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Beyond the Bridge: Contention-Based Covert and Side Channel Attacks on Multi-GPU Interconnect
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High-speed interconnects, such as NVLink, are integral to modern multi-GPU systems, acting as a vital link between CPUs and GPUs. This study highlights the vulnerability of multi-GPU systems to covert and side channel attacks due to congestion on interconnects. An adversary can infer private information about a victim's activities by monitoring NVLink congestion without needing special permissions. Leveraging this insight, we develop a covert channel attack across two GPUs with a bandwidth of 45.5 kbps and a low error rate, and introduce a side channel attack enabling attackers to fingerprint applications through the shared NVLink interconnect.
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