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Prebunking Design as a Defense Mechanism Against Misinformation Propagation on Social Networks

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arxiv 2311.14200 v1 pith:JJZH6DPQ submitted 2023-11-23 cs.SI cs.SYeess.SY

classification cs.SIcs.SYeess.SY
keywords misinformationinformationprebunkingaccurateoptimalpolicyproblempropagation
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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The growing reliance on social media for news consumption necessitates effective countermeasures to mitigate the rapid spread of misinformation. Prebunking, a proactive method that arms users with accurate information before they come across false content, has garnered support from journalism and psychology experts. We formalize the problem of optimal prebunking as optimizing the timing of delivering accurate information, ensuring users encounter it before receiving misinformation while minimizing the disruption to user experience. Utilizing a susceptible-infected epidemiological process to model the propagation of misinformation, we frame optimal prebunking as a policy synthesis problem with safety constraints. We then propose a policy that approximates the optimal solution to a relaxed problem. The experiments show that this policy cuts the user experience cost of repeated information delivery in half, compared to delivering accurate information immediately after identifying a misinformation propagation.

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Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. How Media Competition Fuels the Spread of Misinformation

    cs.SI 2024-11 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    In a simulated zero-sum media competition with bounded-rational players, equilibrium strategies reproduce the pattern that hyper-partisan sources spread more misinformation than centrists and that one side's misinform...

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