Pith. sign in

REVIEW 4 major objections 6 minor 1 cited by

Post-Quantum Cryptography and Quantum-Safe Security: A Comprehensive Survey

T0 review · 4 major / 6 minor · reviewed 2026-08-04 · deepseek-v4-flash

Challenge this review Re-run · record.json Download PDF Read on arXiv ↗

Pith's one-line read This survey argues that post-quantum cryptography is best understood as six algorithm families with distinct security and performance profiles, and that lattice- and hash-based schemes should anchor near-term migration, supported by impleme

desk verdict A useful 2025 PQC survey whose load-bearing performance data is internally inconsistent — fix the numbers and citations and it's a solid reference. read the letter →

arxiv 2510.10436 v2 pith:63POMRYC submitted 2025-10-12 cs.CR

Gaurab Chhetri , Shriyank Somvanshi , Pavan Hebli , Shamyo Brotee , Subasish Das This is my paper · ORCID
classification cs.CR
keywords post-quantumcryptographyNISTstandardizationlattice-basedhash-basedsignatureshybridmigrationcrypto-agilityperformancebenchmarkingquantum-safesecurity
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

The pith

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The reading

This paper is a survey that attempts to give practitioners a single, evidence-based map of the post-quantum cryptography (PQC) landscape as of 2025. It organizes the field into six algorithm families defined by their hardness assumptions, then assesses each family's security track record, standardization status, and performance. It compares algorithms using implementation-grounded measurements, reviews protocol integration and side-channel resistance, and synthesizes deployment guidance for IoT, finance, cloud, and blockchain. The paper's central claim is that lattice-based schemes are the production-ready anchor, hash-based SLH-DSA is the conservative high-assurance fallback, and hybrid migration with crypto-agility is the necessary operational strategy. A sympathetic reader would care because the survey tries to bridge standards, engineering, and operations in one place, providing a reference orientation for anyone planning a quantum-safe transition.

What carries the argument

The organizing machinery is the six-family taxonomy, which groups algorithms by underlying hardness problem—LWE/M-LWE for lattices, syndrome decoding for codes, hash preimage and collision resistance, MQ equations, supersingular isogenies, and MPC-in-the-Head zero-knowledge proofs—paired with a comparative performance table built from representative implementation measurements. This two-part apparatus does the work of the survey: it lets the authors explain why lattice and hash schemes won the NIST standards, why code-based HQC remains a fallback, why multivariate and isogeny designs are cautionary, and why deployment must be managed through hybrid and crypto-agility frameworks rather than o

What would settle it

Re-measure the algorithms on one shared hardware baseline and compare the results to the performance table and the text: the paper itself quotes ML-DSA signing at 0.65 ms versus the table's 0.840 ms, Falcon signing at 3.28 ms versus the table's 0.168 ms, and SLH-DSA verification at 3.6 ms versus the table's 1.45 ms, so the discrepancy is directly checkable.

Watch

Extended reading notes

Core claim

The paper's claim is that the PQC ecosystem can be productively organized into six families—lattice-based, code-based, hash-based, multivariate, isogeny-based, and MPC-in-the-Head—each defined by a distinct hardness assumption, and that this taxonomy, combined with implementation-level performance measurements and an account of protocol and PKI integration challenges, yields actionable guidance for migration. On the paper's own terms, readers can trust its classification of families, its ordering of performance trade-offs, and its recommendation that near-term deployment center on ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and FN-DSA, with SLH-DSA for high-assurance settings and hybrid classical–post-quantum modes for

Load-bearing premise

The survey's practical value rests on the fidelity of its secondary evidence—that the cited performance numbers and security claims are transcribed and aggregated accurately; if they are not, the evidence base fails even though the qualitative narrative matches field consensus.

Editorial extensions

If this is right

  • Practitioners can build near-term quantum-safe systems around ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and FN-DSA, treating these lattice standards as production-ready anchors for key exchange, signing, and verification.
  • SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+) is the recommended conservative alternative where long-term assurance outweighs speed, at the cost of large signatures (roughly 8–30 KB) and significantly slower signing.
  • Because post-quantum signatures enlarge handshakes, protocol integration in TLS, DNSSEC, and PKI will require fragmentation strategies, hybrid key exchange, and careful certificate-chain management.
  • Code-based schemes such as HQC fill the role of providing assumption diversity, while multivariate and isogeny-based families should not be used for critical deployments given recent cryptanalytic breaks.
  • Crypto-agility and hybrid classical–post-quantum modes are the necessary operational strategy for migration, allowing rollback and interoperability while cryptographic inventories and rotation procedures are built.

Reading between the lines

Editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • Inference: A single shared-hardware benchmark suite that reconciles the timings quoted in the text and the performance table would settle the survey's quantitative claims; the qualitative ordering of families would likely survive even if specific numbers change.
  • Inference: The survey's taxonomy suggests a testable prediction: after NIST's additional-signatures round, newly standardized schemes will come from MPC-in-the-Head and non-structured multivariate families rather than from isogeny-based designs, whose recent breaks the survey treats as decisive.
  • Inference: The 'harvest now, decrypt later' frame implies that organizations with long-lived secrets—financial records, healthcare data, government archives—should start hybrid PQC deployment before large-scale quantum hardware exists; the survey's own timeline supports this urgency.
Share X Bluesky LinkedIn Reddit HN

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, and a circularity audit.

Referee Report

4 major / 6 minor

Summary. This paper is a survey of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) intended as a practical reference for researchers and practitioners. It proposes a taxonomy of six algorithmic families (lattice-, code-, hash-, multivariate-, isogeny-, and MPC-in-the-Head based), reviews NIST standardization status, presents a performance comparison in Table 2, and discusses hardware acceleration, side-channel security, protocol integration (TLS, DNSSEC), domain-specific deployment (IoT, finance, blockchain), and the relationship between PQC and QKD/QRNGs. The survey's stated contribution is to bridge standards, engineering, and operations, with an emphasis on evidence-based guidance.

Significance. If the data and citations were reliable, this survey would be a useful single-source snapshot of the 2025 PQC ecosystem. Its strengths include a broad scope, a clear taxonomy (though with errors, see below), coverage of implementation security and migration challenges, and a curated open repository (awesome-pqc). The paper also provides explicit discussion of open research problems and domain-specific rollout considerations. However, the survey's value as an evidence-based reference is currently undermined by internal inconsistencies between the prose and Table 2, and by several misattributed citations. These issues are not peripheral because the survey explicitly promises 'implementation-grounded measurements' and 'evidence-based guidance'; they must be corrected before the paper can be used as a practical reference.

major comments (4)
  1. [§4.1, §4.2, §4.3 vs Table 2] The performance numbers in the text and in Table 2 are irreconcilable. §4.1 reports ML-DSA signing in ~0.65 ms and verification in ~0.53 ms, while Table 2 lists ML-DSA-44 at 0.840 ms signing / 0.267 ms verification and ML-DSA-65 at 1.205 ms / 0.398 ms. §4.2 reports Falcon signing at ~3.28 ms and verification near 0.3 ms, while Table 2 lists FALCON-512 at 0.168 ms / 0.036 ms. §4.3 reports SLH-DSA-128s signing near 131 ms and verification around 3.6 ms, while Table 2 lists 120.5 ms / 1.45 ms. Moreover, §4.1 describes these as 'at NIST Security Level 2', but the standardized ML-DSA parameter sets are Levels 1, 3, and 5 (ML-DSA-44, -65, -87). Since the survey's stated value proposition is evidence-based guidance, this internal contradiction is load-bearing and must be resolved by aligning the text and table and by stating which parameter sets and hardware are used.
  2. [Table 2 methodology] Table 2 aggregates timings from four distinct sources ([27], [33], [72], [29]) without a common hardware platform, compiler, benchmark harness, or parameter-set baseline. The table note only gives units (ms). Without such context, cross-family performance ordering (e.g., ML-KEM vs HQC, FALCON vs SLH-DSA) is not reproducible and cannot support migration recommendations. The survey should either report all measurements on a single, clearly specified platform, or clearly annotate each row with its original environment and reproduce the source numbers consistently.
  3. [References [72] and related citations] Reference [72] (Nguyen et al., 'New code-based privacy-preserving cryptographic constructions') is repeatedly cited for claims it cannot support: §2.1.3 cites it for the SPHINCS+ framework and FORS; §3.3 cites it for SPHINCS+ standardization; §3.6 cites it for MPC-in-the-Head constructions; §3.2 cites it for advanced information set decoding; and Table 2 uses it as the source for SLH-DSA timings. The actual source for SLH-DSA/SPHINCS+ is the SPHINCS+ framework paper (reference [12] in this manuscript), and the MPC-in-the-Head citations should point to the relevant original works (e.g., the MiRitH paper [1] or the PERK paper [13]). These misattributions are load-bearing because the survey's 'comprehensive, evidence-based' claim rests on citation fidelity.
  4. [Table 1 classification errors] Table 1 lists CROSS and LESS as 'Multivariate' and HAWK as 'Multivariate' as well. In the NIST additional-signatures context, CROSS is code-based (restricted syndrome decoding), LESS is code-based (linear equivalence), and HAWK is lattice-based (NTRU-like). These are not multivariate schemes. Since a correct taxonomy is a stated core contribution of the paper, these misclassifications undermine the trustworthiness of the classification, and the table should be corrected with accurate family assignments.
minor comments (6)
  1. [§2.1.3, §3.3, §3.6] The SPHINCS+ framework description should cite the SPHINCS+ paper (reference [12]) rather than [72]. Please correct these citations throughout.
  2. [§3.2] The 'information set decoding' passage cites [72]; [72] is not an information-set-decoding reference. A dedicated ISD reference, e.g., the original Prange or modern ISD analyses, should be cited.
  3. [§5.1] The sentence on FPGA implementations cites [29] for lattice-based algorithms, but [29] is an HQC (code-based) hardware implementation. Please provide a lattice-specific citation or adjust the claim.
  4. [§4.3] The name 'SPHINCSLET' should be 'SPHINCSlet' (the area-efficient accelerator for SPHINCS+).
  5. [§7.4] The text mentions 'dual-signature blocks' as a proposed hybrid blockchain approach but does not cite a source. Please add a reference or remove the specific proposal.
  6. [General] The manuscript includes a 'Received 11 October 2025' line in the article header, which is a publisher-inserted field. It should not appear in the author-submitted version.

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged · score 1.0 of 10

No derivation-level circularity; the survey's claims are external-synthesis claims, with minor non-load-bearing self-citation and evidence-fidelity problems that are not circularity.

full rationale

This is a survey, not a derivation. There is no equation-level chain in which an output is constructed from its own inputs. The taxonomy, security-assumption summaries, standardization status, and deployment guidance are all presented as syntheses of external sources (NIST FIPS/IR reports, [12], [27], [29], [33], [64], [77], etc.), so the central claim that the paper is a practical reference does not reduce to a fitted parameter or a self-citation. The performance section is the closest thing to a 'result,' but Table 2 is an aggregation of timings attributed to [27], [33], [72], and [29]; even though §4.1-4.3 and Table 2 are internally inconsistent (e.g., ML-DSA signing listed as 0.65 ms in prose vs 0.840/1.205 ms in Table 2), a contradiction between two transcriptions of external benchmarks is a correctness/fidelity problem, not a circular reduction: the prose numbers are not derived from the table by construction, and neither is derived from the paper's own assumptions. The apparently misattributed reference [72] (a code-based privacy-preserving constructions paper cited for SPHINCS+/MPC-in-the-Head claims) is likewise a sourcing error rather than a self-referential argument. The only overlapping self-citation is [86], the authors' TinyML survey, used in §6.2 as an analogy about low-power constraints; it is illustrative and non-load-bearing: the PQC integration claims around it are tied to other cited IoT/embedded work. The paper itself acknowledges limitations in Section 11 (benchmark generality, side-channel treatment, geographic concentration of literature), which further indicates the authors are not presenting a forced self-consistent derivation. No circular step meets the required standard of quoting a specific reduction of a claimed result to its inputs.

Assumptions & free parameters 0 free parameters · 3 assumptions · 0 invented entities

As a survey, this paper contributes no derivation, so it introduces no free parameters and no invented entities. Its central claim rests on the accuracy and comparability of the cited literature — particularly the NIST status reports that anchor maturity claims and the benchmark papers that anchor Table 2. The three axioms listed are the load-bearing external premises; the internal text–table inconsistencies show axiom 3 is partially violated.

assumptions (3)
  • domain assumption Post-quantum threat framing: large-scale quantum computers would break RSA/ECC via Shor's algorithm, making 'harvest now, decrypt later' a real risk.
    Introduction §1; the entire motivation of the survey rests on this external premise, cited to [47] and treated as background rather than derived.
  • domain assumption The NIST standardization process and its status reports ([4], [5], [70], [71]) are authoritative and correctly represented.
    Used throughout §§2–6 as the normative frame for maturity and readiness claims; the survey does not independently verify cryptanalytic statuses or timeline claims.
  • domain assumption Cited performance measurements are accurate and mutually comparable across sources.
    Table 2 aggregates timings from [27], [29], [33], [72] with no common benchmark; the text-vs-table contradictions (ML-DSA signing, Falcon signing, SLH-DSA verification) show this premise is partially violated inside the paper itself.

how reviews work

0 comments
Cite this review

Pith. "Pith review of Post-Quantum Cryptography and Quantum-Safe Security: A Comprehensive Survey." pith.science (2026). https://pith.science/paper/63POMRYC

@misc{pith2026251010436,
  author       = {Pith},
  title        = {Pith review of: Post-Quantum Cryptography and Quantum-Safe Security: A Comprehensive Survey},
  year         = {2026},
  howpublished = {\url{https://pith.science/paper/63POMRYC}},
  note         = {Machine review of arXiv:2510.10436}
}
read the original abstract

Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is moving from evaluation to deployment as NIST finalizes standards for ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA. This survey maps the space from foundations to practice. We first develop a taxonomy across lattice-, code-, hash-, multivariate-, isogeny-, and MPC-in-the-Head families, summarizing security assumptions, cryptanalysis, and standardization status. We then compare performance and communication costs using representative, implementation-grounded measurements, and review hardware acceleration (AVX2, FPGA/ASIC) and implementation security with a focus on side-channel resistance. Building upward, we examine protocol integration (TLS, DNSSEC), PKI and certificate hygiene, and deployment in constrained and high-assurance environments (IoT, cloud, finance, blockchain). We also discuss complementarity with quantum technologies (QKD, QRNGs) and the limits of near-term quantum computing. Throughout, we emphasize crypto-agility, hybrid migration, and evidence-based guidance for operators. We conclude with open problems spanning parameter agility, leakage-resilient implementations, and domain-specific rollout playbooks. This survey aims to be a practical reference for researchers and practitioners planning quantum-safe systems, bridging standards, engineering, and operations.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2510.10436 by the authors.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Taxonomy of major PQC algorithm families. The classification highlights six primary categories-lattice [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p004_1.png] view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Pictorial representation of a 2D lattice [80]. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p008_2.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. The ML-DSA (CRYSTALS-Dilithium) signature process. Bob signs a message [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p012_3.png] view at source ↗
Figures from the paper (3 more)
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: Illustration of SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+) input processing for SHAKE256. The top approach shows a buffer [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p013_4.png]
Figure 5
Figure 5. Figure 5: Cloudflare’s experimental deployment of PQC in the web ecosystem. The figure illustrates a user [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p018_5.png]
Figure 6
Figure 6. Figure 6: Illustration of twin-field QKD schemes that overcome the PLOB bound. (a) Entanglement-based [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p021_6.png]

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Forward citations

Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Quantifying quantum risk: a measure of crypto agility

    cs.CR 2026-06 unverdicted novelty 4.0 of 10

    Defines rotation time as a crypto agility metric, derives its tolerance from risk tolerance via an approximation, and uses CVE data to illustrate values of hours to days.

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

98 extracted references · 3 canonical work pages · cited by 1 Pith paper

  1. [27]

    Elif Dicle Demir, Buse Bilgin, and Mehmet Cengiz Onbasli. 2025. Performance analysis and industry deployment of post-quantum cryptography algorithms.arXiv preprint arXiv:2503.12952(2025)

    arXiv 2025

  2. [33]

    Pierre-Alain Fouque, Jeffrey Hoffstein, Paul Kirchner, Vadim Lyubashevsky, Thomas Pornin, Thomas Prest, Thomas Ricosset, Gregor Seiler, William Whyte, Zhenfei Zhang, et al. 2018. Falcon: Fast-Fourier lattice-based compact signatures over NTRU.Submission to the NIST’s post-quantum cryptography standardization process36, 5 (2018), 1–75

    2018

  3. [72]

    Khoa Nguyen, Hanh Tang, Huaxiong Wang, and Neng Zeng. 2019. New code-based privacy-preserving cryptographic constructions. InInternational Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security. Springer, 25–55

    2019

  4. [29]

    Sanjay Deshpande, Chuanqi Xu, Mamuri Nawan, Kashif Nawaz, and Jakub Szefer. 2023. Fast and efficient hardware implementation of HQC. InInternational Conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography. Springer, 297–321

    2023

  5. [12]

    Daniel J Bernstein, Andreas Hülsing, Stefan Kölbl, Ruben Niederhagen, Joost Rijneveld, and Peter Schwabe. 2019. The SPHINCS+ signature framework. InProceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC conference on computer and communications security. 2129–2146

    2019

  6. [1]

    Gora Adj, Stefano Barbero, Emanuele Bellini, Andre Esser, Luis Rivera-Zamarripa, Carlo Sanna, Javier Verbel, and Floyd Zweydinger. 2024. MiRitH: Efficient Post-Quantum Signatures from MinRank in the Head.IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems2024, 2 (Mar. 2024), 304–328. https://doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2024.i2. 304-328

    work page doi:10.46586/tches.v2024.i2 2024

  7. [13]

    Slim Bettaieb, Loïc Bidoux, Alessandro Budroni, Marco Palumbi, and Lucas Pandolfo Perin. 2024. Enabling PERK and other MPC-in-the-Head Signatures on Resource-Constrained Devices.IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems2024, 4 (Sep. 2024), 84–109. https://doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2024.i4.84-109

    work page doi:10.46586/tches.v2024.i4.84-109 2024

  8. [2]

    Aikata Aikata, Ahmet Can Mert, Malik Imran, Samuel Pagliarini, and Sujoy Sinha Roy. 2022. KaLi: A crystal for post-quantum security using Kyber and Dilithium.IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems I: Regular Papers70, 2 (2022), 747–758

    2022

Show all 98 references
  1. [3]

    Mst Shapna Akter, Hossain Shahriar, Iysa Iqbal, MD Hossain, MA Karim, Victor Clincy, and Razvan Voicu. 2023. Exploring the vulnerabilities of machine learning and quantum machine learning to adversarial attacks using a malware dataset: a comparative analysis. In2023 IEEE Inter...

    2023

  2. [4]

    Gorjan Alagic, Maxime Bros, Pierre Ciadoux, David Cooper, Quynh Dang, Thinh Dang, John Kelsey, Jacob Lichtinger, Yi-Kai Liu, Carl Miller, et al. 2024. Status Report on the First Round of the Additional Digital Signature Schemes for the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardiz...

    2024

  3. [5]

    Gorjan Alagic, Maxime Bros, Pierre Ciadoux, David Cooper, Quynh Dang, Thinh Dang, John Kelsey, Jacob Lichtinger, Yi- Kai Liu, Carl Miller, et al. 2025. Status report on the fourth round of the nist post-quantum cryptography standardization process.National Institute of Standar...

    2025

  4. [6]

    Marcos Allende, Diego López León, Sergio Cerón, Adrián Pareja, Erick Pacheco, Antonio Leal, Marcelo Da Silva, Alejandro Pardo, Duncan Jones, David J Worrall, et al. 2023. Quantum-resistance in blockchain networks.Scientific Reports13, 1 (2023), 5664

    2023

  5. [7]

    Ghada Alsuhli, Hani Saleh, Mahmoud Al-Qutayri, Baker Mohammad, and Thanos Stouraitis. 2024. Area and Power Efficient FFT/IFFT Processor for FALCON Post-Quantum Cryptography.IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing(2024)

    2024

  6. [8]

    Raphael Auer and BIS Innovation Hub Eurosystem Centre. 2023. Project Leap: Quantum-proofing the financial system. Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Innovation Hub. https://www.bis.org/about/bisih/topics/cyber_security/leap. htm Accessed: 2025-06-25

    2023

  7. [9]

    Thomas Aulbach, Soundes Marzougui, Jean-Pierre Seifert, and Vincent Quentin Ulitzsch. 2024. MAYo or MAY-not: Exploring implementation security of the post-quantum signature scheme MAYO against physical attacks. In2024 Workshop on Fault Detection and Tolerance in Cryptography (...

    2024

  8. [10]

    Ryad Benadjila, Thibauld Feneuil, and Matthieu Rivain. 2024. MQ on my Mind: Post-Quantum Signatures from the Non-Structured Multivariate Quadratic Problem. In2024 IEEE 9th European Symposium on Security and Privacy ACM Comput. Surv., Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: ...

    2024

  9. [11]

    Steven Benny, Ishaan Desai, Leah Uriarte, Isaac Tsai, and Larry McMahan. 2024. A Meta -Analysis on NIST Post-Quantum Cryptographic Primitive Finalists.Journal of Emerging Investigators7, 1 (Sept. 2024). https: //doi.org/10.59720/23-233 Received September 9 2023; Accepted April...

    2024 doi

  10. [14]

    Luk Bettale, Marco De Oliveira, and Emmanuelle Dottax. 2022. Post-Quantum Protocols for Banking Applications. InFourth PQC Standardization Conference. NIST, Online. https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Events/2022/fourth-pqc- standardization-conference/documents/papers/post-quantu...

    2022

  11. [15]

    Ward Beullens. 2021. Improved cryptanalysis of UOV and rainbow. InAnnual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques. Springer, 348–373

    2021

  12. [16]

    Ward Beullens. 2022. Breaking rainbow takes a weekend on a laptop. InAnnual International Cryptology Conference. Springer, 464–479

    2022

  13. [17]

    Javier Blanco-Romero, Vicente Lorenzo, Florina Almenares, Daniel Díaz Sánchez, Celeste Campo, and Carlos García Rubio. 2024. Integrating Post-Quantum Cryptography into CoAP and MQTT-SN Protocols. In2024 IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC). IEEE, 1–6

    2024

  14. [18]

    William J Buchanan. 2025. FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) with JavaScript. https://asecuritysite.com/signatures/mldsa_js. https: //asecuritysite.com/signatures/mldsa_js Accessed: October 01, 2025

    2025

  15. [19]

    Jian Cao, Minghui Zhang, Weiqi Liu, Lin Wang, and Jinye Peng. 2024. Deep Learning-Based Security Analysis of Quantum Random Numbers Generated by Imperfect Devices.IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security (2024)

    2024

  16. [20]

    Wouter Castryck and Thomas Decru. 2023. An efficient key recovery attack on SIDH. InAnnual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques. Springer, 423–447

    2023

  17. [21]

    Kanza Cherkaoui Dekkaki, Igor Tasic, María Dolores Cano, et al. 2024. Exploring post-quantum cryptography: Review and directions for the transition process.Technologies12, 12 (2024)

    2024

  18. [22]

    Cloudflare Team. 2024. The State of the Post-Quantum Internet. Cloudflare Blog. https://blog.cloudflare.com/pq-2024/ Accessed: 2025-06-25

    2024

  19. [23]

    Daniel Commey, Benjamin Appiah, Griffith S Klogo, Winful Bagyl-Bac, James D Gadze, Yousef Alsenani, and Garth V Crosby. 2025. Performance Analysis and Deployment Considerations of Post-Quantum Cryptography for Consumer Electronics.arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.02239(2025)

    2025 arXiv

  20. [24]

    Daniel Commey and Garth V Crosby. 2025. PQS-BFL: A Post-Quantum Secure Blockchain-based Federated Learning Framework.arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.01866(2025)

    2025

  21. [25]

    Luca De Feo, Nadia El Mrabet, Aymeric Genêt, Novak Kaluđerović, Natacha Linard de Guertechin, Simon Pontié, and Élise Tasso. 2022. Zero-Value Side-Channel Attacks on SIKE.IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems(2022)

    2022

  22. [26]

    Javier Oliva del Moral, Antonio deMarti iOlius, Gerard Vidal, Pedro M Crespo, and Josu Etxezarreta Martinez. 2024. Cybersecurity in critical infrastructures: A post-quantum cryptography perspective.IEEE Internet of Things Journal11, 18 (2024), 30217–30244

    2024

  23. [28]

    Sanjay Deshpande, Yongseok Lee, Cansu Karakuzu, Jakub Szefer, and Yunheung Paek. 2025. Sphincslet: An area- efficient accelerator for the full sphincs+ digital signature algorithm.ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems(2025)

    2025

  24. [30]

    Julien Devevey, Pouria Fallahpour, Alain Passelègue, and Damien Stehlé. 2023. A detailed analysis of fiat-shamir with aborts. InAnnual International Cryptology Conference. Springer, 327–357

    2023

  25. [31]

    Jayashree Dey and Ratna Dutta. 2023. Progress in multivariate cryptography: Systematic review, challenges, and research directions.Comput. Surveys55, 12 (2023), 1–34

    2023

  26. [32]

    Gregory Fitzgibbon and Carlo Ottaviani. 2024. Constrained device performance benchmarking with the implementation of post-quantum cryptography.Cryptography8, 2 (2024), 21. ACM Comput. Surv., Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: October 2025. Post-Quantum Cryptography and...

    2024

  27. [34]

    Carlos Rubio Garcia, Abraham Cano Aguilera, Juan Jose Vegas Olmos, Idelfonso Tafur Monroy, and Simon Rommel

  28. [35]

    Ginni Garg and Arti Garg. 2024. Post-Quantum Cryptography and Quantum Key Distribution: An In-Depth Survey of Techniques, Comparative Study, and Future Trends.Comparative Study, and Future Trends (November 01, 2024)(2024)

    2024

  29. [36]

    Lydia Garms, Taofiq K Paraïso, Neil Hanley, Ayesha Khalid, Ciara Rafferty, James Grant, James Newman, Andrew J Shields, Carlos Cid, and Maire O’Neill. 2024. Experimental Integration of Quantum Key Distribution and Post-Quantum Cryptography in a Hybrid Quantum-Safe Cryptosystem...

    2024

  30. [37]

    Alexandre Augusto Giron et al. 2023. Hybrid post-quantum cryptography in network protocols. (2023)

    2023

  31. [38]

    Jason Goertzen and Douglas Stebila. 2022. Post-Quantum Signatures in DNSSEC via Request-Based Fragmentation. arXiv:2211.14196 [cs.CR] https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.14196

    2022 arXiv

  32. [39]

    Sharon Goldberg, Wesley Evans, Bas Westerbaan, and John Engates. 2025. Conventional cryptography is under threat. Upgrade to post-quantum cryptography with Cloudflare Zero Trust. Cloudflare Blog, https://blog.cloudflare.com/post- quantum-zero-trust/. Published: March 17, 2025

    2025

  33. [40]

    2025.Post Quantum Cryptography in IoT Ecosystem

    GSMA Innovation Hub and GSMA Post-Quantum Telco Network Task Force. 2025.Post Quantum Cryptography in IoT Ecosystem. Official Document PQ.04 V1.0. GSMA Innovation Hub, London. https://www.gsma.com/solutions-and- impact/technologies/security/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/PQ.04-Pos...

    2025

  34. [41]

    Xiaomin Guo, Fading Lin, Jiehong Lin, Zhijie Song, Qiqi Wang, Yanqiang Guo, et al . 2024. Parallel and real-time post-processing for quantum random number generators.arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.19479(2024)

    2024 arXiv

  35. [42]

    Sanzida Hoque, Abdullah Aydeger, and Engin Zeydan. 2024. Exploring post quantum cryptography with quantum key distribution for sustainable mobile network architecture design. InProceedings of the 4th Workshop on Performance and Energy Efficiency in Concurrent and Distributed S...

    2024

  36. [43]

    Seyed Mohammadreza Hosseini and Hossein Pilaram. 2024. A Comprehensive Review of Post-Quantum Cryptography: Challenges and Advances.Cryptology ePrint Archive(2024)

    2024

  37. [44]

    Xinyi Hou, Yanjie Zhao, Shenao Wang, and Haoyu Wang. 2025. Model context protocol (mcp): Landscape, security threats, and future research directions.arXiv preprint arXiv:2503.23278(2025)

    2025 arXiv

  38. [45]

    Chien-Lung Hsu, Yi-Cheih Hsu, Yu-Jen Shih, Cheng-Wei Wu, and Fu-Hau Hsu. 2024. A Vehicle Forensics framework with Post-Quantum Cryptography and Blockchain. In2024 International Symposium on Intelligent Signal Processing and Communication Systems (ISPACS). IEEE, 1–5

    2024

  39. [46]

    Maksim Iavich and Tamari Kuchukhidze. 2024. Investigating CRYSTALS-Kyber Vulnerabilities: Attack Analysis and Mitigation.Cryptography8, 2 (2024), 15

    2024

  40. [47]

    David Joseph, Rafael Misoczki, Marc Manzano, Joe Tricot, Fernando Dominguez Pinuaga, Olivier Lacombe, Stefan Leichenauer, Jack Hidary, Phil Venables, and Royal Hansen. 2022. Transitioning organizations to post-quantum cryptography.Nature605, 7909 (2022), 237–243

    2022

  41. [48]

    Emre Karabulut and Aydin Aysu. 2024. A hardware-software co-design for the discrete gaussian sampling of falcon digital signature. In2024 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST). IEEE, 90–100

    2024

  42. [49]

    Kashish Karera, Areej Khan, Humanyou Tariq, Mantasha Nadeem, Roohi Zafar, Muhammad Kamran, and Muham- mad Mubashir Khan. 2024. Construction of a Quantum Random Number Generator. In2024 4th International Conference on Innovations in Computer Science (ICONICS). IEEE, 1–8

    2024

  43. [50]

    AR Kavitha, R Balachandhar, and K Harikrishna. 2025. Synergizing Quantum Cryptography and Post-Quantum Cryptography: A New Era of Ultra-Secure Data Transmission. In2025 International Conference on Data Science, Agents & Artificial Intelligence (ICDSAAI). IEEE, 1–6

    2025

  44. [51]

    Juliane Krämer and Mirjam Loiero. 2019. Fault attacks on UOV and rainbow. InConstructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design: 10th International Workshop, COSADE 2019, Darmstadt, Germany, April 3–5, 2019, Proceedings 10. Springer, 193–214

    2019

  45. [52]

    Satwik Kundu and Swaroop Ghosh. 2024. SoK Paper: Security Concerns in Quantum Machine Learning as a Service. In Proceedings of the International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy 2024. 28–36

    2024

  46. [53]

    Adeline Langlois and Damien Stehlé. 2015. Worst-case to average-case reductions for module lattices.Designs, Codes and Cryptography75, 3 (2015), 565–599

    2015

  47. [54]

    Wai-Kong Lee, Raymond K Zhao, Ron Steinfeld, Amin Sakzad, and Seong Oun Hwang. 2024. High throughput lattice-based signatures on gpus: Comparing falcon and mitaka.IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems 35, 4 (2024), 675–692. ACM Comput. Surv., Vol. 1, No. 1, Art...

    2024

  48. [55]

    Pingzhi Li, Tianlong Chen, and Junyu Liu. 2024. Enhancing Quantum Security over Federated Learning via Post- Quantum Cryptography. In2024 IEEE 6th International Conference on Trust, Privacy and Security in Intelligent Systems, and Applications (TPS-ISA). IEEE, 499–505. https:/...

    2024

  49. [56]

    Xing Lin, Shuang Wang, Zhen-Qiang Yin, Guan-Jie Fan-Yuan, Rong Wang, Wei Chen, De-Yong He, Zheng Zhou, Guang-Can Guo, and Zheng-Fu Han. 2020. Security analysis and improvement of source independent quantum random number generators with imperfect devices.npj Quantum Information...

    2020

  50. [58]

    Ramachandran, and R

    Tao Liu, G. Ramachandran, and R. Jurdak. 2024. Post-Quantum Cryptography for Internet of Things: A Survey on Performance and Optimization.arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.17538v1(31 Jan. 2024). https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.17538v1 Submitted January 31, 2024; accessed 2025-06-25

    2024 arXiv

  51. [59]

    Zheng Liu, An Wang, Congming Wei, Yaoling Ding, Jingqi Zhang, Annyu Liu, and Liehuang Zhu. 2025. Release the Power of Rejected Signatures: An Efficient Side-Channel Attack on Dilithium.Cryptology ePrint Archive(2025)

    2025

  52. [60]

    Pierre Loidreau. 2000. Strengthening McEliece cryptosystem. InInternational conference on the theory and application of cryptology and information security. Springer, 585–598

    2000

  53. [61]

    GS Mamatha, Namya Dimri, and Rasha Sinha. 2024. Post-Quantum Cryptography: Securing Digital Communication in the Quantum Era.arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.11741(2024)

    2024 arXiv

  54. [62]

    Yingqiu Mao, Pei Zeng, and Teng-Yun Chen. 2021. Recent advances on quantum key distribution overcoming the linear secret key capacity bound.Advanced Quantum Technologies4, 1 (2021), 2000084

    2021

  55. [63]

    McEliece

    Robert J. McEliece. 1978. A Public-Key Cryptosystem Based on Algebraic Coding Theory. InDSN Progress Report, Vol. 42-44. Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, CA, 114–116

    1978

  56. [64]

    Carlos Aguilar Melchor, Nicolas Aragon, Slim Bettaieb, Loıc Bidoux, Olivier Blazy, Jean-Christophe Deneuville, Philippe Gaborit, Edoardo Persichetti, Gilles Zémor, and IC Bourges. 2018. Hamming quasi-cyclic (HQC).NIST PQC Round2, 4 (2018), 13

    2018

  57. [65]

    Daniele Micciancio. 2004. Almost perfect lattices, the covering radius problem, and applications to Ajtai’s connection factor.SIAM J. Comput.34, 1 (2004), 118–169

    2004

  58. [66]

    Puja Mondal, Supriya Adhikary, Suparna Kundu, and Angshuman Karmakar. 2024. ZKFault: Fault attack analysis on zero-knowledge based post-quantum digital signature schemes. arXiv:2409.07150 [cs.CR] https://arxiv.org/abs/2409. 07150

    2024 arXiv

  59. [67]

    Mobin Motaharifar, Mahmood Hasani, and Hassan Kaatuzian. 2025. A Survey on Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution for Secure Data Transmission: Toward the Future of Secured Quantum-Networks.Quantum Information & Computation25, 2025 (2025), 175–194

    2025

  60. [68]

    Michael Naehrig and Joost Renes. 2019. Dual isogenies and their application to public-key compression for isogeny- based cryptography. InInternational Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security. Springer, 243–272

    2019

  61. [69]

    National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE), NIST. 2023. Crypto -agility considerations for migrating post-quantum cryptographic algorithms. NIST NCCoE Project Page. https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/crypto-agility- considerations-migrating-post-quantum-cryptographic-algorith...

    2023

  62. [70]

    National Institute of Standards and Technology. 2024. Announcing Approval of Three Federal Information Pro- cessing Standards (FIPS) for Post-Quantum Cryptography. News Release, NIST Computer Security Resource Cen- ter. https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2024/08/announcing-...

    2024

  63. [71]

    National Institute of Standards and Technology, Computer Security Resource Center. 2024. Announcing Approval of Three Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) for Post -Quantum Cryptography. News Release, NIST Computer Security Resource Center. https://csrc.nist.gov/new...

    2024

  64. [73]

    Cameron Nili, Tom Patterson, and Carl Dukatz. 2024. Safeguarding Central Bank Digital Currency Systems in the Post-Quantum Computing Age. World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2024/05/safeguarding- central-bank-digital-currency-systems-post-quantum-age/ Accesse...

    2024

  65. [74]

    Anthony Obulor Olisa. 2025. Quantum-Resistant Blockchain Architectures for Securing Financial Data Governance against Next-Generation Cyber Threats.Journal of Engineering Research and Reports27, 4 (2025), 189–211

    2025

  66. [75]

    Shashi Kant Pandey and R Jenef. 2024. A comparative study and analysis of quantum random number generator with true random number generator. In2024 16th International Conference on COMmunication Systems & NETworkS (COMSNETS). IEEE, 1000–1005. ACM Comput. Surv., Vol. 1, No. 1, ...

    2024

  67. [76]

    Carter Pape. [n. d.]. Why banks need to plan beyond post-quantum encryption. Online.American Banker([n. d.]). https://www.americanbanker.com/news/why-banks-need-to-plan-beyond-post-quantum-encryption Accessed: 2025- 06-25

    2025

  68. [77]

    Christian Paquin, Douglas Stebila, and Goutam Tamvada. 2020. Benchmarking post-quantum cryptography in TLS. In Post-Quantum Cryptography: 11th International Conference, PQCrypto 2020, Paris, France, April 15–17, 2020, Proceedings

    2020

  69. [78]

    Liangxin Qian and Jun Zhao. 2025. Quantum Networks in 6G Communications: Technologies, Challenges, and Applications. In2025 International Conference on Quantum Communications, Networking, and Computing (QCNC). IEEE, 701–703

    2025

  70. [79]

    N Rajkumar, K Kishore Kumar, M Gokul, and S Durai. 2024. Post-Quantum Cryptography Security with CSPM for Secure Data Transmission in Cloud Environments. In2024 4th International Conference on Ubiquitous Computing and Intelligent Information Systems (ICUIS). IEEE, 1456–1462

    2024

  71. [80]

    Prasanna Ravi, James Howe, Anupam Chattopadhyay, and Shivam Bhasin. 2021. Lattice-based key-sharing schemes: A survey.ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)54, 1 (2021), 1–39

    2021

  72. [81]

    Oded Regev. 2009. On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and cryptography.Journal of the ACM (JACM)56, 6 (2009), 1–40

    2009

  73. [82]

    Post -Quantum TLS without handshake signatures

    Peter Schwabe, Douglas Stebila, and Thom Wiggers. 2021. KEMTLS: Post-quantum TLS without signatures. Cloudflare Blog. https://blog.cloudflare.com/kemtls-post-quantum-tls-without-signatures/ Based on publication “Post -Quantum TLS without handshake signatures” (ACM CCS 2020) an...

    2021

  74. [83]

    P Sharma, A Agrawal, V Bhatia, S Prakash, and AK Mishra. 2021. Quantum key distribution secured optical networks: a survey. IEEE Open J. Commun. Soc. 2, 2049–2083 (2021)

    2021

  75. [84]

    Shiyu Shen, Hao Yang, Wenqian Li, and Yunlei Zhao. 2025. cuML-DSA: Optimized Signing Procedure and Server- Oriented GPU Design for ML-DSA.IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing22, 3 (2025), 2295–2307. https://doi.org/10.1109/TDSC.2024.3494835

    2025

  76. [85]

    2023.Attacking B-SIDH Using Castryck-Decru’s Key Recovery Attack on SIDH

    Georg Skuggedal. 2023.Attacking B-SIDH Using Castryck-Decru’s Key Recovery Attack on SIDH. Master’s thesis. Norwe- gian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Department of Information Security and Communication Technol- ogy. https://ntnuopen.ntnu.no/ntnu-xmlui/bitstream...

    2023

  77. [86]

    Shriyank Somvanshi, Md Monzurul Islam, Gaurab Chhetri, Rohit Chakraborty, Mahmuda Sultana Mimi, Sawgat Ahmed Shuvo, Kazi Sifatul Islam, Syed Aaqib Javed, Sharif Ahmed Rafat, Anandi Dutta, et al . 2025. From Tiny Machine Learning to Tiny Deep Learning: A Survey.arXiv preprint a...

    2025

  78. [87]

    Jakub Sowa, Bach Hoang, Advaith Yeluru, Steven Qie, Anita Nikolich, Ravishankar Iyer, and Phuong Cao. 2024. Post- quantum cryptography (pqc) network instrument: Measuring pqc adoption rates and identifying migration pathways. In2024 IEEE International Conference on Quantum Com...

    2024

  79. [88]

    Quang Dang Truong, Phap Ngoc Duong, and Hanho Lee. 2024. Efficient Low-Latency Hardware Architecture for Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard.IEEE Access12 (2024), 32395–32407. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS. 2024.3370470

    2024

  80. [89]

    Utimaco Team. 2024. Discussing NSA’s Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0. Utimaco Blog. https: //utimaco.com/news/blog-posts/NSA-suite-against-cryptanalytically-relevant-quantum-computers Accessed: 2025- 06-25

    2024

  81. [90]

    Girraj Kumar Verma, Nahida Majeed Wani, and Prosanta Gope. 2024. Quantum-Secure Certificate-Less Conditional Privacy-Preserving Authentication for VANET.arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.13743(2024)

    2024 arXiv

  82. [91]

    Liu-Jun Wang, Kai-Yi Zhang, Jia-Yong Wang, Jie Cheng, Yong-Hua Yang, Shi-Biao Tang, Di Yan, Yan-Lin Tang, Zhen Liu, Yu Yu, et al. 2021. Experimental authentication of quantum key distribution with post-quantum cryptography.npj quantum information7, 1 (2021), 67

    2021

  83. [92]

    2023.Cryptanalysis of Isogeny-based Protocols in Genus 1 and 2

    Charlotte Weitkämper. 2023.Cryptanalysis of Isogeny-based Protocols in Genus 1 and 2. Ph. D. Dissertation. University of Birmingham

    2023

  84. [93]

    Zewen Ye, Xin Li, Chuhui Wang, Ray CC Cheung, and Kejie Huang. 2025. RVSLH: Acceleration of Postquantum Standard SLH-DSA With Customized RISC-V Processor.IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems(2025)

    2025

  85. [94]

    Mahmoud Yehia, Riham AlTawy, and T Aaron Gulliver. 2020. Hash-based signatures revisited: A dynamic fors with adaptive chosen message security. InInternational Conference on Cryptology in Africa. Springer, 239–257

    2020

  86. [95]

    Dimitris Zacharopoulos. 2024. On the Drawbacks of Post -Quantum Cryptography in TLS. PKI Consortium Blog. https://pkic.org/2024/09/27/on-the-drawbacks-of-post-quantum-cryptography-in-tls/ Accessed: 2025-06-25

    2024

  87. [96]

    Rina Zeitoun. 2022. The Challenge of Side-Channel Countermeasures on Post -Quantum Crypto. Presentation, Fourth PQC Standardization Conference. https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Presentations/2022/the-challenge-of-side-channel- ACM Comput. Surv., Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Public...

    2022

  88. [97]

    Hongyi Zhou. 2023. Numerical framework for semi-device-independent quantum random-number generators.Physical Review A107, 5 (2023), 052402

    2023

  89. [98]

    Hongyi Zhou. 2024. Continuous-Variable Source-Independent Quantum Random Number Generator with a Single Phase-Insensitive Detector.arXiv preprint arXiv:2411.14817(2024). A List of Acronyms To assist the reader, a list of all acronyms and abbreviations used throughout this pape...

    2024 arXiv

  90. [2023]

    In 2023 IEEE 28th International Workshop on Computer Aided Modeling and Design of Communication Links and Networks (CAMAD)

    Quantum-resistant TLS 1.3: A hybrid solution combining classical, quantum and post-quantum cryptography. In 2023 IEEE 28th International Workshop on Computer Aided Modeling and Design of Communication Links and Networks (CAMAD). IEEE, 246–251

    2023

Pith tools

Reviewed August 4, 2026 · model on record in the stance chip above.