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Efficient, Fair, and Incentive-Compatible Healthcare Rationing

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arxiv 2102.04384 v2 pith:D7CQOIEU submitted 2021-02-08 cs.GT econ.TH

classification cs.GTecon.TH
keywords rationingcategoryhealthcaremedicalpatientsruleunitsagents
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Rationing of healthcare resources has emerged as an important issue, which has been discussed by medical experts, policy-makers, and the general public. We consider a rationing problem where medical units are to be allocated to patients. Each unit is reserved for one of several categories and each category has a priority ranking of the patients. We present an allocation rule that respects the priorities, complies with the eligibility requirements, allocates the largest feasible number of units, and does not incentivize agents to hide that they qualify through a category. The rule characterizes all possible allocations that satisfy the first three properties and is polynomial-time computable.

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Cited by 1 Pith paper

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  1. Strategyproof Maximum Matching under Dichotomous Agent Preferences

    cs.GT 2025-02 conditional novelty 7.0 of 10

    Two equivalent mechanism families, SAFE and Rank-Maximal, achieve maximum-size, fair, strategyproof, Pareto-efficient, and non-bossy matching under dichotomous agent preferences.

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