REVIEW 3 major objections 3 minor 14 references
Was Schr\"odinger ever a determinist?
T0 review · 3 major / 3 minor · reviewed 2026-08-14 · deepseek-v4-flash
Pith's one-line read This paper argues that Schrödinger was not a conservative determinist: from the early 1920s he held that physics, including classical mechanics, is fundamentally statistical and indeterministic.
desk verdict A plausible and well-sourced historical essay that makes a good case Schrödinger was an indeterminist, but the title's 'ever' overreaches because the paper never confronts the deterministic status of his own wave equation. read the letter →
The pith
A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.
The reading
What carries the argument
The argument is carried by two primary texts: Schrödinger's 1929 essay 'Was ist ein Naturgesetz?' and his 1931 lecture 'Über Indeterminismus in der Physik,' read against the background of Vienna indeterminism. The essay establishes that he already held nature's laws to be thoroughly statistical; the lecture contains his three explicit arguments for classical indeterminism—challenging infinitely precise initial conditions as a Newtonian artifice, elevating statistical laws and irreversibility to fundamental status, and grounding indeterminism in the finite information content of a discrete sequence of yes–no answers. These texts are what convert the title question from biography into an argument: they are offered as direct evidence that his indeterminism predated and exceeded quantum mechanics.
What would settle it
A decisive check would be archival: locate a text by Schrödinger, after 1922—for example a letter, lecture note, or a passage in his later philosophical writings—in which he explicitly affirms that classical mechanics determines every outcome in principle or retracts the 1931 lecture. Finding such a statement would weaken the claim that he was never a determinist; failing to find one would support it.
Extended reading notes
Core claim
The central claim is that Schrödinger's opposition to the quantum orthodoxy was not a defense of determinism but a more radical indeterminism. In his 1931 lecture 'Indeterminism in Physics' he regrets not that Heisenberg introduced indeterminism, but that nobody had said forty or fifty years earlier that modern physics was compelled to give up causality and determinism. He advances three arguments: that classical mechanics itself is indeterminate once the idealization of infinitely precise initial conditions is dropped; that statistical laws may be fundamental rather than approximations to hidden deterministic laws; and that nature's finite information content, understood as a sequence of yes–no answers, makes indeterminism the more compelling assumption. The paper therefore portrays Schrödinger not as a reactionary clinging to determinism, but as foreseeing, a century early, the view that physics was never deterministic.
Load-bearing premise
The reconstruction assumes that Schrödinger's 1929 essay and 1931 lecture record his considered, settled views rather than occasional polemical performances, and that the Vienna-indeterminism influence is the right explanation for them.
Editorial extensions
If this is right
- The standard history that groups Schrödinger with Einstein and de Broglie as determinist holdouts should be revised: his opposition to the quantum orthodoxy did not make him a believer in determinism.
- Schrödinger's 1931 argument implies that the indeterminism of quantum mechanics was not a rupture with classical physics but the belated recognition of a feature he thought physics had possessed all along.
- The deterministic evolution of the wave function should not be taken as evidence of Schrödinger's commitment to determinism; the paper treats his broader philosophical statements as expressing his settled view.
- The resurgence of arguments that classical physics is indeterminate, based on finite information and irreversibility, can be seen as a rediscovery of a position Schrödinger already held.
- A direct corollary is that careful historical study matters for current physics: the modern finite-information program has a century-old precedent in a founding figure.
Reading between the lines
- If the Vienna-indeterminism lineage is right, Schrödinger's famous equation may best be read as a mathematical device within an indeterminist worldview, not as a metaphysical commitment to determinism—a distinction the paper gestures at but does not develop.
- A natural test of the paper's thesis would be to examine Schrödinger's later published work, such as his popular and philosophical writings of the 1940s and 1950s, for any explicit retraction or defense of determinism; the paper concentrates on the 1920s and 1930s and does not claim to close that question.
- Schrödinger's 1931 yes–no sequence can be read as an early information-theoretic argument for indeterminism; the paper notes the anticipation of information but does not map that sequence to modern bit-based uncertainty or to later theorems, which would be a separate historical and technical study.
Editorial analysis
A structured set of objections, weighed in public.
Referee Report
Summary. The paper challenges the standard narrative that Erwin Schrödinger was a determinist hold-out against quantum indeterminism. Drawing on the 'Vienna indeterminism' of Boltzmann and Exner, and especially on Schrödinger's 1929 essay 'Was ist ein Naturgesetz?' and his 1931 lecture 'Über Indeterminismus in der Physik', the authors argue that Schrödinger advocated a more radical position: classical mechanics itself is statistical and indeterminate, and genuine indeterminism predates quantum theory. The paper identifies three arguments in the 1931 lecture (idealized initial conditions, statistical laws and irreversibility, and a finite-information picture of nature) and concludes that Schrödinger may have been so radical an indeterminist that the significance of his thought has 'eluded recognition for a century.'
Significance. If sustained, the revisionist reading would materially change the usual historical picture, moving Schrödinger from the conservative opposition to quantum indeterminism into a precursor of modern information-theoretic and indeterministic interpretations of physics. The paper has the virtue of grounding its claim in direct quotations from primary sources and in independent historical scholarship (Hanle, Stöltzner), and it usefully raises the question whether pre-quantum classical physics was deterministic at all. Its main value is as a provocative corrective; however, the strength of the final claims exceeds what the currently marshaled evidence can support, so the contribution is more a research program than a settled conclusion.
major comments (3)
- [Opening paragraph and concluding paragraph] The title asks whether Schrödinger was ever a determinist, and the conclusion asserts that his indeterminism may have 'eluded recognition for a century,' but the manuscript examines only a small set of philosophical texts from the period 1922–1931 and never discusses the deterministic status of Schrödinger's own wave equation, which the first paragraph itself characterizes as 'smooth, time-reversal-invariant, deterministic evolution.' The subsequent mention of Everettians who treat the equation as fundamental does not resolve this tension. Without an account of what Schrödinger himself thought about the status of his equation, the evidence supports only the weaker claim that he made indeterminist statements in certain contexts, not the universal 'ever' claim in the title. This gap is load-bearing, because the central thesis is the universal negative about Schrödinger's beliefs.
- [The three arguments drawn from 'Über Indeterminismus in der Physik'] The paper relies on the 1929 essay [7] and the 1931 lecture [8] as the definitive record of Schrödinger's settled position, but it does not subject these occasional texts to source criticism. In particular, the 1931 lecture was delivered to the Society for Philosophical Instruction in Berlin; the manuscript does not consider how that rhetorical context might have shaped its polemical framing, nor does it compare the lecture with Schrödinger's other writings on causality, probability, and determinism across his career. The assumption that these two texts are representative of a lifelong worldview is therefore unsupported, and the title's 'ever' is not justified by the cited evidence.
- [Opening paragraph (Exner influence and chronology)] The opening paragraph asserts as biographical fact that Schrödinger was shaped by 'Vienna indeterminism' and 'embraced a fundamentally indeterministic view' already from 1922 onward, citing the secondary literature. This causal-historical claim is foundational for the paper's answer to the title question, yet the manuscript does not weigh alternative explanations, does not consider whether Schrödinger's views were stable or context-dependent, and does not examine any post-1931 statements that might count against the universality claim. A historical conclusion of the form 'ever a determinist?' requires a broader engagement with the documentary record, not just an assertion of one formative influence.
minor comments (3)
- [Abstract and first paragraph] There are several typographical spacing errors in the abstract and the opening paragraph, including 'forthatmatter' and 'astudentshapedby'; the manuscript should be carefully proofread before resubmission.
- [Reference [8]] The citation for Schrödinger's 1931 lecture lists only the occasion and date, without an archival locator or a published edition. Since this lecture is one of the two central sources, a fuller citation would help readers verify the quotations.
- [Final paragraph] The concluding sentence, 'Schrödinger may have been so radical in his indeterminism that the significance of his thought may have eluded recognition for a century,' is difficult to reconcile with the paper's own citations of Hanle and Stöltzner, which show that the Exner connection was already recognized in the historical literature. The hedging ('may have') also sits awkwardly with the assertive title; the authors might either soften the title or substantiate the 'eluded recognition' claim by stating what specifically remained unrecognized.
Circularity Check
No significant circularity; the historical thesis rests on primary sources and independent scholarship.
full rationale
The paper's central claim—that Schrödinger was not a committed determinist and in fact held a radical indeterminist view—is supported by direct quotations from Schrödinger's own writings, chiefly the 1929 essay 'Was ist ein Naturgesetz?' [7] and the 1931 lecture 'Über Indeterminismus in der Physik' [8]. These are primary sources external to the authors and do not derive from the paper's own framework. The argument is historical-interpretive rather than a formal derivation, so there is no fitted parameter later renamed as a prediction, no definition that presupposes the target conclusion, and no imported uniqueness theorem. The self-citations that appear ([3], [12], [13]) are used only in contextual remarks: [3] for a companion paper on Bohm, and [12,13] for the observation that some contemporary physicists are revisiting classical indeterminism. Neither is load-bearing for the historical thesis about Schrödinger; removing them would not alter the argument from the primary texts. A possible concern—that the deterministic status of Schrödinger's own wave equation is not analyzed as potential counter-evidence—is a completeness or correctness issue, not a circularity issue, because the paper never claims to have derived that equation's status from its interpretation. Accordingly, no circular step can be exhibited, and the appropriate finding is a clean non-finding.
Assumptions & free parameters
assumptions (3)
- domain assumption The quoted passages from Schrödinger's works [7], [8] are authentic and accurately transcribed and translated.
- domain assumption Vienna indeterminism via Boltzmann and Exner is the correct causal explanation for Schrödinger's views.
- domain assumption Schrödinger's public philosophical statements are coherent and reflect his actual considered position, not just rhetorical argumentation for a specific audience.
Cite this review
Pith. "Pith review of Was Schr\"odinger ever a determinist?." pith.science (2026). https://pith.science/paper/3YDDRDMC
@misc{pith2026260810160,
author = {Pith},
title = {Pith review of: Was Schr\"odinger ever a determinist?},
year = {2026},
howpublished = {\url{https://pith.science/paper/3YDDRDMC}},
note = {Machine review of arXiv:2608.10160}
}
read the original abstract
Erwin Schr\"odinger is often portrayed as a reactionary who resisted the indeterminism introduced by quantum mechanics, but on closer inspection his views on determinism prove to be more complex and more radical.
Reference graph
Works this paper leans on
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[7]
E. Schrödinger, “Was ist ein Naturgesetz?”Naturwis- senschaften17, 9–11 (1929)
work page 1929
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[8]
Was Schr\"odinger ever a determinist?
The “artifice” he refers to is the assumption of in- finitely precise velocities as part of the initial conditions in classical equations of motion: “possibly, however, this is incorrect”—he continues—“possibly this mathematical process of approach to the limit [of the incremental ra- tio∆x/∆t], which was specially invented by Newton for mechanical purpos...
work page Pith review arXiv 1948
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[1]
Quantisierung als Eigenwertproblem (Erste Mitteilung),
E. Schrödinger, “Quantisierung als Eigenwertproblem (Erste Mitteilung),”Annalen der Physik384, 361–376 (1926)
work page 1926
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[2]
A.D.Stone,Einstein and the Quantum: The Quest of the Valiant Swabian(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2016)
work page 2016
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[3]
Against the ‘night- mare of a mechanically determined universe’,
F. Del Santo and G. C. Krizek, “Against the ‘night- mare of a mechanically determined universe’,” inGuiding Waves in Quantum Mechanics: One Hundred Years of de Broglie–Bohm Pilot-Wave Theory, edited by A. Old- ofredi, p. 151 (2025)
work page 2025
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[4]
Vienna indeterminism: Mach, Boltzmann, Exner,
M. Stöltzner, “Vienna indeterminism: Mach, Boltzmann, Exner,”Synthese119, 85–111 (1999)
work page 1999
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[5]
F. S. Exner,Über Gesetze in Naturwissenschaft und Hu- manistik(Alfred Hölder, Wien–Leipzig, 1909)
work page 1909
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[6]
IndeterminacybeforeHeisenberg: TheCase of Franz Exner and Erwin Schrödinger,
P.A.Hanle, “IndeterminacybeforeHeisenberg: TheCase of Franz Exner and Erwin Schrödinger,”Historical Stud- ies in the Physical Sciences10, 225–269 (1979)
work page 1979
Show all 14 references
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[9]
Über Indeterminismus in der Physik,
E. Schrödinger, “Über Indeterminismus in der Physik,” paper presented before the Congress of the Society for Philosophical Instruction, Berlin, 16 June 1931
1931
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[10]
Is classical physics in fact deterministic?
M. Born, “Is classical physics in fact deterministic?” in Physics in My Generation(Springer-Verlag, New York, 1969)
1969
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[11]
Real numbers, chaos, and the principle of a bounded density of information,
G. Dowek, “Real numbers, chaos, and the principle of a bounded density of information,” inInternational Com- puter Science Symposium in Russia(Springer, Berlin– Heidelberg, 2013)
2013
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[12]
On the relation between the second law of thermodynamics and classical and quantum mechanics,
B. Drossel, “On the relation between the second law of thermodynamics and classical and quantum mechanics,” inWhy More Is Different(Springer, Berlin–Heidelberg, 2015)
2015
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[13]
Physicswithoutdeterminism: Alternative interpretations of classical physics,
F.DelSantoandN.Gisin, “Physicswithoutdeterminism: Alternative interpretations of classical physics,”Physical Review A100, 062107 (2019)
2019
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[14]
Which features of quantum physics are not fundamentally quantum but are due to indeterminism?
F. Del Santo and N. Gisin, “Which features of quantum physics are not fundamentally quantum but are due to indeterminism?”Quantum9, 1686 (2025)
2025
Reviewed August 14, 2026 · model on record in the stance chip above.
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