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Exploiting Parallel Memory Write Requests for Covert Channel Attacks in Integrated CPU-GPU Systems

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arxiv 2307.16123 v1 pith:DS7O4MD2 submitted 2023-07-30 cs.CR cs.AR

classification cs.CRcs.AR
keywords memoryrequestsintegratedwritecovertsystemsacceleratorsachieve
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

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In heterogeneous SoCs, accelerators like integrated GPUs (iGPUs) are integrated on the same chip as CPUs, sharing the memory subsystem. In such systems, the massive memory requests from throughput-oriented accelerators significantly interfere with CPU memory requests. In addition to the large performance impact, this interference provides an attacker with a strong leakage vector for covert attacks across the processors, which is hard to achieve across the cores in a multi-core CPU. In this paper, we demonstrate that parallel memory write requests of the iGPU and more specifically, the management policy of the write buffer in the memory controller (MC) can lead to significantly stalling CPU memory read requests in heterogeneous SoCs. We characterize the slowdown on the shared read and write buffers in the memory controller and exploit it to build a cross-processor covert channel in Intel-based integrated CPU-GPU systems. We develop two attack variants that achieve a bandwidth of 1.65 kbps and 4.41 kbps and error rates of 0.49% and 4.32% respectively.

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Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. EXAM: Exploiting Exclusive System-Level Cache in Apple M-Series SoCs for Enhanced Cache Occupancy Attacks

    cs.CR 2025-04 conditional novelty 8.0 of 10

    An attacker can use the exclusive System-Level Cache on Apple M-series chips to monitor GPU and other CPU activity, enabling website fingerprinting, pixel stealing, and screen snooping.

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