Quantum secure blind decryption with two users

We propose two types of protocols for quantum secure blind decryption, involving two users and servers. User 1 holds the encrypted ciphertext. The servers store several indexed keys including the key encrypting the ciphertext. User 2 aims to obtain the decrypted text. The protocols are designed to preserve the following types of secrecy: Users ensure the secrecy of the text from the servers. Servers maintain the secrecy of the keys from the users. Our protocols enable User 2 to obtain the decrypted text while preserving these secrecy requirements. Additionally, the second protocol ensures the secrecy of the key index to identify the key encrypting the ciphertext from the servers, and the second protocol requires two non-commuting servers. Furthermore, we analyze the secrecy of the second protocol under post-attack scenarios, where the two servers communicates with each other after the completion of the protocol. We show that our quantum protocol satisfies the secrecy under these attacks, whereas its classical counterpart fails to do so.