Pith. sign in

REVIEW 1 cited by

On Fairness in Committee-based Blockchains

Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.

Re-run · record.json Download PDF Read on arXiv ↗

This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.

SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event

T0 review · schema-true

One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.

pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp

arxiv 1910.09786 v1 pith:D37H7UGD submitted 2019-10-22 cs.DC

Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou (DILS , NPA) , Antonella del Pozzo (DILS) , Maria Potop-Butucaru (NPA , LINCS) , Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni (DILS) This is my paper · ORCID
classification cs.DC
keywords blockchainsblockcommittee-basedblockchainbitcoinblockscommitteefairness
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
0 comments
read the original abstract

Committee-based blockchains are among the most popular alternatives of proof-of-work based blockchains, such as Bitcoin. They provide strong consistency (no fork) under classical assumptions, and avoid using energy-consuming mechanisms to add new blocks in the blockchain. For each block, these blockchains use a committee that executes Byzantine-fault tolerant distributed consensus to decide the next block they will add in the blockchain. Unlike Bitcoin, where there is only one creator per block with high probability, in committee-based blockchain any block is cooperatively created. In order to incentivize committee members to participate to the creation of new blocks rewarding schemes have to be designed. In this paper, we study the fairness of rewarding in committee-based blockchains and we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the system communication under which it is possible to have a fair reward mechanism.

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Forward citations

Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Balancing incentives in committee-based blockchains

    cs.GT 2025-05 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    In committee-based blockchains, the cost of omitting a vote and the cost of delaying a vote are mathematical inverses, so reward systems must balance the two attacks; both Cosmos and Ethereum are shown to be imbalanced.

Pith tools