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(Almost) Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading
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We study the bilateral trade problem: one seller, one buyer and a single, indivisible item for sale. It is well known that there is no fully-efficient and incentive compatible mechanism for this problem that maintains a balanced budget. We design simple and robust mechanisms that obtain approximate efficiency with these properties. We show that even minimal use of statistical data can yield good approximation results. Finally, we demonstrate how a mechanism for this simple bilateral-trade problem can be used as a "black-box" for constructing mechanisms in more general environments.
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Cited by 1 Pith paper
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Bilateral Trade Under Heavy-Tailed Valuations: Minimax Regret with Infinite Variance
Under bounded density and finite p-th moments with p in (1,2), contextual bilateral trade has exact minimax regret rate T to the power 1 minus 2β(p-1)/(βp + d(p-1)).
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