Pith. sign in

REVIEW 2 major objections 4 minor 43 references

Independent Optical Frequency Combs Powered 546 km Field Test of Twin-Field Quantum Key Distribution

T0 review · 2 major / 4 minor · reviewed 2026-08-12 · deepseek-v4-flash

Challenge this review Re-run · record.json Download PDF Read on arXiv ↗ Review JSON

Pith's one-line read A field trial shows twin-field QKD can work over 546 km with independent optical frequency combs and no shared frequency reference.

desk verdict A credible field first for OFC-based TF-QKD without frequency dissemination, but the finite-size key claim needs a phase-randomization patch. read the letter →

arxiv 2411.13943 v1 pith:LHVVPBBT submitted 2024-11-21 quant-ph physics.app-phphysics.optics

Lai Zhou , Jinping Lin , Chengfang Ge , Yuanbin Fan , Zhiliang Yuan , Hao Dong , Yang Liu , Di Ma
show 6 more authors
Jiu-Peng Chen Cong Jiang Xiang-Bin Wang Li-Xing You Qiang Zhang Jian-Wei Pan
This is my paper · ORCID
classification quant-phphysics.app-phphysics.optics MSC 81P94 PACS 03.67.Dd
keywords twin-fieldquantumkeydistributionopticalfrequencycombfieldtrialopenchannelsending-not-sendingprotocolfinite-sizerate100dBlinklossfiberasymmetry
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

The pith

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The reading

This paper reports a field trial of twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) in which two independent optical frequency combs, installed at sites 300 km apart in a straight line, drive the protocol over a deployed 427 km fiber link without any shared optical frequency reference. The authors claim that this open-channel setup delivers a finite-size secure key rate of 0.53 bit/s at 546 km and an asymptotic rate of 0.12 bit/s at 603 km, making it the first field trial to exceed 100 dB of link loss. They also demonstrate operation with 44 km of fiber asymmetry. The significance is that earlier long-distance TF-QKD field tests needed a frequency-dissemination channel between users; this design removes that requirement, which is what a scalable, switchable quantum network would need.

What carries the argument

The central mechanism is coherent dual-band phase stabilization—locking the phase of a strong classical reference tone at one wavelength and transferring that lock to the quantum signal at a different wavelength—so that two remote lasers interfere as if they shared a frequency reference. Each user's independent electro-optic comb provides three phase-coherent lines: a quantum wavelength, a strong channel reference, and a timing wavelength. Charlie uses the strong reference for a fast phase-locking loop and a slow loop on the quantum wavelength, while rubidium-referenced comb spacing, automated time alignment, and polarization feedback keep the interference stable. The protocol layer is the SNS-AOPP scheme with four intensities, 16 discrete phase slices for phase randomization, and the zig-zag finite-size key-rate formula (Eq. A2).

What would settle it

Take the emitted phase values from the encoder and compute the statistical distance between their distribution and a continuous uniform phase; if that distance exceeds the tolerance allowed by the composable security proof, then the 0.53 bit/s finite-size rate at 546 km is not supported. A simpler check is to recompute Eq. (A2) with the actual values of $\epsilon_{\mathrm{cor}}$, $\epsilon_{\mathrm{PA}}$ and $\hat{\epsilon}$; the claimed key rate stands only if the result remains positive.

Watch

Extended reading notes

Core claim

Using the sending-not-sending (SNS) variant of twin-field QKD with four pulse intensities, actively odd-parity pairing (AOPP), and the zig-zag finite-size analysis, the authors establish that TF-QKD works in the field over an open quantum channel: each user generates an electro-optic optical frequency comb locked to a local rubidium clock, and no optical frequency is disseminated between the users. Over a deployed 427 km fiber link they measure a finite-size secure key rate of 0.53 bit/s at 546.61 km (100.13 dB loss) and an asymptotic rate of 0.12 bit/s at 603.87 km (108.59 dB loss), and at 452.46 km with 44 km fiber asymmetry they obtain an asymptotic rate of 24.28 bit/s and a finite-size rate of 16.06 bit/s. All measured rates beat the repeaterless PLOB bound, and the 546.61 km point is claimed as the first field trial to break the 100 dB link-loss barrier for QKD.

Load-bearing premise

The load-bearing premise is that the published security proof for the sending-not-sending protocol with continuous random phase still applies to this transmitter, which randomizes the phase in 16 discrete steps and does not report the numerical values of its finite-size security parameters.

Editorial extensions

If this is right

  • Twin-field QKD can operate over an open quantum channel with only local frequency references, eliminating the closed-loop fiber configuration that earlier long-distance field trials required.
  • The finite-size key rate of 0.53 bit/s at 546 km exceeds the repeaterless PLOB bound by a factor of 7.57, showing the repeater-like scaling survives in the field.
  • At 452 km with 44 km fiber asymmetry, the system still produces a finite-size key rate of 16.06 bit/s, so unequal network arms need not block deployment.
  • A positive asymptotic key rate of 0.12 bit/s at 603 km extends the demonstrated field reach of TF-QKD beyond the previous 511 km field record.

Reading between the lines

Editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • If the 16-slice phase randomization is later shown to meet the continuous-phase assumption in the security proof, the same hardware could plausibly be pushed to longer distances, since the asymptotic rate at 603 km is still positive.
  • This open-channel design implies that TF-QKD nodes could be added to an existing fiber route by installing local frequency combs, without laying a parallel frequency-dissemination fiber; that would cut the infrastructure cost of multi-city quantum networks.
  • Swapping the rubidium clocks for references with higher accuracy should reduce the residual phase drift and improve the X-basis error rate, which would raise the secure key rate at a fixed distance.
  • A direct independent check of the paper's finite-size claim would be to recalculate the key rate once the numerical values of $\epsilon_{\mathrm{cor}}$, $\epsilon_{\mathrm{PA}}$ and $\hat{\epsilon}$ are supplied; until then, the 0.53 bit/s number is best read as conditional on those unpublished parameters.
Share X Bluesky LinkedIn Reddit HN

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, and a circularity audit.

Referee Report

2 major / 4 minor

Summary. The paper reports a field trial of twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) in which Alice and Bob are equipped with independent optical frequency combs and no optical frequency dissemination channel is used. Over a deployed 427 km fiber link extended with spools, the authors report a finite-size secure key rate of 0.53 bit/s at 546.61 km (100.13 dB total loss), an asymptotic rate of 0.12 bit/s at 603.87 km, and a finite-size rate of 16.06 bit/s over an asymmetric 452.46 km link. The protocol is a four-intensity sending-or-not-sending (SNS) variant with actively odd-parity pairing (AOPP) and zig-zag post-processing. The experimental sections provide detailed stabilization data for phase, frequency, timing, and polarization, and the rate calculations use the published SNS-AOPP formula with measured counts and error rates.

Significance. If the security claim is valid, this is a significant experimental advance: it is, to my knowledge, the first field demonstration of TF-QKD with independent combs and an open quantum channel, it exceeds 100 dB link loss in the field, and it shows tolerance to 44 km channel asymmetry. The reported stabilization results, the detailed count tables, and the use of a published key-rate formula are strengths that make the experimental part largely reproducible. The main uncertainty is the security certification of the finite-size key rates, which rests on closing a gap between the implemented source and the assumptions of the cited security proofs and on specifying the composable security parameters.

major comments (2)
  1. [Section IV and Appendix B.2.b] The encoder randomizes each quantum pulse phase over 16 discrete values, theta in {0, pi/8, ..., 15pi/8}, described as meeting the phase-randomization requirement. However, the SNS-AOPP security proofs cited for Eq. A2 (Refs. 25-28, 37) model each weak coherent pulse as continuously phase-randomized, which yields a Fock-diagonal mixture. The actual 16-slice source retains off-diagonal Fock coherences, e.g., between |0> and |16> for mu=0.493. The manuscript provides no trace-distance bound, no adapted proof, and no citation to a result showing that this discrete phase randomization is covered by the finite-size terms in Eq. A2. Because the finite-size key rate at 546.61 km is computed from the cited formulas, this is a load-bearing gap in the security claim. Please either supply a quantitative bound on the source deviation and show that it is absorbed into the security parameters, or revise the security argument accordingly.
  2. [Appendix A, Eq. A2] The finite-size key-rate formula contains security parameters epsilon_cor, epsilon_PA, and epsilon_hat, but their numerical values are never stated in the paper. The reported finite-size rates (0.53 bit/s at 546.61 km and 16.06 bit/s at 452.46 km) cannot be independently checked or associated with a composable security level without these values. Please state the chosen parameters and, if a specific overall security parameter is claimed, explain how the individual epsilons combine to yield it.
minor comments (4)
  1. [Table VI caption and Section IV] The notation "Detected AB ab" is confusing: the first two letters are meant to denote Alice's and Bob's bases and the digits the intensity indices, but the caption's explanation "where 'A' ('B') indicates the X (Z) basis" is ambiguous because A and B are also the user labels. Please clarify with an explicit example, e.g., "Detected XX20 means Alice uses the X basis with intensity mu_2 and Bob uses the X basis with intensity mu_0."
  2. [Table VI] Several SKR entries are left blank (e.g., asymptotic for 546.61 and 452.46 km, finite-size for 603.87 km). Please mark unavailable entries with an explicit dash or footnote, and state in the text why they are not reported (for example, that the finite-size calculation was not performed for 603.87 km because the data set was limited by fiber access time).
  3. [Section III] The sentence comparing the achieved phase-drift reduction factor with the theoretical prediction of lambda_c / |lambda_c - lambda_q| about 1900 would benefit from a brief derivation or a pointer to the cited work, as the reader is expected to infer the origin of the factor.
  4. [Appendix B.2.b] The closing statement that the encoder is capable of supporting all TF-QKD protocols is an unsupported generalization; please restrict it to the protocols actually demonstrated or to the technical features relevant to this work.

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged · score 0.0 of 10

No circular derivation: key rates are computed from measured click data using the published SNS-AOPP rate formula, and simulations use independently measured channel parameters.

full rationale

The central finite-size and asymptotic key rates (Sec. IV, Table VI) are obtained by inserting experimentally counted events and QBERs into the published SNS-AOPP rate formula (Eq. A2), with the decoy-state bounds for n'_1 and e'^ph_1 taken from the cited theoretical analysis of Ref. [37]; they are not obtained by fitting a model to the target rates. The simulation curves in Fig. 3 use independently measured values of fiber attenuation (0.183 and 0.180 dB/km) and detector efficiencies (0.660 and 0.580), so the theoretical lines are not constructed from the same endpoint data they are compared against. The SNS and AOPP security proofs (Refs. 25-28 and 37) are self-citations by the same research group, but they are parameter-free published theoretical results that are externally checkable and do not incorporate this experiment's fitted values, so they function as genuine evidence rather than a circular premise. The only notable gap is a correctness concern rather than a circularity: the encoder uses 16 discrete phase slices (App. B.2.b and Sec. IV) while the cited security proofs assume ideal continuous phase randomization, and the paper supplies no explicit bound on the induced source deviation. That is an assumption-validity issue, not a step where the prediction reduces to its input by construction, so it does not raise the circularity score.

Assumptions & free parameters 2 free parameters · 3 assumptions · 0 invented entities

The central result rests on the standard SNS-AOPP security framework and on assumptions about the experimental state preparation and channel noise. Two load-bearing choices are the discrete 16-phase-slice encoding and the unstated security parameters in the key-rate formula; both affect whether the finite-size key rate is composably secure as claimed.

free parameters (2)
  • Protocol intensities and probabilities (µZ, µ2, µ1, µ0, PZ, PX, ϵ, pµ2, pµ1, pµ0) = Table V; e.g., 546.61 km symmetric: µZ=0.493, µ2=0.493, µ1=0.090, µ0=0.0002, PZ=0.735, PX=0.265, ϵ=0.269, pµ2=0.316…
    Chosen by the authors to optimize key rate under each link's loss; they are operating parameters, not hidden variables that force the claimed rate, but the exact SKR depends on them.
  • AOM frequency pre-compensation slope = 1777 Hz/h, characterized in lab (Fig. 5); residual within ±300 Hz over 20 h
    Preset compensation for the linear differential drift between the two independent lasers; if drift is nonlinear or environment-dependent, residual phase noise grows, so the slope is a load-bearing calibration value.
assumptions (3)
  • domain assumption The published SNS-AOPP security proofs (Refs. 25-28, 37) apply to this implementation, including the finite-size formula in Eq. A2.
    The paper does not re-derive the proof; it uses the formula and decoy analysis from cited works. If the implementation violates a proof condition, the claimed SKR is not composably secure.
  • ad hoc to paper A 16-slice discrete phase randomization is sufficient for the security proof.
    Appendix B.2.b states 16 phase slices are used 'to meet the requirement of phase randomization', but no analysis or citation is provided for discrete-slice sufficiency.
  • domain assumption Source intensities remain at their set values and the channel noise is independent and characterized by the measured dark counts and losses.
    Decoy-state analysis assumes known intensity values and independent channel statistics; the paper does not report in-run intensity monitoring.

how reviews work

0 comments
Cite this review

Pith. "Pith review of Independent Optical Frequency Combs Powered 546 km Field Test of Twin-Field Quantum Key Distribution." pith.science (2026). https://pith.science/paper/LHVVPBBT

@misc{pith2026241113943,
  author       = {Pith},
  title        = {Pith review of: Independent Optical Frequency Combs Powered 546 km Field Test of Twin-Field Quantum Key Distribution},
  year         = {2026},
  howpublished = {\url{https://pith.science/paper/LHVVPBBT}},
  note         = {Machine review of arXiv:2411.13943}
}
read the original abstract

Owing to its repeater-like rate-loss scaling, twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) has repeatedly exhibited in laboratory its superiority for secure communication over record fiber lengths. Field trials pose a new set of challenges however, which must be addressed before the technology's roll-out into real-world. Here, we verify in field the viability of using independent optical frequency combs -- installed at sites separated by a straight-line distance of 300~km -- to achieve a versatile TF-QKD setup that has no need for optical frequency dissemination and thus enables an open and network-friendly fiber configuration. Over 546 and 603 km symmetric links, we record a finite-size secure key rate (SKR) of 0.53~bit/s and an asymptotic SKR of 0.12 bit/s, respectively. Of practical importance, the setup is demonstrated to support 44~km fiber asymmetry in the 452 km link. Our work marks an important step towards incorporation of long-haul fiber links into large quantum networks.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2411.13943 by the authors.

Figure 1
Figure 1. FIG. 1. Field test setup. (a) Deployed fiber route. (b) TF-QKD setup. (c) Transmitter, including OFC and Modulation [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p003_1.png] view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. FIG. 2. Autonomous alignment for phase, optical frequency and arrival time. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p004_2.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. FIG. 3. Secure key rate results and simulations. Accord [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p005_3.png] view at source ↗
Figures from the paper (5 more)
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: FIG. 4. Phase and polarization stabilization setup. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p007_4.png]
Figure 5
Figure 5. Figure 5: FIG. 5. Frequency difference between Alice and Bob’s ultra [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p007_5.png]
Figure 6
Figure 6. Figure 6: FIG. 6. Encoder (a) and the encoding sequence of the basic [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p008_6.png]
Figure 8
Figure 8. Figure 8: FIG. 8. Differential frequency between two independent lasers [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p009_8.png]
Figure 9
Figure 9. Figure 9: FIG. 9. Clock synchronization and delay feedback setup. In Charlie the clock is used to synchronize his own time tagger locally. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p010_9.png]

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

43 extracted references · 34 canonical work pages

  1. [1]

    For each OFC, its 25 GHz driver is referenced to a local Rubidium frequency standard of with a short-term (1 s) stability of 2 × 10−11 and an accuracy of 5 × 10−11

    Optical frequency combs In the experiment, we use two independent optical fre- quency combs (OFCs) that are realized through 25 GHz electro-optic modulation to ultra-stable lasers. For each OFC, its 25 GHz driver is referenced to a local Rubidium frequency standard of with a short-term (1 s) stability of 2 × 10−11 and an accuracy of 5 × 10−11. The frequen...

    work page

  2. [2]

    Modulation unit a. Wavelengths arrangement and filtering From their electro-optical frequency combs, each user filters out three wavelength lines: λq (1550.495 nm), λc (1549.694 nm) and λt (1549.293 nm). The quantum wavelength λq has 100 GHz and 150 GHz spacings from λc and λt, respectively. λq passes through the encoder and reunites with λc using a 50 GH...

    work page

  3. [3]

    4 as well as in Fig

    Measurement units Charlie has two measurement units (MUs), see Fig. 4 as well as in Fig. 1(b), Main Text. Coherent MU contains a 50/50 beam splitter, 2 DWDM filters and 3 supercon- ducting nanowire single photon detectors. The incoming signals from Alice and Bob meet and interfere at the 50/50 beamsplitter, and their interference outcomes are spectrally f...

    work page

  4. [4]

    Drifts compensation We implement feedback controls to correct for drifts of polarization, phase, optical frequency and temporal arrivals. a. Active polarization feedback Charlie’s coherent MU requires the incoming optical signals to have an identical polarization so as to ensure high-visibility interference. To meet this requirement, a polarization beam s...

    work page

  5. [5]

    Detected AB ab

    Quantum channel and system loss characterization The deployed fiber link is formed by ultra-low-loss fiber (G654.E ULL). The buried fiber from Alice (Bob) to Charlie is 223.01 km (204.22 km) with a loss of 42.40 dB (37.77 dB), while the physical separation between Alice and Bob is about 300 km. In Charlie’s side, fiber spools (G654.C ultra-low-loss fiber)...

    work page

  6. [6]

    C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing, Theor. Comput. Sci. 560, 7 (2014)

    2014

  7. [7]

    M. Peev, C. Pacher, R. All´ eaume, C. Barreiro, J. Bouda, W. Boxleitner, T. Debuisschert, E. Diamanti, M. Dianati, J. F. Dynes, S. Fasel, S. Fossier, M. F¨ urst, J.-D. Gautier, O. Gay, N. Gisin, P. Grangier, A. Happe, Y. Hasani, M. Hentschel, H. H¨ ubel, G. Humer, T. L¨ anger, M. Legr´ e, R. Lieger, J. Lodewyck, T. Lor¨ unser, N. L¨ utkenhaus, A. Marhold,...

    work page 2009

  8. [8]

    Sasaki, M

    M. Sasaki, M. Fujiwara, H. Ishizuka, W. Klaus, K. Wakui, M. Takeoka, S. Miki, T. Yamashita, Z. Wang, A. Tanaka, K. Yoshino, Y. Nambu, S. Takahashi, A. Tajima, A. Tomita, T. Domeki, T. Hasegawa, Y. Sakai, H. Kobayashi, T. Asai, K. Shimizu, T. Tokura, T. Tsurumaru, M. Matsui, T. Honjo, K. Tamaki, H. Takesue, Y. Tokura, J. F. Dynes, A. R. Dixon, A. W. Sharpe...

    work page 2011

Show all 43 references
  1. [9]

    J. F. Dynes, A. Wonfor, W. W.-S. Tam, A. W. Sharpe, R. Takahashi, M. Lucamarini, A. Plews, Z. L. Yuan, A. R. Dixon, J. Cho, A. R. Dixon, Y. Tanizawa, R. Penty, and A. J. Shields, Cambridge quantum network, npj Quant. Inf. 5, 101 (2019)

    2019

  2. [10]

    Y.-A. Chen, Q. Zhang, T.-Y. Chen, W.-Q. Cai, S.-K. Liao, J. K. Chen, J. Yin, J.-G. Ren, Z. Chen, S.-L. Han, Q. Yu, K. Liang, F. Zhou, X. Yuan, M.-S. Zhao, T.-Y. Wang, X. Jiang, L. Zhang, W.-Y. Liu, Y. Li, Q. Shen, Y. Cao, C.-Y. Lu, R. Shu, J.-Y. Wang, L. Li, N.-L. Liu, F. Xu, ...

    2021

  3. [11]

    Ribezzo, M

    D. Ribezzo, M. Zahidy, I. Vagniluca, N. Biagi, S. Francesconi, T. Occhipinti, L. K. Oxenløwe, M. Lonˇ cari´ c, I. Cviti´ c, M. Stipˇ cevi´ c, . Puˇ savec, R. Kaltenbaek, A. Ramˇ sak, F. Cesa, G. Giorgetti, F. Scazza, A. Bassi, P. De Natale, F. S. Cataliotti, M. In- guscio, D. ...

    2023

  4. [12]

    Bersin, M

    E. Bersin, M. Grein, M. Sutula, R. Murphy, Y. Q. Huan, M. Stevens, A. Suleymanzade, C. Lee, R. Riedinger, D. J. Starling, P.-J. Stas, C. M. Knaut, N. Sinclair, D. R. As- sumpcao, Y.-C. Wei, E. N. Knall, B. Machielse, D. D. Sukachev, D. S. Levonian, M. K. Bhaskar, M. Lonˇ car, ...

    2024

  5. [13]

    Z. Yuan, A. Plews, R. Takahashi, K. Doi, W. Tam, A. W. Sharpe, A. R. Dixon, E. Lavelle, J. F. Dynes, A. Mu- rakami, , M. Kujiraoka, M. Lucamarini, Y. Tanizawa, H. Sato, and A. J. Shields, 10-Mb/s quantum key distri- bution, J. Lightwave Technol. 36, 3427 (2018)

    2018

  6. [14]

    W. Li, L. Zhang, H. Tan, Y. Lu, S.-K. Liao, J. Huang, H. Li, Z. Wang, H.-K. Mao, B. Yan, Q. Li, Y. Liu, Q. Zhang, C.-Z. Peng, L. You, F. Xu, and J.-W. Pan, High-rate quantum key distribution exceeding 110 Mb s−1, Nat. Photon. 17, 416 (2023)

    2023

  7. [15]

    Gr¨ unenfelder, A

    F. Gr¨ unenfelder, A. Boaron, G. V. Resta, M. Perrenoud, D. Rusca, C. Barreiro, R. Houlmann, R. Sax, L. Stasi, S. El-Khoury, E. H¨ anggi, N. Bosshard, F. Bussi´ eres, and H. Zbinden, Fast single-photon detectors and real-time key distillation enable high secret-key-rate quantu...

    2023

  8. [16]

    Boaron, G

    A. Boaron, G. Boso, D. Rusca, C. Vulliez, C. Autebert, M. Caloz, M. Perrenoud, G. Gras, F. Bussi` eres, M.-J. Li, D. Nolan, A. Martin, and H. Zbinden, Secure quantum key distribution over 421 km of optical fiber, Phys. Rev. Lett. 121, 190502 (2018)

    2018

  9. [17]

    Lucamarini, Z

    M. Lucamarini, Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, Overcoming the rate–distance limit of quantum key distribution without quantum repeaters, Nature557, 400 (2018)

    2018

  10. [18]

    P. Zeng, H. Zhou, W. Wu, and X. Ma, Mode-pairing quantum key distribution, Nat. Commun. 13, 3903 (2022)

    2022

  11. [19]

    Xie, Y.-S

    Y.-M. Xie, Y.-S. Lu, C.-X. Weng, X.-Y. Cao, Z.-Y. Jia, Y. Bao, Y. Wang, Y. Fu, H.-L. Yin, and Z.-B. Chen, Breaking the rate-loss bound of quantum key distribution with asynchronous two-photon interference, PRX Quan- tum 3, 020315 (2022)

    2022

  12. [20]

    J.-P. Chen, C. Zhang, Y. Liu, C. Jiang, W. Zhang, X.- L. Hu, J.-Y. Guan, Z.-W. Yu, H. Xu, J. Lin, M.-J. Li, H. Chen, H. Li, L. You, Z. Wang, X.-B. Wang, Q. Zhang, and J.-W. Pan, Sending-or-not-sending with independent lasers: secure twin-field quantum key distribution over 509...

    2020

  13. [21]

    Pittaluga, M

    M. Pittaluga, M. Minder, M. Lucamarini, M. San- zaro, R. I. Woodward, M.-J. Li, Z. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, 600-km repeater-like quantum communications with dual-band stabilization, Nat. Photon. 15, 530 (2021)

    2021

  14. [22]

    Wang, Z.-Q

    S. Wang, Z.-Q. Yin, D.-Y. He, W. Chen, R.-Q. Wang, P. Ye, Y. Zhou, G.-J. Fan-Yuan, F.-X. Wang, W. Chen, Y.-G. Zhu, P. V. Morozov, A. V. Divochiy, Z. Zhou, G.-C. Guo, and Z.-F. Han, Twin-field quantum key distribution 13 over 830-km fibre, Nat. Photon. 16, 154 (2022)

    2022

  15. [23]

    L. Zhou, J. Lin, Y. Jing, and Z. Yuan, Twin-field quan- tum key distribution without optical frequency dissemi- nation, Nat. Commun. 14, 928 (2023)

    2023

  16. [24]

    Liu, W.-J

    Y. Liu, W.-J. Zhang, C. Jiang, J.-P. Chen, C. Zhang, W.-X. Pan, D. Ma, H. Dong, J.-M. Xiong, C.-J. Zhang, et al. , Experimental twin-field quantum key distribution over 1000 km fiber distance, Phys. Rev. Lett.130, 210801 (2023)

    2023

  17. [25]

    L. Zhou, J. Lin, Y.-M. Xie, Y.-S. Lu, Y. Jing, H.-L. Yin, and Z. Yuan, Experimental quantum communica- tion overcomes the rate-loss limit without global phase tracking, Phys. Rev. Lett. 130, 250801 (2023)

    2023

  18. [26]

    H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and B. Qi, Measurement-device- independent quantum key distribution, Phys. Rev. Lett. 108, 130503 (2012)

    2012

  19. [27]

    H. Liu, C. Jiang, H.-T. Zhu, M. Zou, Z.-W. Yu, X.-L. Hu, H. Xu, S. Ma, Z. Han, J.-P. Chen, Y. Dai, S.-B. Tang, W. Zhang, H. Li, L. You, Z. Wang, Y. Hua, H. Hu, H. Zhang, F. Zhou, Q. Zhang, X.-B. Wang, T.-Y. Chen, and J.-W. Pan, Field test of twin-field quantum key dis- tributi...

    2021

  20. [28]

    J.-P. Chen, C. Zhang, C. Liu, Yang Jiang, W.-J. Zhang, Z.-Y. Han, S.-Z. Ma, X.-L. Hu, Y.-H. Li, F. Liu, Hui Zhou, H.-F. Jiang, H. Chen, Teng-Yun Li, L.-X. You, Z. Wang, X.-B. Wang, Q. Zhang, and J.-W. Pan, Twin- field quantum key distribution over a 511 km optical fibre linkin...

    2021

  21. [29]

    Clivati, A

    C. Clivati, A. Meda, S. Donadello, S. Virz ` ı, M. Genovese, F. Levi, A. Mura, M. Pittaluga, Z. Yuan, A. J. Shields, M. Lucamarini, I. P. Degiovanni, and D. Calonico, Co- herent phase transfer for real-world twin-field quantum key distribution, Nat. Commun. 13, 157 (2022)

    2022

  22. [30]

    Wang, Z.-W

    X.-B. Wang, Z.-W. Yu, and X.-L. Hu, Twin-field quan- tum key distribution with large misalignment error, Phys. Rev. A 98, 062323 (2018)

    2018

  23. [31]

    X.-L. Hu, C. Jiang, Z.-W. Yu, and X.-B. Wang, Sending- or-not-sending twin-field protocol for quantum key distri- bution with asymmetric source parameters, Phys. Rev. A 100, 062337 (2019)

    2019

  24. [32]

    Xu, Z.-W

    H. Xu, Z.-W. Yu, C. Jiang, X.-L. Hu, and X.-B. Wang, Sending-or-not-sending twin-field quantum key distribu- tion: Breaking the direct transmission key rate, Phys. Rev. A 101, 042330 (2020)

    2020

  25. [33]

    Jiang, X.-L

    C. Jiang, X.-L. Hu, H. Xu, Z.-W. Yu, and X.-B. Wang, Zigzag approach to higher key rate of sending-or-not- sending twin field quantum key distribution with finite- key effects, New J. Phys. 22, 053048 (2020)

    2020

  26. [34]

    Pirandola, R

    S. Pirandola, R. Laurenza, C. Ottaviani, and L. Banchi, Fundamental limits of repeaterless quantum communica- tions, Nat. Commun. 8, 15043 (2017)

    2017

  27. [35]

    Amies-King, K

    B. Amies-King, K. P. Schatz, H. Duan, A. Biswas, J. Bailey, A. Felvinti, J. Winward, M. Dixon, M. Min- der, R. Kumar, S. Albosh, and M. Lucamarini, Quan- tum communications feasibility tests over a UK-Ireland 224 km undersea link, Entropy 25, 1572 (2023)

    2023

  28. [36]

    S. P. Neumann, A. Buchner, L. Bulla, M. Bohmann, and R. Ursin, Continuous entanglement distribution over a transnational 248 km fiber link, Nat. Commun. 13, 6134 (2022)

    2022

  29. [37]

    C. M. Knaut, A. Suleymanzade, Y.-C. Wei, D. R. As- sumpcao, P.-J. Stas, Y. Q. Huan, B. Machielse, E. N. Knall, M. Sutula, G. Baranes, N. Sinclair, C. De- Eknamkul, D. S. Levonian, M. K. Bhaskar, H. Park, M. Lonˇ car, and M. D. Lukin, Entanglement of nanopho- tonic quantum memo...

    2024

  30. [38]

    Liu, X.-Y

    J.-L. Liu, X.-Y. Luo, Y. Yu, C.-Y. Wang, B. Wang, Y. Hu, J. Li, M.-Y. Zheng, B. Yao, Z. Yan, D. Teng, J.-W. Jiang, X.-B. Liu, X.-P. Xie, J. Zhang, Q.-H. Mao, X. Jiang, Q. Zhang, X.-H. Bao, and J.-W. Pan, A multin- ode quantum network over a metropolitan area, Nature 629, 579 (2024)

    2024

  31. [39]

    com/documents/productpdf/TA1000-M1.pdf

    Optically pumped miniaturised Cs atomic clock, high performance version, see https://shop.stepglobal. com/documents/productpdf/TA1000-M1.pdf

  32. [40]

    Z. Yan, T. Shi, Y. Fan, L. Zhou, and Z. Yuan, Compact InGaAs/InP single-photon detector module with ultra- narrowband interference circuits, Adv. Dev. Instrum. 4, 0029 (2023)

    2023

  33. [41]

    Yu, X.-L

    Z.-W. Yu, X.-L. Hu, C. Jiang, H. Xu, and X.-B. Wang, Sending-or-not-sending twin-field quantum key distribu- tion in practice, Sci. Rep. 9, 3080 (2019)

    2019

  34. [42]

    Jiang, X.-L

    C. Jiang, X.-L. Hu, Z.-W. Yu, and X.-B. Wang, Com- posable security for practical quantum key distribution with two way classical communication, New J. Phys. 23, 063038 (2021)

    2021

  35. [43]

    Vitanov, F

    A. Vitanov, F. Dupuis, M. Tomamichel, and R. Renner, Chain rules for smooth min- and max-entropies, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theor. 59, 2603 (2013)

    2013

Pith tools

Reviewed August 12, 2026 · model on record in the stance chip above.