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Notions of Anonymity, Fairness and Symmetry for Finite Strategic-Form Games
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In this paper we survey various notions of anonymity and symmetry for finite strategic-form games present in relevant literature, and discuss notions of fairness; show that game bijections and game isomorphisms form groupoids; introduce matchings as a convenient characterisation of strategy triviality; and outline how to construct and partially order parameterised (symmetric) games with examples that range all combinations of surveyed symmetry notions, which when combined with other results in this paper gives the precise relationship between the various symmetry notions.
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Cited by 1 Pith paper
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Aggregate Fictitious Play for Learning in Anonymous Polymatrix Games (Extended Version)
In anonymous polymatrix games, fictitious play can be run on aggregate action counts without changing agents' best responses or losing convergence to Nash equilibrium.
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