REVIEW 2 cited by
Basins of Attraction in Two-Player Random Ordinal Potential Games
Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.
This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.
SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event
T0 review · schema-true
One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.
pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp
abstract
We consider the class of two-person ordinal potential games where each player has the same number of actions $K$. Each game in this class admits at least one pure Nash equilibrium and the best-response dynamics converges to one of these pure Nash equilibria; which one depends on the starting point. So, each pure Nash equilibrium has a basin of attraction. We pick uniformly at random one game from this class and we study the joint distribution of the sizes of the basins of attraction. We provide an asymptotic exact value for the expected basin of attraction of each pure Nash equilibrium, when the number of actions $K$ goes to infinity.
Forward citations
Cited by 2 Pith papers
-
Game connectivity and adaptive dynamics in many-action games
For fixed n≥3, the large-k connected fraction of generic games with a pure Nash equilibrium is asymptotically 1−ζ_n, with ζ_n explicit and tending to 0 rapidly in n.
-
Equilibrium stability as a driver of cooperation among Q-learners
Q-learners with constant exploration in the repeated prisoner's dilemma spend most of their time on cooperative win-stay/lose-shift play above a boundary derived from Q-value gaps, matching simulations.
Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.