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From LLMs to MLLMs to Agents: A Survey of Emerging Paradigms in Jailbreak Attacks and Defenses within LLM Ecosystem
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Large language models (LLMs) are rapidly evolving from single-modal systems to multimodal LLMs and intelligent agents, significantly expanding their capabilities while introducing increasingly severe security risks. This paper presents a systematic survey of the growing complexity of jailbreak attacks and corresponding defense mechanisms within the expanding LLM ecosystem. We first trace the developmental trajectory from LLMs to MLLMs and Agents, highlighting the core security challenges emerging at each stage. Next, we categorize mainstream jailbreak techniques from both the attack impact and visibility perspectives, and provide a comprehensive analysis of representative attack methods, related datasets, and evaluation metrics. On the defense side, we organize existing strategies based on response timing and technical approach, offering a structured understanding of their applicability and implementation. Furthermore, we identify key limitations in existing surveys, such as insufficient attention to agent-specific security issues, the absence of a clear taxonomy for hybrid jailbreak methods, a lack of detailed analysis of experimental setups, and outdated coverage of recent advancements. To address these limitations, we provide an updated synthesis of recent work and outline future research directions in areas such as dataset construction, evaluation framework optimization, and strategy generalization. Our study seeks to enhance the understanding of jailbreak mechanisms and facilitate the advancement of more resilient and adaptive defense strategies in the context of ever more capable LLMs.
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SoK: Intent-Oriented Systematization of Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreaks
Multi-turn LLM jailbreaks succeed based on how harmful intent is organized across turns, not on interaction length, and detection should shift to session and cross-session scope.
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