model is missing and would improve the manuscript. We will add a dedicated threat-model subsection that enumerates the attack surfaces mentioned (physical access to motes, MITM on the sensor-to-node link, and commissioning-key compromise) and describes the mitigations afforded by Hyperledger Fabric’s permissioned model, TLS-protected channels, and the commissioning protocol. Where the design does not fully mitigate a threat, we will note the limitation. revision: yes

  3. Referee: [Experimental Results] Experimental Results / Prototype section: only benign-condition operation is demonstrated; no adversarial testing, red-team evaluation, or formal security argument is supplied to support the tamper-resistance claim under realistic supply-chain tampering scenarios.

    Authors: We partially agree. The prototype experiments were designed to validate functional correctness and performance of direct device-to-ledger recording under normal operating conditions; they do not include adversarial or red-team testing. The tamper-resistance claim rests on the immutability and consensus guarantees of Hyperledger Fabric together with the elimination of intermediate data stores. In revision we will add an explicit limitations paragraph clarifying that comprehensive adversarial evaluation lies outside the current scope and is identified as future work. No new adversarial experiments will be added. revision: partial

standing simulated objections not resolved
  • Comprehensive adversarial testing, red-team evaluation, or formal security proofs under realistic supply-chain tampering scenarios, as these were not performed in the original prototype evaluation and cannot be supplied without substantial new experimental work.

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No circularity in system architecture description

full rationale

The paper is a descriptive engineering work presenting an architecture (AmBox) for device-to-blockchain ambient sensing using Raspberry Pi/ESP32 hardware and Hyperledger Fabric. It includes a prototype implementation, commissioning/operation management, and experimental results on timely data recording under benign conditions. There are no mathematical derivations, equations, predictions, fitted parameters, or first-principles results that could reduce to inputs by construction. Claims of secure and tamper-resistant data collection are supported directly by the described system components and experiments rather than any self-referential loop, self-citation chain, or renamed known result. This matches the default expectation for non-circular papers.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 0 axioms · 0 invented entities

No mathematical model, free parameters, or new entities are introduced; the paper is an applied systems description.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5450 in / 885 out tokens · 59037 ms · 2026-05-10T15:06:46.090755+00:00 · methodology

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Reference graph

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