Pith. Sign in

REVIEW

Multiplicative and Additive Extractors for Low Entropy Samplable Sources Under Reduced Assumptions

Computational Complexity · Submitted 5 Nov 2026 · 13 references

Pith's verdict: Significant, well-written paper that substantially lowers min-entropy thresholds for seedless extractors under standard hardness assumptions. All constructions conditional, but the technical work is rigorous and introduces new machinery.

T0 · AI review

How this review was made: An AI referee (deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash) read the paper on November 6, 2026 and answered a fixed list of questions about it. T0 is the starting level every paper gets. The levels describe how deeply Pith has checked the paper, never the authors.

  1. T0 AI review An AI read the paper and answered a fixed list of questions.
  2. T1 Audit Automatic checks that the references and files the paper relies on exist and match.
  3. T2 Compute The paper's code or calculations re-run with the same results.
  4. T3 Formal statement The claims written out in a formal math language a computer can read.
  5. T4 Proof Those claims proved, and the proof checked by computer.

How Pith checks papers →

· 5 minor · Ask about this paper · The compiled record · Read the full review →
Challenge this review Comment (0) Read on arXiv ↗
Cite ▾
arXiv ID2611.07829 (version 1)
Pith IDHXP7GELY, Pith's permanent record of this paper and its review
CitationEshan Chattopadhyay, Marshall Ball, Mohit Gurumukhani, Ronen Shaltiel, Yunya Zhao. "Multiplicative and Additive Extractors for Low Entropy Samplable Sources Under Reduced Assumptions." arXiv:2611.07829 (2026). https://pith.science/paper/HXP7GELY
Cite this reviewBibTeX for Pith's review of this paper
Claim paper

Why Pith says this

Highlight any text to comment on it.

Referee report
The paper

The paper claims

Three new extractors for samplable sources push the entropy threshold to O(log n) under nondeterministic hardness, matching nonconstructive bounds.

The reading

This paper constructs three explicit seedless extractors for distributions that can be sampled by small circuits, under the assumption that the class E cannot be computed by exponential-size nondeterministic circuits (or Σ₂ circuits for one result). The first extractor pulls out one bit from sources with just O(log n) min-entropy, matching what a nonconstructive argument says is possible. The second extracts almost all the entropy from sources with n^α min-entropy, and it is multiplicative, meaning it preserves cryptographic security guarantees even with constant error. The third works for polylog n min-entropy but requires a slightly stronger Σ₂ hardness assumption. All three constructions improve on previous work, which either needed stronger hardness assumptions or could not handle such low entropy.

What carries the argument

The constructions rely on three main ingredients: (1) robust errorless block condensers, which condense entropy from subsources of a samplable joint distribution; (2) errorless condensers, built via an iterative win-win argument that repeatedly splits the source into medium- and light-weight parts; and (3) local correlation breakers, constructed from a seed-extending PRG, a low-degree extension of a hard function, and a two-source non-malleable extractor. The Goldwasser–Sipser set-lower-bound protocol is used to implement polynomial tests with small nondeterministic circuits.

Extended reading notes

Core claim

The paper proves that under the assumption that E is hard for exponential-size nondeterministic circuits, one can construct seedless extractors for samplable distributions with min-entropy as low as k = O(log n) (one bit, constant error), k = n^α (multiplicative extractor outputting k^Ω(1) bits with polynomially small error), and k = polylog(n) (additive extractor outputting almost all entropy with polynomially small error, under Σ₂ hardness). These results dramatically lower the min-entropy threshold compared to prior work such as [TV00], [BSS25], [Sha25a], while using weaker hardness assumptions. The constructions also work for distributions samplable with nondeterministic postselection, a generalization that captures leakage scenarios.

Load-bearing premise

The paper assumes that the complexity class E contains a problem that cannot be solved by nondeterministic circuits of size $2^{{β n}}$ for some constant β > 0; if this assumption is false, all three main constructions collapse.

Editorial extensions

If this is right

  • If the nondeterministic hardness assumption is true, then cryptographic protocols can use the multiplicative extractor to select keys from weak random sources while retaining negligible security loss, even when the extractor error is a constant.
  • The one-bit extractor matches the probabilistic method, showing that explicit construction can achieve the same parameters for samplable sources under a plausible computational assumption.
  • The results provide extractors for the more general model of distributions samplable with postselection, meaning extraction is possible even when information about the sample is leaked via an efficient predicate.
  • The errorless condenser construction gives a way to boost entropy in a lossless way for samplable sources, which may be useful for other derandomization tasks.
  • Compared to prior work, the min-entropy threshold is lowered from near n to n^α or even O(log n), making extractors practical for sources with much less randomness.

Reading between the lines

Editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • The paper does not provide evidence for the hardness assumptions; if those assumptions were refuted, all constructions would collapse. It would be interesting to see whether any of the results can be based on weaker, still plausible assumptions or on worst-case hardness.
  • The iterative win-win construction of errorless condensers uses a delicate decomposition that may be reusable for other pseudorandom objects, such as condensers for more general models of computation.
  • The local correlation breaker is built from a two-source non-malleable extractor; improving that construction (e.g., to longer output or lower error) would directly improve the parameters of the extractors.
Original abstract

Trevisan and Vadhan [TV, FOCS'00] constructed (seedless) extractors for distributions samplable by poly-size circuits that have very high min-entropy, under the very strong complexity theoretic hardness assumption that $\mathsf{E}=\mathsf{DTIME}(2^{O(n)})$ requires size $2^{\Omega(n)}$ circuits that have oracle access to $\Sigma_6^{\text{P}}$. In this paper we give three new explicit constructions of extractors for samplable distributions. First, we construct an extractor that extracts one bit, with constant error, for min-entropy $k=O(\log n)$, which matches the non-constructive probabilistic argument. This result uses hardness for nondeterministic circuits, and achieves the same parameters as the recent extractor of Oh and Shaltiel [OS, STOC'26] under an incomparable hardness assumption. In contrast to the extractor of [OS26], our extractor (and, similarly, the constructions below) also works for the more general class of distributions samplable with postselection (a model introduced by [BGDM, FOCS'23] that generalizes samplable and recognizable sources). Second, we construct an extractor that extracts almost all the entropy, with polynomially small error, for min-entropy $k=n^{\alpha}$, where $\alpha>0$ is an arbitrary constant. This result also uses hardness for nondeterministic circuits, and significantly improves upon the recent extractor of [Shaltiel, FOCS'25] which required a much stronger assumption. This extractor is also \textit{multiplicative}: a stronger notion suggested in [AASY, Comp. Complexity'16; Shaltiel, CCC'25] to make extractors for samplable distributions suitable for selecting keys for cryptographic protocols. Third, we construct an extractor that extracts almost all the entropy, with polynomially small error, for min-entropy $k=\mathrm{polylog}(n)$. This result uses hardness for circuits that have oracle access to $\Sigma_2^{\text{P}}$.

The compiled record

The paper's own sentences, arranged, kept beside the review and separate from it. Each label is drawn from a closed vocabulary; the number beside it is the probability the classifier gave that label. Numbers in the tables are the authors', checked by code. No sentence in this record was written by a model.

Compiled by classifier-1.13.0 via TypeSafe API, question bank abstract-p1-20260923, 2026-11-06: 1 request, 8,638 input tokens.

What the abstract itself states, as probabilities: claims first 0.12 · states limitation 0.29 · human participants 0.01 · controlled comparison 0.11 · randomized assignment 0.01 · states quantitative result 0.97 · compares with prior results 0.98 · mentions code or data availability 0.02.

The abstract, sentence by sentence

arXiv listing abstract v1. Results and the main claim are underlined; .

Trevisan and Vadhan [TV, FOCS'00] constructed (seedless) extractors for distributions samplable by poly-size circuits that have very high min-entropy, under the very strong complexity theoretic hardness assumption that $\mathsf{E}=\mathsf{DTIME}(2^{O(n)})$ requires size $2^{\Omega(n)}$ circuits that have oracle access to $\Sigma_6^{\text{P}}$. In this paper we give three new explicit constructions of extractors for samplable distributions. First, we construct an extractor that extracts one bit, with constant error, for min-entropy $k=O(\log n)$, which matches the non-constructive probabilistic argument. This result uses hardness for nondeterministic circuits, and achieves the same parameters as the recent extractor of Oh and Shaltiel [OS, STOC'26] under an incomparable hardness assumption. In contrast to the extractor of [OS26], our extractor (and, similarly, the constructions below) also works for the more general class of distributions samplable with postselection (a model introduced by [BGDM, FOCS'23] that generalizes samplable and recognizable sources). Second, we construct an extractor that extracts almost all the entropy, with polynomially small error, for min-entropy $k=n^{\alpha}$, where $\alpha>0$ is an arbitrary constant. This result also uses hardness for nondeterministic circuits, and significantly improves upon the recent extractor of [Shaltiel, FOCS'25] which required a much stronger assumption. This extractor is also \textit{multiplicative}: a stronger notion suggested in [AASY, Comp. Complexity'16; Shaltiel, CCC'25] to make extractors for samplable distributions suitable for selecting keys for cryptographic protocols. Third, we construct an extractor that extracts almost all the entropy, with polynomially small error, for min-entropy $k=\mathrm{polylog}(n)$. This result uses hardness for circuits that have oracle access to $\Sigma_2^{\text{P}}$.

background contribution method result interpretation main claim

What the classifier reports for each sentence. The number is the probability it gave the label.
#sentencerolethe authors' own workstates the main conclusionstrength
s0 Trevisan and Vadhan [TV, FOCS'00] constructed (seedless) extractors for distributions samplable by poly-size circuits that have very high min-entropy, under the very strong complexity theoretic hardness assumption that $\mathsf{E}=\mathsf{DTIME}(2^{O(n)})$ requires size $2^{\Omega(n)}$ circuits that have oracle access to $\Sigma_6^{\text{P}}$. background 1.00 0.03 0.03 asserted 1.00
s1 In this paper we give three new explicit constructions of extractors for samplable distributions. contribution 1.00 0.93 0.40 asserted 1.00
s2 First, we construct an extractor that extracts one bit, with constant error, for min-entropy $k=O(\log n)$, which matches the non-constructive probabilistic argument. result 0.64 0.95 0.17 asserted 1.00
s3 This result uses hardness for nondeterministic circuits, and achieves the same parameters as the recent extractor of Oh and Shaltiel [OS, STOC'26] under an incomparable hardness assumption. result 0.39 0.76 0.08 asserted 1.00
s4 In contrast to the extractor of [OS26], our extractor (and, similarly, the constructions below) also works for the more general class of distributions samplable with postselection (a model introduced by [BGDM, FOCS'23] that generalizes samplable and recognizable sources). contribution 0.60 0.82 0.07 asserted 1.00
s5 Second, we construct an extractor that extracts almost all the entropy, with polynomially small error, for min-entropy $k=n^{\alpha}$, where $\alpha>0$ is an arbitrary constant. contribution 0.55 0.96 0.12 asserted 1.00
s6 This result also uses hardness for nondeterministic circuits, and significantly improves upon the recent extractor of [Shaltiel, FOCS'25] which required a much stronger assumption. contribution 0.42 0.81 0.10 asserted 1.00
s7 This extractor is also \textit{multiplicative}: a stronger notion suggested in [AASY, Comp. contribution 0.37 0.71 0.07 asserted 0.97
s8 Complexity'16; Shaltiel, CCC'25] to make extractors for samplable distributions suitable for selecting keys for cryptographic protocols. interpretation 0.68 0.16 0.05 asserted 0.56
s9 Third, we construct an extractor that extracts almost all the entropy, with polynomially small error, for min-entropy $k=\mathrm{polylog}(n)$. contribution 0.70 0.96 0.13 asserted 1.00
s10 This result uses hardness for circuits that have oracle access to $\Sigma_2^{\text{P}}$. method 0.85 0.85 0.06 asserted 1.00

What kind of paper the classifier reports this is: theoretical result 0.80 · evidence from proof or derivation 0.98.

What was examined, and what was not

sources read
  • arXiv listing abstract v1
not examined
  • full text
  • figures and tables
  • references and citing sentences
  • relations to other papers
levels run
  • P abstract
not run
  • S sections
  • T body sentences
  • C citations
  • R cross-paper relations

Every quoted sentence on this record is the authors'. Every label is from Pith's closed vocabulary, with the probability shown beside it. Every number in the measurements table is the authors', checked by code. Record as JSON

Figures
Figure 1. The private-coin protocol used in the reduction.
Figure 2. The common interaction and its two tests. The verifier never computes G. On a generator input, the honest prover supplies ai = G′ (pi); soundness allows arbitrary suffix replies. On generator inputs, a successful prover can supply the actual suffixes G′ (pi), so failure of decorrelation becomes detectable. For uniform inputs, fixing the seed tuple makes the uniform suffix independent of the conditioned rows. Non-malleability then limits the success of every prover. The next observation isolates the common final step, after these two acceptance estimates have been proved. Lemma 12.7…

Figures reproduced from arXiv:2611.07829 by the authors.

References

Discussion

Disagree with the review, or know something it missed? Leave a comment, highlight any passage above to comment on it, or challenge this review formally.