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Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Screening Under Competition

As of 16 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 17 of 17 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2606.22720.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2606.22720 v1

Coverage vector

measured 17 of 17 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-06-26T09:13:13.073787Z

measured 17 of 17 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-15T06:32:42.880941+00:00

measured 0 of 0 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: cited_works

Reference resolution

17 of 17 outbound references displayed

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  • verified fuzzy0
  • unresolved16
  • parse uncertain1
  • malformed identifier0
  • metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation 4c2555b5-d9fd-4cbf-b6b4-827cc65bc035 · outbound

This paper cites The existence of such an equilib- rium follows from the proof of Corollary 3.1.

Screening Under Competition The existence of such an equilib- rium follows from the proof of Corollary 3.1

Reference 1

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Source-reported events for the cited work

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-26T09:13:13.073787Z digest=sha256:624a8991c32e0c7f4cff0ff07254c1aca3f850c18624c8f3717948676ef98371

Observation e0d4d0d4-7361-462c-988e-0c60d297cf50 · outbound

This paper cites We can conclude that (q ′ 1, t′.

Screening Under Competition We can conclude that (q ′ 1, t′

Reference 2

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-26T09:13:13.073787Z digest=sha256:81ab19638a5e2c39dcf3beae7fe979f6de44c18dec96cc236eecc5a4c0858c60

Observation 04d98341-4547-4215-9f9a-f76dd032cde3 · outbound

This paper cites As for allθ∈Θ ′ A \Θ A, they stick to the original contract (q 1, t1).

Screening Under Competition As for allθ∈Θ ′ A \Θ A, they stick to the original contract (q 1, t1)

Reference 3

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-26T09:13:13.073787Z digest=sha256:8faf7ab3d0d698cd2d9bf03d13de22b01cf4e1ec79a2c4ad1faace628e614123

Observation 1c3e3cf8-7737-4c0c-847d-7d886b776481 · outbound

This paper cites Firm 1 can be strictly better off by deviating toM ′, which completes the proof thatMis not an equilibrium.

Screening Under Competition Firm 1 can be strictly better off by deviating toM ′, which completes the proof thatMis not an equilibrium

Reference 4

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-26T09:13:13.073787Z digest=sha256:c08cba3ea75ddbfc0970a719869c0d7906c82e761e258934e92c0ca6e5d9b7c2

Observation 948c1f53-137e-4ea0-898b-ae496d69174f · outbound

This paper cites Thus, p= ˆ∆(1−q k) +t k 1 +t k 2.(7) Since ∆k = ∆>0,q k <1, andt k 2 ≥0, we have ∆k(1−q k) +t k 2 >0.

Screening Under Competition Thus, p= ˆ∆(1−q k) +t k 1 +t k 2.(7) Since ∆k = ∆>0,q k <1, andt k 2 ≥0, we have ∆k(1−q k) +t k 2 >0

Reference 5

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-26T09:13:13.073787Z digest=sha256:447839f32f6d1a8e2c086b621f00bf4998c57973a09c001b0b8a99e2f3dd7e99

Observation 8bec8311-6e98-43db-bac9-8d96a4a03261 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Screening Under Competition Unresolved cited work

Reference 6

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parse uncertain
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Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-26T09:13:13.073787Z digest=sha256:2e11540b9da43e027d3b11f6c56105a607be3b40169c89aef33c5eab6771e34f

Observation 72ce49aa-4f2c-41cb-b7ed-8a8d229ac71a · outbound

This paper cites Hence, all types ∆> ˆ∆ strictly prefer (1, p), while all types ∆< ˆ∆ in the top interval do not prefer the new contract.

Screening Under Competition Hence, all types ∆> ˆ∆ strictly prefer (1, p), while all types ∆< ˆ∆ in the top interval do not prefer the new contract

Reference 7

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-26T09:13:13.073787Z digest=sha256:851b2549f8924cd160121967feb9317b87d9b452a0855629e050e194fa382008

Observation e296db40-a24b-4152-88de-ff6c88e1d316 · outbound

This paper cites The utility gain from (1, p) over (q j, tj 1) paired with (1−q j, tj.

Screening Under Competition The utility gain from (1, p) over (q j, tj 1) paired with (1−q j, tj

Reference 8

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-26T09:13:13.073787Z digest=sha256:3afa3702c34286fddf791a97b722d31cffab295b488bec8e5b702140497281c0

Observation 88ff77ef-ff40-4dbe-af4b-17511e9848eb · outbound

This paper cites This expression is increasing in ∆, since 1−q j ≥0.

Screening Under Competition This expression is increasing in ∆, since 1−q j ≥0

Reference 9

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-26T09:13:13.073787Z digest=sha256:0d23bf21e24ab83576e5aa50ef2ac6180bcbc3fe365fb7e778bbaae5c3029682

Observation 1abde818-cea0-44b6-a693-a80b5821b3f1 · outbound

This paper cites Summing these differences froml=jtok−1 yields ∆jqj −t j 1 −t j 2 = ∆jqk −t k 1 −t k 2 − k−1X l=j (∆j −∆ l)(ql+1 −q l).

Screening Under Competition Summing these differences froml=jtok−1 yields ∆jqj −t j 1 −t j 2 = ∆jqk −t k 1 −t k 2 − k−1X l=j (∆j −∆ l)(ql+1 −q l)

Reference 10

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-26T09:13:13.073787Z digest=sha256:b2bdbea257ce7314ca71df8d7efeadea25451df0d385319f371d5dbfcb2576d2

Observation a2b8218e-ade8-489c-9206-c9432a055aa8 · outbound

This paper cites The change in firm 1’s expected revenue is ∆Π1 = (p−t k 1) H(∆ k)−H( ˆ∆).

Screening Under Competition The change in firm 1’s expected revenue is ∆Π1 = (p−t k 1) H(∆ k)−H( ˆ∆)

Reference 11

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-26T09:13:13.073787Z digest=sha256:bf16effbfb4d21c6b536d71bd45a6305df27602870da4089308f7e0b51840285

Observation 734edbbe-4665-4a46-971f-6afbb201746f · outbound

This paper cites •Types with ∆>∆ K−1 buy exclusively from firm 1, choosing (1, p 1) from firm 1 and (0,0) from firm 2.

Screening Under Competition •Types with ∆>∆ K−1 buy exclusively from firm 1, choosing (1, p 1) from firm 1 and (0,0) from firm 2

Reference 12

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-26T09:13:13.073787Z digest=sha256:168ce496538c21dabd6da3ffdb8a72d75cc5f5c755a6f74d2d845b70c4817897

Observation 1c87137c-0501-47d0-8566-4a273a731536 · outbound

This paper cites , K−1, the agent is indifferent between adjacent contractskandk+ 1: ∆k qk −s k = ∆k qk+1 −s k+1.

Screening Under Competition , K−1, the agent is indifferent between adjacent contractskandk+ 1: ∆k qk −s k = ∆k qk+1 −s k+1

Reference 13

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-26T09:13:13.073787Z digest=sha256:b0a54dddc6da241bf56bed0cd51f69eae7f0f690ab5f25d4b1b6cc9d76206de5

Observation a6d91e45-31d7-42dc-8e0e-8f45d9c0cb71 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Screening Under Competition Unresolved cited work

Reference 14

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-26T09:13:13.073787Z digest=sha256:256876adec221d9d227a57a85a5e0fe85247c81e6c29258e810a84a3fa49b176

Observation d6bc9d52-f8b9-4471-a45a-85a706071490 · outbound

This paper cites By the same calculation, with ∂∆k−1 ∂tk 2 = 1 αk and ∂∆k ∂tk 2 = −1 αk+1 , setting ∂Π2 ∂tk 2 = 0 yields: H(∆ k)−H(∆ k−1) + h(∆k−1) αk (tk−1 2 −t k.

Screening Under Competition By the same calculation, with ∂∆k−1 ∂tk 2 = 1 αk and ∂∆k ∂tk 2 = −1 αk+1 , setting ∂Π2 ∂tk 2 = 0 yields: H(∆ k)−H(∆ k−1) + h(∆k−1) αk (tk−1 2 −t k

Reference 15

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-26T09:13:13.073787Z digest=sha256:bc81863acfb2702522df41b3186968a411b25bcc385058e19dae8600ba57f8c7

Observation 9ceb6c02-0181-40bf-b5f8-a85f4ea28b47 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Screening Under Competition Unresolved cited work

Reference 16

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-26T09:13:13.073787Z digest=sha256:c0ae44ad94eb6be2eb9af645241b50e71d340af3e27522ff30df5b5a678979b3

Observation 44f290f1-6af2-4f21-9422-9453bb5c6951 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Screening Under Competition Unresolved cited work

Reference 17

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-06-26T09:13:13.073787Z digest=sha256:25f1fad2177ee4504970dcd368c15136f512e528b79435dc8c5dcbcfc120f6c4

Pith citing papers

No inbound Pith citation observations are available.