pith. sign in

arxiv: 2604.25225 · v2 · submitted 2026-04-28 · 🪐 quant-ph

Semi-transmitter-device-independent quantum key distribution

Qiang Zeng , Abhishek Mishra , Haoyang Wang , Zhiliang Yuan This is my paper

Pith reviewed 2026-05-07 16:55 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 🪐 quant-ph
keywords quantum key distributionone-sided device-independenttransmitter device dependenceentanglement sourceblack-box detectordiscrete-variable QKDsecure key rate
0
0 comments X

The pith

A 1sDI quantum key distribution scheme with a composable transmitter largely eliminates transmitter device dependence.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper shows how to reduce transmitter device dependence in quantum key distribution without requiring full device independence. It does this by placing the entanglement source as a separate, composable module inside the transmitter while treating the entire detection module as a black box under one-sided device-independent assumptions. This setup delivers a positive secure key rate in a proof-of-principle experiment, achieving 1 kbps at an equivalent distance of 20 km of fiber. The result demonstrates the first discrete-variable implementation of 1sDI-QKD and keeps the protocol tolerant to realistic channel losses.

Core claim

By constructing a composable transmitter in a 1sDI configuration, the transmitter-device-dependence can be largely eliminated. Our scheme integrates the entanglement source into the transmitter as an individual part, and the detection module is another individual part treated as black box. In a proof-of-principle experiment we obtain a secure key-rate of 1 kbps at an equivalent transmission fiber distance of 20 km, demonstrating the first discrete-variable 1sDI-QKD.

What carries the argument

Composable transmitter that integrates the entanglement source as an independent module under one-sided device-independent (1sDI) assumptions, with the detection module modeled as a black box.

If this is right

  • Secure keys can be generated without full characterization of every transmitter component.
  • The protocol retains loss tolerance needed for practical fiber distances.
  • It provides a concrete path from theoretical 1sDI security to implementable hardware.
  • The first positive-rate discrete-variable 1sDI-QKD demonstration is achieved at 20 km equivalent distance.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • Modularizing the source this way could simplify upgrades to existing QKD transmitters without redesigning the whole system.
  • The black-box detector treatment may still leave room for receiver-specific side-channel attacks that future work would need to bound.
  • Extending the same composable-source idea to continuous-variable 1sDI protocols could further increase achievable rates.

Load-bearing premise

Treating the entanglement source as a fully composable and isolated module inside the transmitter is enough to remove transmitter device dependence under the 1sDI security model.

What would settle it

An experiment or calculation that extracts secret key information from the transmitter side even when the source is integrated as a composable module and the 1sDI assumptions hold.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2604.25225 by Abhishek Mishra, Haoyang Wang, Qiang Zeng, Zhiliang Yuan.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: FIG. 1. (a) Transmitter-device-independent configuration. view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Figure 2: FIG. 2. Experimental setup. The setup of transmitter is contained in two isolated virtual black boxes indicating the internal view at source ↗
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: FIG. 4. Comparison of our detector and state-of-the-art de view at source ↗
read the original abstract

Transmitter-device-dependence is a longstanding but often implicit problem in quantum key distribution (QKD), as compared to measurement-device-dependence. One-sided device-independent (1sDI) scenario relaxes the security conditions of DI framework and offers an intuitive solution to transmitter-sided dependence. Here we show that, by constructing a composable transmitter in a 1sDI configuration, the transmitter-device-dependence can be largely eliminated. Our scheme integrates the entanglement source into the transmitter as an individual part, and the detection module is another individual part treated as black box. In a proof-of-principle experiment we obtain a secure key-rate of 1~kbps at an equivalent transmission fiber distance of 20~km, demonstrating the first discrete-variable 1sDI-QKD. By implementing semi-transmitter-device-independent security while maintaining strong loss tolerance, our approach bridges security and practicality for real-world 1sDI-QKD deployments.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

2 major / 2 minor

Summary. The paper proposes a semi-transmitter-device-independent QKD scheme within the one-sided device-independent (1sDI) framework. It constructs a composable transmitter by integrating the entanglement source as an individual part while treating the detection module as a black box, claiming this largely eliminates transmitter-device dependence. A proof-of-principle experiment reports a secure key rate of 1 kbps at an equivalent 20 km fiber distance, presented as the first discrete-variable 1sDI-QKD demonstration with strong loss tolerance.

Significance. If the security reduction is rigorous and the experimental data processing is sound, the result would provide a practical bridge between full device independence and standard QKD by mitigating transmitter-side assumptions without requiring complete DI, potentially enabling more deployable secure key distribution with positive rates over moderate distances.

major comments (2)
  1. [Security Analysis (implied in Abstract and scheme description)] The central claim that integrating the entanglement source as a 'composable individual part' within the transmitter suffices to largely eliminate transmitter-device-dependence (Abstract) requires an explicit security reduction showing that source imperfections (multi-photon components, phase drifts, or correlations) are fully absorbed into the 1sDI model without residual trusted modeling or additional assumptions; the provided description offers no indication of such a derivation from standard 1sDI assumptions alone.
  2. [Experimental Results (implied in Abstract)] The experimental result of 1 kbps secure key rate at 20 km equivalent distance (Abstract) is reported without visible error analysis, finite-size effects, or data processing steps, which are load-bearing for validating the practicality claim and the first DV 1sDI-QKD assertion.
minor comments (2)
  1. [Title and Abstract] Terminology consistency: the title uses 'Semi-transmitter-device-independent' while the abstract text uses 'semi-transmitter-device-independent'; standardize capitalization and hyphenation throughout.
  2. [Abstract] The abstract states the scheme 'bridges security and practicality' but does not reference prior 1sDI works or clarify how the composable transmitter differs from existing semi-DI approaches; add brief context for readers.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

2 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for the careful reading and constructive comments, which help clarify the presentation of our security analysis and experimental results. We address each major comment below and describe the revisions planned for the next version of the manuscript.

read point-by-point responses

  1. Referee: The central claim that integrating the entanglement source as a 'composable individual part' within the transmitter suffices to largely eliminate transmitter-device-dependence (Abstract) requires an explicit security reduction showing that source imperfections (multi-photon components, phase drifts, or correlations) are fully absorbed into the 1sDI model without residual trusted modeling or additional assumptions; the provided description offers no indication of such a derivation from standard 1sDI assumptions alone.

    Authors: We agree that an explicit security reduction is necessary to substantiate the claim. Our construction places the entanglement source inside the trusted transmitter module of the standard 1sDI framework, with only the detection module treated as untrusted; source imperfections are therefore modeled as part of the trusted component and absorbed into the existing 1sDI security bounds. To make this fully rigorous and transparent, the revised manuscript will contain a new dedicated subsection that derives the composable security reduction step by step from the standard 1sDI assumptions, explicitly showing how multi-photon components, phase drifts, and correlations are accounted for without introducing extra trusted modeling or assumptions beyond the 1sDI setting. revision: yes

  2. Referee: The experimental result of 1 kbps secure key rate at 20 km equivalent distance (Abstract) is reported without visible error analysis, finite-size effects, or data processing steps, which are load-bearing for validating the practicality claim and the first DV 1sDI-QKD assertion.

    Authors: We acknowledge that the current main-text presentation does not make the supporting analysis sufficiently visible. The revised manuscript will expand the experimental results section to include a concise but explicit summary of the error analysis (including statistical uncertainties), the finite-size corrections applied via standard 1sDI finite-key analysis, and the key data-processing steps (raw data filtering, basis reconciliation, and parameter estimation). These additions will directly support the reported key rate, the practicality claim, and the assertion of the first discrete-variable 1sDI-QKD demonstration. revision: yes

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No significant circularity; derivation self-contained in standard 1sDI framework

full rationale

The paper constructs a composable transmitter in a 1sDI configuration by integrating the entanglement source as an individual part and treating the detection module as a black box, then reports an experimental key rate. This rests on the established one-sided device-independent QKD model without any quoted equations, self-definitional reductions, fitted inputs renamed as predictions, or load-bearing self-citations that collapse the central claim to its own inputs by construction. The security argument is presented as building directly on prior 1sDI assumptions rather than deriving them internally, and the proof-of-principle result is an empirical demonstration rather than a tautological prediction. No steps reduce by definition or self-reference.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 1 axioms · 0 invented entities

Abstract-only review provides insufficient detail to enumerate specific free parameters, axioms, or invented entities; the scheme appears to rely on standard quantum mechanics and prior 1sDI-QKD assumptions without new ad-hoc elements stated.

axioms (1)
  • domain assumption Standard assumptions underlying one-sided device-independent QKD security models
    The 1sDI configuration is invoked as the basis for eliminating transmitter dependence.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5458 in / 1237 out tokens · 42657 ms · 2026-05-07T16:55:57.784928+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

58 extracted references · 58 canonical work pages

  1. [1]

    C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, Quantum cryptogra- phy: Public key distribution and coin tossing, Theoreti- cal Computer Science560, 7 (2014)

    work page 2014

  2. [2]

    H.-K. Lo, X. Ma, and K. Chen, Decoy State Quantum Key Distribution, Phys. Rev. Lett.94, 230504 (2005)

    work page 2005

  3. [3]

    Wang, Beating the Photon-Number-Splitting At- tack in Practical Quantum Cryptography, Phys

    X.-B. Wang, Beating the Photon-Number-Splitting At- tack in Practical Quantum Cryptography, Phys. Rev. Lett.94, 230503 (2005)

    work page 2005

  4. [4]

    F. Xu, X. Ma, Q. Zhang, H.-K. Lo, and J.-W. Pan, Se- cure quantum key distribution with realistic devices, Rev. Mod. Phys.92, 025002 (2020)

    work page 2020

  5. [5]

    Gisin, S

    N. Gisin, S. Fasel, B. Kraus, H. Zbinden, and G. Ri- bordy, Trojan-horse attacks on quantum-key-distribution systems, Phys. Rev. A73, 022320 (2006)

    work page 2006

  6. [6]

    Lydersen, C

    L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, Hacking commercial quan- tum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumina- tion, Nat. Photon.4, 686 (2010)

    work page 2010

  7. [7]

    Mayers and A

    D. Mayers and A. Yao, Quantum cryptography with imperfect apparatus, inProceedings 39th Annual Sym- posium on Foundations of Computer Science (Cat. No.98CB36280)(IEEE Comput. Soc, Palo Alto, CA, USA, 1998) pp. 503–509

    work page 1998

  8. [8]

    Brunner, D

    N. Brunner, D. Cavalcanti, S. Pironio, V. Scarani, and S. Wehner, Bell nonlocality, Rev. Mod. Phys.86, 419 (2014)

    work page 2014

  9. [9]

    P. M. Pearle, Hidden-Variable Example Based upon Data Rejection, Physical Review D2, 1418 (1970)

    work page 1970

  10. [10]

    Gerhardt, Q

    I. Gerhardt, Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, J. Skaar, V. Scarani, V. Makarov, and C. Kurtsiefer, Experimen- tally Faking the Violation of Bell’s Inequalities, Phys. Rev. Lett.107, 170404 (2011)

    work page 2011

  11. [11]

    D. P. Nadlinger, P. Drmota, B. C. Nichol, G. Araneda, D. Main, R. Srinivas, D. M. Lucas, C. J. Ballance, K. Ivanov, E. Y.-Z. Tan, P. Sekatski, R. L. Urbanke, R. Renner, N. Sangouard, and J.-D. Bancal, Experimen- tal quantum key distribution certified by Bell’s theorem, Nature607, 682 (2022)

    work page 2022

  12. [12]

    Zhang, T

    W. Zhang, T. van Leent, K. Redeker, R. Garthoff, R. Schwonnek, F. Fertig, S. Eppelt, W. Rosenfeld, V. Scarani, C. C.-W. Lim, and H. Weinfurter, A device- independent quantum key distribution system for distant users, Nature607, 687 (2022)

    work page 2022

  13. [13]

    Liu, Y.-Z

    W.-Z. Liu, Y.-Z. Zhang, Y.-Z. Zhen, M.-H. Li, Y. Liu, J. Fan, F. Xu, Q. Zhang, and J.-W. Pan, Toward a Photonic Demonstration of Device-Independent Quan- tum Key Distribution, Phys. Rev. Lett.129, 050502 (2022)

    work page 2022

  14. [14]

    Lu, C.-W

    B.-W. Lu, C.-W. Yang, R.-Q. Wang, B.-F. Gao, Y.-Z. Zhen, Z.-G. Wang, J.-K. Shi, Z.-Q. Ren, T. A. Hahn, E. Y.-Z. Tan, X.-P. Xie, M.-Y. Zheng, X. Jiang, J. Zhang, F. Xu, Q. Zhang, X.-H. Bao, and J.-W. Pan, Device- independent quantum key distribution over 100 km with single atoms, Science391, 592 (2026)

    work page 2026

  15. [15]

    C. Hu, W. Wang, K.-S. Chan, Z. Yuan, and H.-K. Lo, Proof-of-Principle Demonstration of Fully Passive Quan- tum Key Distribution, Phys. Rev. Lett.131, 110801 (2023)

    work page 2023

  16. [16]

    Lu, Z.-H

    F.-Y. Lu, Z.-H. Wang, V. Zapatero, J.-L. Chen, S. Wang, Z.-Q. Yin, M. Curty, D.-Y. He, R. Wang, W. Chen, G.- J. Fan-Yuan, G.-C. Guo, and Z.-F. Han, Experimental demonstration of fully passive quantum key distribution, Phys. Rev. Lett.131, 110802 (2023)

    work page 2023

  17. [17]

    H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and B. Qi, Measurement-Device- 6 Independent Quantum Key Distribution, Phys. Rev. Lett.108, 130503 (2012)

    work page 2012

  18. [18]

    Lucamarini, Z

    M. Lucamarini, Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, Overcoming the rate–distance limit of quantum key distribution without quantum repeaters, Nature557, 400 (2018)

    work page 2018

  19. [19]

    L. Zhou, J. Lin, Y. Jing, and Z. Yuan, Twin-field quan- tum key distribution without optical frequency dissemi- nation, Nat. Commun.14, 928 (2023)

    work page 2023

  20. [20]

    L. Zhou, J. Lin, Y.-M. Xie, Y.-S. Lu, Y. Jing, H.-L. Yin, and Z. Yuan, Experimental Quantum Communication Overcomes the Rate-Loss Limit without Global Phase Tracking, Phys. Rev. Lett.130, 250801 (2023)

    work page 2023

  21. [21]

    Ioannou, M

    M. Ioannou, M. A. Pereira, D. Rusca, F. Gr¨ unenfelder, A. Boaron, M. Perrenoud, A. A. Abbott, P. Sekatski, J.-D. Bancal, N. Maring, H. Zbinden, and N. Brunner, Receiver-device-independent quantum key distribution, Quantum6, 718 (2022)

    work page 2022

  22. [22]

    Ioannou, P

    M. Ioannou, P. Sekatski, A. A. Abbott, D. Rosset, J.- D. Bancal, and N. Brunner, Receiver-device-independent quantum key distribution protocols, New J. Phys.24, 063006 (2022)

    work page 2022

  23. [23]

    W. Wang, R. Wang, V. Zapatero, L. Qian, B. Qi, M. Curty, and H.-K. Lo, Fully-Passive Quantum Key Distribution, Phys. Rev. Lett.130, 220801 (2023), arXiv:2207.05916 [quant-ph]

    work page arXiv 2023

  24. [24]

    Tamaki, M

    K. Tamaki, M. Curty, and M. Lucamarini, Decoy-state quantum key distribution with a leaky source, New J. Phys.18, 65008 (2016)

    work page 2016

  25. [25]

    F.-Y. Lu, P. Ye, Z.-H. Wang, S. Wang, Z.-Q. Yin, R. Wang, X.-J. Huang, W. Chen, D.-Y. He, G.-J. Fan- Yuan, G.-C. Guo, and Z.-F. Han, Hacking measurement- device-independent quantum key distribution, Optica10, 520 (2023)

    work page 2023

  26. [26]

    Pironio, A

    S. Pironio, A. Ac´ ın, N. Brunner, N. Gisin, S. Massar, and V. Scarani, Device-independent quantum key distri- bution secure against collective attacks, New J. Phys.11, 045021 (2009)

    work page 2009

  27. [27]

    Tomamichel and R

    M. Tomamichel and R. Renner, Uncertainty Relation for Smooth Entropies, Phys. Rev. Lett.106, 110506 (2011)

    work page 2011

  28. [28]

    Tomamichel, C

    M. Tomamichel, C. C. W. Lim, N. Gisin, and R. Renner, Tight finite-key analysis for quantum cryptography, Nat. Commun.3, 634 (2012)

    work page 2012

  29. [29]

    Gehring, V

    T. Gehring, V. H¨ andchen, J. Duhme, F. Furrer, T. Franz, C. Pacher, R. F. Werner, and R. Schnabel, Implemen- tation of continuous-variable quantum key distribution with composable and one-sided-device-independent se- curity against coherent attacks, Nat. Commun.6, 8795 (2015)

    work page 2015

  30. [30]

    N. Walk, S. Hosseini, J. Geng, O. Thearle, J. Y. Haw, S. Armstrong, S. M. Assad, J. Janousek, T. C. Ralph, T. Symul, H. M. Wiseman, and P. K. Lam, Experimen- tal demonstration of Gaussian protocols for one-sided device-independent quantum key distribution, Optica3, 634 (2016)

    work page 2016

  31. [31]

    H. M. Wiseman, S. J. Jones, and A. C. Doherty, Steering, Entanglement, Nonlocality, and the Einstein-Podolsky- Rosen Paradox, Phys. Rev. Lett.98, 140402 (2007)

    work page 2007

  32. [32]

    R. Uola, A. C. S. Costa, H. C. Nguyen, and O. G¨ uhne, Quantum steering, Rev. Mod. Phys.92, 015001 (2020)

    work page 2020

  33. [33]

    Branciard, E

    C. Branciard, E. G. Cavalcanti, S. P. Walborn, V. Scarani, and H. M. Wiseman, One-sided device- independent quantum key distribution: Security, feasi- bility, and the connection with steering, Phys. Rev. A 85, 010301(R) (2012)

    work page 2012

  34. [34]

    Masini and S

    M. Masini and S. Sarkar, One-sided DI-QKD secure against coherent attacks over long distances (2024), arXiv:2403.11850 [quant-ph]

    work page arXiv 2024

  35. [35]

    J. Li, W. Wang, and H.-K. Lo, Fully passive measurement-device-independent quantum key distribu- tion, Phys. Rev. Appl.21, 64056 (2024)

    work page 2024

  36. [36]

    Wang, F.-Y

    X. Wang, F.-Y. Lu, Z.-H. Wang, Z.-Q. Yin, S. Wang, J.- Q. Geng, W. Chen, D.-Y. He, G.-C. Guo, and Z.-F. Han, Fully passive measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution, Phys. Rev. Appl.21, 64067 (2024)

    work page 2024

  37. [37]

    ˇSupi´ c and J

    I. ˇSupi´ c and J. Bowles, Self-testing of quantum systems: A review, Quantum4, 337 (2020)

    work page 2020

  38. [38]

    Q. Zeng, J. Shang, H. C. Nguyen, and X. Zhang, Reliable experimental certification of one-way einstein-podolsky- rosen steering, Phys. Rev. Res.4, 013151 (2022)

    work page 2022

  39. [39]

    Zeng, One-way Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen steering be- yond qubits, Phys

    Q. Zeng, One-way Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen steering be- yond qubits, Phys. Rev. A106, 032202 (2022)

    work page 2022

  40. [40]

    Q. Zeng, B. Wang, P. Li, and X. Zhang, Experimen- tal High-Dimensional Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Steering, Phys. Rev. Lett.120, 030401 (2018)

    work page 2018

  41. [41]

    Q. Zeng, H. Yuan, H. Wang, L. Zhou, and Z. Yuan, Steer- ing nonlocality in high-speed telecommunication system without detection loophole, npj Quantum Inf.11, 68 (2025)

    work page 2025

  42. [42]

    Wittmann, S

    B. Wittmann, S. Ramelow, F. Steinlechner, N. K. Langford, N. Brunner, H. M. Wiseman, R. Ursin, and A. Zeilinger, Loophole-free Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen ex- periment via quantum steering, New J. Phys.14, 053030 (2012)

    work page 2012

  43. [43]

    Schwonnek, K

    R. Schwonnek, K. T. Goh, I. W. Primaatmaja, E. Y.-Z. Tan, R. Wolf, V. Scarani, and C. C.-W. Lim, Device- independent quantum key distribution with random key basis, Nat. Commun.12, 2880 (2021)

    work page 2021

  44. [44]

    Brown, H

    P. Brown, H. Fawzi, and O. Fawzi, Computing condi- tional entropies for quantum correlations, Nat. Commun. 12, 575 (2021)

    work page 2021

  45. [45]

    Brown, H

    P. Brown, H. Fawzi, and O. Fawzi, Device-independent lower bounds on the conditional von neumann entropy, Quantum8, 1445 (2024)

    work page 2024

  46. [46]

    Ac´ ın, D

    A. Ac´ ın, D. Cavalcanti, E. Passaro, S. Pironio, and P. Skrzypczyk, Necessary detection efficiencies for secure quantum key distribution and bound randomness, Phys. Rev. A93, 012319 (2016)

    work page 2016

  47. [47]

    Masini, M

    M. Masini, M. Ioannou, N. Brunner, S. Pironio, and P. Sekatski, Joint-measurability and quantum communi- cation with untrusted devices, Quantum8, 1574 (2024), arXiv:2403.14785 [quant-ph]

    work page arXiv 2024

  48. [48]

    Arnon-Friedman, F

    R. Arnon-Friedman, F. Dupuis, O. Fawzi, R. Renner, and T. Vidick, Practical device-independent quantum cryp- tography via entropy accumulation, Nat. Commun.9, 459 (2018)

    work page 2018

  49. [49]

    Dupuis, O

    F. Dupuis, O. Fawzi, and R. Renner, Entropy accumula- tion, Commun. Math. Phys.379, 867 (2020)

    work page 2020

  50. [50]

    Schwaller, G

    N. Schwaller, G. Park, R. Okamoto, and S. Takeuchi, Op- timizing the coupling efficiency of spontaneous paramet- ric down-conversion photon pairs into single-mode fibers, Phys. Rev. A106, 043719 (2022)

    work page 2022

  51. [51]

    D. N. Klyshko, Use of two-photon light for absolute cali- bration of photoelectric detectors, Sov. J. Quantum Elec- tron.10, 1112 (1980)

    work page 1980

  52. [52]

    M. Ho, P. Sekatski, E. Y.-Z. Tan, R. Renner, J.-D. Ban- cal, and N. Sangouard, Noisy Preprocessing Facilitates a Photonic Realization of Device-Independent Quantum 7 Key Distribution, Phys. Rev. Lett.124, 230502 (2020)

    work page 2020

  53. [53]

    Xu, Y.-Z

    F. Xu, Y.-Z. Zhang, Q. Zhang, and J.-W. Pan, Device- Independent Quantum Key Distribution with Random Postselection, Phys. Rev. Lett.128, 110506 (2022)

    work page 2022

  54. [54]

    Orsucci, J.-D

    D. Orsucci, J.-D. Bancal, N. Sangouard, and P. Sekatski, How post-selection affects device-independent claims un- der the fair sampling assumption, Quantum4, 238 (2020)

    work page 2020

  55. [55]

    Buscemi, All Entangled Quantum States Are Nonlo- cal, Phys

    F. Buscemi, All Entangled Quantum States Are Nonlo- cal, Phys. Rev. Lett.108, 200401 (2012)

    work page 2012

  56. [56]

    Y.-Y. Zhao, C. Zhang, S. Cheng, X. Li, Y. Guo, B.-H. Liu, H.-Y. Ku, S.-L. Chen, Q. Wen, Y.-F. Huang, G.- Y. Xiang, C.-F. Li, and G.-C. Guo, Device-independent verification of Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen steering, Optica 10, 66 (2023)

    work page 2023

  57. [57]

    Z.-G. Li, J. Mao, Y.-J. Zhou, J.-W. Guo, S. Chen, H. Hao, Y.-H. Huang, S.-Y. Ru, N.-T. Liu, Z. Liu, J. Deng, F. Yang, X.-C. Tu, L.-B. Zhang, X.-Q. Jia, J. Chen, L. Kang, J. Wang, Q.-Y. Zhao, Q. Gong, and P.- H. Wu, Surpassing 99% detection efficiency by cascading two superconducting nanowires on one waveguide with self-calibration, Light: Science & Applic...

    work page 2025

  58. [58]

    H. Wang, H. Yuan, Q. Zeng, L. Zhou, H. Ma, and Z. Yuan, High-rate cross-channel entanglement swap- ping between independent on-chip sources, Adv. Sci.13, e18802 (2025)

    work page 2025