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An Attack on the the Encryption Scheme of the Moscow Internet Voting System
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The next Moscow City Duma elections will be held on September 8th with an option of Internet voting. Some source code of the voting system is posted online for public testing. Pierrick Gaudry recently showed that due to the relatively small length of the key, the encryption scheme could be easily broken. This issue has been fixed in the current version of the voting system. In this note we show that the new implementation of the ElGamal encryption system is not semantically secure. We also demonstrate how this newly found security vulnerability can be potentially used for counting the number of votes cast for a candidate.
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Breaking the encryption scheme of the Moscow Internet voting system
The Moscow Internet voting system's ElGamal encryption was broken twice: 256-bit keys allowed full private key recovery, and the patched version leaked the quadratic residuosity of each vote.
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