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BlockScope: Detecting and Investigating Propagated Vulnerabilities in Forked Blockchain Projects

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arxiv 2208.00205 v2 pith:HGWVBY4Q submitted 2022-07-30 cs.CR

classification cs.CR
keywords vulnerabilitiesblockscopebitcoincodeforkedethereumprojectsblockchain
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Due to the open-source nature of the blockchain ecosystem, it is common for new blockchains to fork or partially reuse the code of classic blockchains. For example, the popular Dogecoin, Litecoin, Binance BSC, and Polygon are all variants of Bitcoin/Ethereum. These "forked" blockchains thus could encounter similar vulnerabilities that are propagated from Bitcoin/Ethereum during forking or subsequently commit fetching. In this paper, we conduct a systematic study of detecting and investigating the propagated vulnerabilities in forked blockchain projects. To facilitate this study, we propose BlockScope, a novel tool that can effectively and efficiently detect multiple types of cloned vulnerabilities given an input of existing Bitcoin/Ethereum security patches. Specifically, BlockScope adopts similarity-based code match and designs a new way of calculating code similarity to cover all the syntax-wide variant (i.e., Type-1, Type-2, and Type-3) clones. Moreover, BlockScope automatically extracts and leverages the contexts of patch code to narrow down the search scope and locate only potentially relevant code for comparison. Our evaluation shows that BlockScope achieves good precision and high recall both at 91.8% (1.8 times higher recall than that in ReDeBug). BlockScope allows us to discover 101 previously unknown vulnerabilities in 13 out of the 16 forked projects of Bitcoin and Ethereum, including 16 from Dogecoin, 6 from Litecoin, 1 from Binance, and 4 from Optimism. We have reported all the vulnerabilities to their developers; 40 of them have been patched or accepted, 66 were acknowledged or under pending, and only 4 were rejected. We further investigate the propagation and patching processes of discovered vulnerabilities, and reveal three types of vulnerability propagation from source to forked projects, as well as the long delay (over 200 days) for releasing patches in Bitcoin forks.

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Forward citations

Cited by 3 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Building Reuse-Sensitive Control Flow Graphs (CFGs) for EVM Bytecode

    cs.SE 2025-05 conditional novelty 7.0 of 10

    Esuer constructs reuse-sensitive CFGs for EVM bytecode by tainting pre-pushed jump operands and cloning reused basic blocks, improving precision and downstream vulnerability detection.

  2. Unveiling Ethereum's P2P Network: The Role of Chain and Client Diversity

    cs.NI 2025-01 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    An instrumented Ethereum client reveals that only about 13% of discovered peers are fully mainnet-compatible and that client and chain diversity cause most connection failures and discovery timeouts.

  3. Logic Meets Magic: LLMs Cracking Smart Contract Vulnerabilities

    cs.CR 2025-01 reject novelty 4.0 of 10

    Five LLMs show high false-positive rates on smart contract audits; a vulnerability-specific prompt cuts false alarms, but recall on Solidity v0.8 re-entrancy and arithmetic bugs falls sharply.

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