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Loss-Versus-Rebalancing under Deterministic and Generalized block-times
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Loss-Versus-Rebalancing under Deterministic and Generalized block-times
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Although modern blockchains almost universally produce blocks at fixed intervals, existing models still lack an analytical formula for the loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR) incurred by Automated Market Makers (AMMs) liquidity providers in this setting. Leveraging tools from random walk theory, we derive the following closed-form approximation for the per block per unit of liquidity expected LVR under constant block time: \[ \overline{\mathrm{ARB}}= \frac{\,\sigma_b^{2}} {\,2+\sqrt{2\pi}\,\gamma/(|\zeta(1/2)|\,\sigma_b)\,}+O\!\bigl(e^{-\mathrm{const}\tfrac{\gamma}{\sigma_b}}\bigr)\;\approx\; \frac{\sigma_b^{2}}{\,2 + 1.7164\,\gamma/\sigma_b}, \] where $\sigma_b$ is the intra-block asset volatility, $\gamma$ the AMM spread and $\zeta$ the Riemann Zeta function. Our large Monte Carlo simulations show that this formula is in fact quasi-exact across practical parameter ranges. Extending our analysis to arbitrary block-time distributions as well, we demonstrate both that--under every admissible inter-block law--the probability that a block carries an arbitrage trade converges to a universal limit, and that only constant block spacing attains the asymptotically minimal LVR. This shows that constant block intervals provide the best possible protection against arbitrage for liquidity providers.
Forward citations
Cited by 2 Pith papers
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Optimal Dynamic Fees for Automated Market Makers: A Stochastic Control Approach to Loss-Versus-Rebalancing
Derives a pro-cyclical optimal dynamic fee for AMM LPs via ergodic control that is independent of wealth and risk aversion and improves growth rate over static fees.
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Where Does MEV Really Come From? Revisiting CEXDEX Arbitrage on Ethereum
A new discrete-time AMM model with diffusive plus jump price processes shows CEX-DEX arbitrage requires volumes comparable to major liquidity pools and produces profits on the scale of total MEV.
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