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Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information

As of 19 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 32 of 32 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2501.06181.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2501.06181 v2

Coverage vector

measured 32 of 32 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.114433Z

measured 32 of 32 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00

measured 0 of 0 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: cited_works

Reference resolution

32 of 32 outbound references displayed

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  • verified fuzzy24
  • unresolved5
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External citation measurements

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Outbound references

Observation 96bfc6bd-07d3-4c50-ba52-1809c194b76b · outbound

This paper cites Bas ¸ar and G.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Bas ¸ar and G

Reference 1

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Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

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Observation a0b3f413-28b0-4900-80b9-b5da7c9588a3 · outbound

This paper cites A multistage pursuit-evasion game that admits a gaussian random process as a maximin control policy,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information A multistage pursuit-evasion game that admits a gaussian random process as a maximin control policy,

Reference 2

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Observation e3648e7b-02da-464b-94b2-1827191eb6dc · outbound

This paper cites Differential games with imperfect state information,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Differential games with imperfect state information,

Reference 3

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Observation 14e70ee5-f253-463f-83be-bf7a20005c17 · outbound

This paper cites Decomposition techniques for markov zero-sum games with nested information,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Decomposition techniques for markov zero-sum games with nested information,

Reference 4

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Observation 7891cf13-8f2a-410d-9424-e74044193484 · outbound

This paper cites Common informa- tion based markov perfect equilibria for linear-gaussian games with asymmetric information,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Common informa- tion based markov perfect equilibria for linear-gaussian games with asymmetric information,

Reference 5

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Observation ea92dab1-08fa-4ea2-901a-b7ad82160791 · outbound

This paper cites Zero-sum stochastic games with asymmetric information,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Zero-sum stochastic games with asymmetric information,

Reference 6

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Observation 377e1c5e-b0c8-4002-bb85-484c96879597 · outbound

This paper cites Linear-quadratic Gaussian Games with Asymmetric Information: Belief Corrections Using the Opponents Actions.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Linear-quadratic Gaussian Games with Asymmetric Information: Belief Corrections Using the Opponents Actions

Reference 7

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local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.163084Z

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Observation 9b851f73-b30b-4a56-bc78-6788a102ff1f · outbound

This paper cites Stochastic dynamic games in belief space,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Stochastic dynamic games in belief space,

Reference 8

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.039724Z digest=sha256:f02d3be6748f417043b2b308a808b3e4a80743dc205765daf85dc482e57b9526

Observation a0de676c-1a2e-4cdb-828b-f791a723b854 · outbound

This paper cites Learning Mixed Strategies in Trajectory Games.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Learning Mixed Strategies in Trajectory Games

Reference 9

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local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.151746Z

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No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

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Observation fd79f582-5fc5-4956-bd0f-fae3a02b11d7 · outbound

This paper cites Learning equilibria in asymmetric auction games,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Learning equilibria in asymmetric auction games,

Reference 10

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Observation b3dd8bd1-650f-4c31-b30b-88b7da05764c · outbound

This paper cites Dynamic games with asymmetric information and resource constrained players with applications to security of cyberphysical systems,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Dynamic games with asymmetric information and resource constrained players with applications to security of cyberphysical systems,

Reference 11

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Observation ad79ed4e-a9cd-4401-8f50-b6548a689bc1 · outbound

This paper cites Dynamic games for secure and resilient control system design,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Dynamic games for secure and resilient control system design,

Reference 12

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No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

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Observation ea30db2e-feae-4a87-84b9-2347f88b539a · outbound

This paper cites Games with incomplete information played by “bayesian.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Games with incomplete information played by “bayesian

Reference 13

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Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

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Observation 43998a7c-d036-4d5d-a276-ed818ca24f8a · outbound

This paper cites The market for “lemons.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information The market for “lemons

Reference 14

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Observation 537ac002-73d2-4e45-997e-0cf51f19d14b · outbound

This paper cites Agreeing to disagree,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Agreeing to disagree,

Reference 15

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Observation 285ca93f-b695-4d50-ab7d-66dfd8f4d6a5 · outbound

This paper cites Job market signaling,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Job market signaling,

Reference 16

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No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

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Observation 2239ecfa-dafc-4866-a92f-63ff17d814ef · outbound

This paper cites Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information,

Reference 17

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No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

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Observation fca1bf44-2067-4ea3-9b8e-ed26de2a1ce5 · outbound

This paper cites The theory of learning in games, economics learning and social evolution series,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information The theory of learning in games, economics learning and social evolution series,

Reference 18

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No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

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Observation e72f04a9-9ebb-4bfb-b0ab-dd55e8839190 · outbound

This paper cites Computing Best-Response Strategies in Infinite Games of Incomplete Information.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Computing Best-Response Strategies in Infinite Games of Incomplete Information

Reference 19

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local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.140250Z

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No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

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Observation be506546-5f96-4a90-8f0c-0f8ad7ea8dda · outbound

This paper cites On the rate of convergence of continuous-time fictitious play,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information On the rate of convergence of continuous-time fictitious play,

Reference 20

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Observation f9e88f7e-7464-40ab-83ac-51478f3401d5 · outbound

This paper cites Best response dynamics for continuous zero-sum games,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Best response dynamics for continuous zero-sum games,

Reference 21

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Observation d86cb2a1-7a1a-4dbf-b15c-ea09ea28637d · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Unresolved cited work

Reference 22

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Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

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Observation cbe13efd-9912-46fb-885f-f2a78cdb05bc · outbound

This paper cites Best response model predictive control for agile interactions between autonomous ground vehicles,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Best response model predictive control for agile interactions between autonomous ground vehicles,

Reference 23

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Observation ed3a6618-edbc-47fa-a653-2e780f13217d · outbound

This paper cites Game theoretic motion planning for multi-robot racing,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Game theoretic motion planning for multi-robot racing,

Reference 24

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Observation c231ce91-ad63-4fff-9175-7f135bea84ac · outbound

This paper cites Game- theoretic planning for self-driving cars in multivehicle competitive scenarios,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Game- theoretic planning for self-driving cars in multivehicle competitive scenarios,

Reference 25

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Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.093837Z digest=sha256:9ddd2f50f714015a79d99ca71003bb82fd2fe16cbe0e174feedabd2a6781e6b2

Observation 807a481e-cb7c-463f-b2e4-3d57447dbdec · outbound

This paper cites Controllability metrics, limitations and algorithms for complex networks,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Controllability metrics, limitations and algorithms for complex networks,

Reference 26

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raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.220543Z

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.096919Z digest=sha256:3fe1829c8c05bd31a72779c4fb62a6ad8dde9cea4fed25ea381152a47ae634bf

Observation ff29a10d-f0ba-4c73-a36e-92092af0ebd4 · outbound

This paper cites Performance bounds for optimal and robust feedback control in networks,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Performance bounds for optimal and robust feedback control in networks,

Reference 27

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.099405Z digest=sha256:7fe790edba3d75d9f5e0ae3324a0a5a4221d5fa0f5c44cb2fa9759671021ace7

Observation 5674e98b-6ba6-4adf-82a7-bf7bef389a62 · outbound

This paper cites On the decay rate of hankel singular values and related issues,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information On the decay rate of hankel singular values and related issues,

Reference 28

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raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.204824Z

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source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.102909Z digest=sha256:f860339c8bca79f70c2ebd004f8d87e20496ee6c7c5b89126d5000ad2d534ada

Observation 035db1e5-2ff7-4d28-b337-e8de6d8c851e · outbound

This paper cites Least squares stationary optimal control and the algebraic Riccati equation,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Least squares stationary optimal control and the algebraic Riccati equation,

Reference 29

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No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.105971Z digest=sha256:d0fcac003fa206434be1d46023b289b5244a857042409eb95062d8765169e547

Observation 52cd3977-2b38-4cde-bc16-8ee555ab8797 · outbound

This paper cites The stable regulator problem and its inverse,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information The stable regulator problem and its inverse,

Reference 30

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raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.189161Z

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No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.108868Z digest=sha256:15e41d8583b1808af71f0516e0387a074103eca7d4d40ec77feeb5c5a5afa5f5

Observation b580de59-2569-41a7-a9a1-8d02cb725599 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information Unresolved cited work

Reference 31

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No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.111400Z digest=sha256:7e6a8be0189a3dc003d850dd3657ef3513c6be2b3470f50a9f27c8f7402cd8a8

Observation 39e08635-617d-4cad-92ba-bd08b8e4b35f · outbound

This paper cites All optimal Hankel-norm approximations of linear multivariable systems and their L, ∞ -error bounds†,.

Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic Dynamic Games with Partial and Asymmetric Information All optimal Hankel-norm approximations of linear multivariable systems and their L, ∞ -error bounds†,

Reference 32

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raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T21:09:50.172122Z

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No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-18T06:34:40.430872+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-10T21:09:50.114433Z digest=sha256:a86480d3a020d39d4b9b1ee5a7ca3dbd0fac7cdb95ece72baab3449a41e8c6f1

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