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MakeupAttack: Feature Space Black-box Backdoor Attack on Face Recognition via Makeup Transfer

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arxiv 2408.12312 v1 pith:AHBRGI2S submitted 2024-08-22 cs.CV

classification cs.CV
keywords backdoorattackfacerecognitionfeatureattacksexistingmakeupattack
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Backdoor attacks pose a significant threat to the training process of deep neural networks (DNNs). As a widely-used DNN-based application in real-world scenarios, face recognition systems once implanted into the backdoor, may cause serious consequences. Backdoor research on face recognition is still in its early stages, and the existing backdoor triggers are relatively simple and visible. Furthermore, due to the perceptibility, diversity, and similarity of facial datasets, many state-of-the-art backdoor attacks lose effectiveness on face recognition tasks. In this work, we propose a novel feature space backdoor attack against face recognition via makeup transfer, dubbed MakeupAttack. In contrast to many feature space attacks that demand full access to target models, our method only requires model queries, adhering to black-box attack principles. In our attack, we design an iterative training paradigm to learn the subtle features of the proposed makeup-style trigger. Additionally, MakeupAttack promotes trigger diversity using the adaptive selection method, dispersing the feature distribution of malicious samples to bypass existing defense methods. Extensive experiments were conducted on two widely-used facial datasets targeting multiple models. The results demonstrate that our proposed attack method can bypass existing state-of-the-art defenses while maintaining effectiveness, robustness, naturalness, and stealthiness, without compromising model performance.

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Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. From Detection to Correction: Backdoor-Resilient Face Recognition via Vision-Language Trigger Detection and Noise-Based Neutralization

    cs.CV 2025-08 unverdicted novelty 5.0 of 10

    A majority vote of large vision-language models is claimed to detect backdoor triggers in face images, with calibrated noise correcting poisoned samples at 100% accuracy.

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