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Defending Against Backdoor Attack on Graph Nerual Network by Explainability

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arxiv 2209.02902 v1 pith:4OTDOMR3 submitted 2022-09-07 cs.AI

classification cs.AI
keywords attackbackdoorgraphtriggerdefenseexplainabilitymaliciousmethod
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Backdoor attack is a powerful attack algorithm to deep learning model. Recently, GNN's vulnerability to backdoor attack has been proved especially on graph classification task. In this paper, we propose the first backdoor detection and defense method on GNN. Most backdoor attack depends on injecting small but influential trigger to the clean sample. For graph data, current backdoor attack focus on manipulating the graph structure to inject the trigger. We find that there are apparent differences between benign samples and malicious samples in some explanatory evaluation metrics, such as fidelity and infidelity. After identifying the malicious sample, the explainability of the GNN model can help us capture the most significant subgraph which is probably the trigger in a trojan graph. We use various dataset and different attack settings to prove the effectiveness of our defense method. The attack success rate all turns out to decrease considerably.

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Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Fine-tuning is Not Fine: Mitigating Backdoor Attacks in GNNs with Limited Clean Data

    cs.LG 2025-01 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    GraphNAD uses degree-weighted graph attention transfer plus layer-relation congruence to distill backdoored GNNs on 3% clean data and lower attack success rate below 5%.

  2. MADE: Graph Backdoor Defense with Masked Unlearning

    cs.CR 2024-11 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    MADE is a training-set-only graph backdoor defense combining homophily-based poisoned-sample isolation with masked unlearning to drive attack success rate to near zero while keeping accuracy high.

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