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arxiv: 2604.21679 · v1 · submitted 2026-04-23 · 💻 cs.CR

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A Sociotechnical, Practitioner-Centered Approach to Technology Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations: An LLM Case

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Pith reviewed 2026-05-09 21:38 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💻 cs.CR
keywords LLM adoptionsecurity operations centersociotechnical co-creationcybersecurity operationstechnology adoption barriersNonaka SECI modelpractitioner-centered designethnographic fieldwork
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The pith

Embedding researchers in a SOC to co-create LLM tools with practitioners produces sustained adoption by aligning with operational needs.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper reports six months of ethnographic work inside a multinational company's security operations center where two researchers collaborated directly with analysts to build LLM companion tools. Traditional barriers such as workflow misalignment, lack of trust in AI outputs, and rigid tooling gave way once the tools were iteratively shaped to fit daily tasks and data realities. The authors link the observed shift from skepticism to ongoing use with a sociotechnical co-creation process that follows Nonaka's SECI model of knowledge conversion. This approach is presented as a way to bypass the stagnation that has long affected new technology in cybersecurity operations. A sympathetic reader would care because it offers a concrete method for making advanced tools actually usable rather than merely technically capable.

Core claim

Embedding researchers within the SOC for six months allowed identification of recurring operational challenges such as repetitive tasks, fragmented data, and tooling bottlenecks; direct collaboration with practitioners then produced LLM companion tools that were iteratively refined to reduce workflow disruption and increase interpretability, resulting in a transition from initial skepticism to sustained adoption explained by a sociotechnical co-creation process consistent with Nonaka's SECI model.

What carries the argument

The sociotechnical co-creation process aligned with Nonaka's SECI model (socialization, externalization, combination, and internalization of knowledge between researchers and practitioners) that converts tacit operational expertise into usable LLM tools.

Load-bearing premise

The shift to sustained adoption occurred primarily because of the sociotechnical co-creation process rather than because of the particular company culture, the researchers' ongoing presence, or the specific capabilities of the LLM.

What would settle it

Observe whether a comparable SOC that receives LLM tools without the six-month embedded co-creation process still reaches sustained adoption, or whether a SOC that follows the co-creation process fails to adopt the tools.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2604.21679 by Alexandru G. Bardas, Daniel Lende, Francis Hahn, Michael Collins, Mohd Mamoon, S. Raj Rajagopalan, Xinming Ou.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: Tool-Oriented SECI Model (based on [21]) – SECI adaptation for cybersecurity fieldwork where ethnographic insight is translated into operational tools that embed expli￾cated tacit knowledge back into analyst workflows. ipating in peripheral tasks [22] and encountering situated challenges [40], we gained firsthand insight into operational constraints. These experiences, combined with interviews and informal… view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Figure 2: Feedback Loop – Six-month embedded fieldwork and co-creation timeline showing how ethnographic immersion, [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p005_2.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Figure 3: Demonstration SOC Tool Workflow – End-to-end pipeline showing how alert inputs are processed, enriched with [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p006_3.png] view at source ↗
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: LLM Security Platform – The platform receives [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p008_4.png] view at source ↗
Figure 5
Figure 5. Figure 5: LLM-Oriented SECI Model – Extension of the [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p011_5.png] view at source ↗
read the original abstract

Technology for security operations centers (SOCs) has a storied history of slow adoption due to concerns about trust and reliability. These concerns are amplified with artificial intelligence, particularly large language models (LLMs), which exhibit issues such as hallucinations and inconsistent outputs. To assess whether LLM-based tools can improve SOC efficiency, we embedded two PhD researchers within a multinational company SOC for six months of ethnographic fieldwork. We identified recurring challenges, such as repetitive tasks, fragmented/unclear data, and tooling bottlenecks, and collaborated directly with practitioners to develop LLM companion tools aligned with their operational needs. Iterative refinement reduced workflow disruption and improved interpretability, leading from skepticism to sustained adoption. Ethnographic analysis indicates that this shift was enabled by our sociotechnical co-creation process consistent with Nonaka's SECI model. This framework explains the common challenges in traditional SOC technology adoption, including workflow misalignment, rigidity against evolving threats and internal requirements, and stagnation over time. Our findings show that the co-creation approach can overcome these old barriers and create a new paradigm for creating usable technology for cybersecurity operations.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

2 major / 2 minor

Summary. The paper reports on a six-month embedded ethnographic study in which two PhD researchers collaborated with practitioners in a multinational SOC to co-create LLM-based companion tools addressing repetitive tasks, fragmented data, and tooling bottlenecks. Drawing on Nonaka's SECI model as an interpretive framework, the authors claim that their sociotechnical co-creation process enabled a transition from initial skepticism to sustained adoption, overcoming longstanding barriers such as workflow misalignment, rigidity to evolving threats, and stagnation that have historically impeded technology uptake in cybersecurity operations.

Significance. If the attribution of sustained adoption to the co-creation/SECI-aligned process is robustly supported, the work would provide a concrete, practitioner-centered model for developing usable AI tools in high-stakes operational environments. The embedded fieldwork yields rich, context-specific insights into SOC workflows and LLM integration challenges that are rarely captured in lab-based or survey studies. The paper also explicitly credits the iterative, collaborative refinement process for reducing disruption and improving interpretability.

major comments (2)
  1. [Abstract and Findings/Discussion sections] The central causal claim—that the observed shift to sustained LLM tool adoption resulted primarily from the sociotechnical co-creation process aligned with the SECI model—rests on interpretive ethnographic analysis whose supporting evidence is not detailed. No description is given of data collection protocols, coding procedures, inter-rater reliability checks, or systematic comparison against plausible alternative explanations (researcher presence/Hawthorne effect, pre-existing company culture, specific LLM capabilities, or external iterative pressures). This directly undermines the load-bearing attribution in the abstract and findings.
  2. [Methodology and Discussion] The manuscript presents a single-case ethnography without a baseline period, control condition, or explicit falsification steps for the SECI interpretation. While qualitative work does not require statistical controls, the strong claim that the co-creation approach 'can overcome these old barriers and create a new paradigm' requires at least a transparent account of how alternative accounts were considered and why they were set aside.
minor comments (2)
  1. [Abstract] The abstract states that 'ethnographic analysis indicates' the enabling role of the process but supplies no methodological detail; moving a concise methods summary into the abstract would strengthen the reader's ability to evaluate the claim.
  2. [Introduction and Discussion] Clarify whether the SECI model was used prospectively to guide the co-creation activities or applied retrospectively as an interpretive lens; the current wording leaves this ambiguous.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

2 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for their constructive feedback, which highlights important areas for strengthening the evidentiary basis and transparency of our ethnographic claims. We have prepared point-by-point responses below and will incorporate revisions to address the concerns while preserving the interpretive nature of the study.

read point-by-point responses
  1. Referee: [Abstract and Findings/Discussion sections] The central causal claim—that the observed shift to sustained LLM tool adoption resulted primarily from the sociotechnical co-creation process aligned with the SECI model—rests on interpretive ethnographic analysis whose supporting evidence is not detailed. No description is given of data collection protocols, coding procedures, inter-rater reliability checks, or systematic comparison against plausible alternative explanations (researcher presence/Hawthorne effect, pre-existing company culture, specific LLM capabilities, or external iterative pressures). This directly undermines the load-bearing attribution in the abstract and findings.

    Authors: We agree that greater methodological transparency is required to support the interpretive claims. In the revised manuscript we will expand the Methodology section with explicit descriptions of data collection protocols (daily field notes, semi-structured interviews, artifact analysis, and participant observation logs), the thematic coding process (iterative open and axial coding guided by SECI constructs, with illustrative data excerpts), and our reflexive practices including member checking with SOC practitioners to establish credibility. Although conventional inter-rater reliability statistics are not standard in interpretive ethnography, we will document how multiple researchers cross-verified interpretations. We will also add a new subsection in the Discussion that systematically evaluates alternative explanations, citing specific observational sequences (e.g., periods of persistent skepticism despite LLM availability that resolved only after co-creation workshops) to show why the sociotechnical process was the primary driver rather than researcher presence, pre-existing culture, or external factors. revision: yes

  2. Referee: [Methodology and Discussion] The manuscript presents a single-case ethnography without a baseline period, control condition, or explicit falsification steps for the SECI interpretation. While qualitative work does not require statistical controls, the strong claim that the co-creation approach 'can overcome these old barriers and create a new paradigm' requires at least a transparent account of how alternative accounts were considered and why they were set aside.

    Authors: We accept that the single-case embedded design precludes a formal baseline period or control condition, as the collaboration began immediately upon entry and the study was not structured as an intervention trial. In the revision we will add an explicit account in the Discussion of how alternative explanations were considered and set aside during analysis, drawing on chronological field evidence that links specific co-creation events to adoption milestones while ruling out alternatives (e.g., adoption did not occur until workflow alignment was achieved through practitioner input, despite earlier LLM exposure). We will also moderate the abstract and conclusion language to emphasize the interpretive contribution and list the single-case limitation more prominently, while noting that the depth of contextual data provides a falsification opportunity through within-case variation. revision: partial

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No circularity: interpretive ethnographic analysis applies external SECI lens to observations

full rationale

The paper presents findings from six months of embedded ethnographic fieldwork in a single SOC, identifying challenges and describing iterative co-creation of LLM tools leading to adoption. Nonaka's SECI model is invoked only as a post-hoc interpretive framework to explain the observed shift from skepticism to sustained use, not as a source of predictions or derivations that loop back to the data. No equations, fitted parameters, self-definitional constructs, or load-bearing self-citations appear in the provided text. The central attribution rests on qualitative analysis rather than reducing by construction to its inputs; any weaknesses lie in causal inference and lack of controls, not circular logic.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 1 axioms · 0 invented entities

The central claim depends on the interpretive validity of qualitative observations and the applicability of an established knowledge-creation model to SOC technology adoption.

axioms (1)
  • domain assumption Nonaka's SECI model accurately captures the knowledge conversion processes that enable technology adoption in security operations centers
    Invoked to explain the shift from skepticism to sustained use after co-creation.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5511 in / 1254 out tokens · 42538 ms · 2026-05-09T21:38:32.406155+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

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