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arxiv: 1911.07712 · v1 · pith:KFFPJ34V · submitted 2019-11-18 · cs.AI

Inducing Cooperation via Team Regret Minimization based Multi-Agent Deep Reinforcement Learning

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classification cs.AI
keywords teamagentsgamesmethodmulti-agentnovelregretagent
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Existing value-factorized based Multi-Agent deep Reinforce-ment Learning (MARL) approaches are well-performing invarious multi-agent cooperative environment under thecen-tralized training and decentralized execution(CTDE) scheme,where all agents are trained together by the centralized valuenetwork and each agent execute its policy independently. How-ever, an issue remains open: in the centralized training process,when the environment for the team is partially observable ornon-stationary, i.e., the observation and action informationof all the agents cannot represent the global states, existingmethods perform poorly and sample inefficiently. Regret Min-imization (RM) can be a promising approach as it performswell in partially observable and fully competitive settings.However, it tends to model others as opponents and thus can-not work well under the CTDE scheme. In this work, wepropose a novel team RM based Bayesian MARL with threekey contributions: (a) we design a novel RM method to traincooperative agents as a team and obtain a team regret-basedpolicy for that team; (b) we introduce a novel method to de-compose the team regret to generate the policy for each agentfor decentralized execution; (c) to further improve the perfor-mance, we leverage a differential particle filter (a SequentialMonte Carlo method) network to get an accurate estimation ofthe state for each agent. Experimental results on two-step ma-trix games (cooperative game) and battle games (large-scalemixed cooperative-competitive games) demonstrate that ouralgorithm significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods.

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