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Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets

As of 9 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 0 of 0 outbound references and 2 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2501.12591.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2501.12591 v2

Coverage vector

measured 0 of 0 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 2 of 2 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00

measured 2 of 2 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-05T10:39:19.660024Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: pith, observed 2026-08-05T10:39:19.927084Z

Reference resolution

0 of 0 outbound references displayed

  • verified exact0
  • verified fuzzy0
  • unresolved0
  • parse uncertain0
  • malformed identifier0
  • metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

No outbound reference observations are available for this paper version.

Pith citing papers

Observation 5e0572d3-ce78-4106-8363-7357eebcd2cc · inbound

Regulation or Competition:Major-Minor Optimal Liquidation across Dark and Lit Pools cites this paper.

Regulation or Competition:Major-Minor Optimal Liquidation across Dark and Lit Pools Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets

Reference 15

Resolution
verified exact
local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-05T10:39:19.999760Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-05T10:39:19.660024Z digest=sha256:4ee1cfcce4371b30c60e6467d498b7fddab83169a46d7a073e64048813bd4397

Observation 852398c3-3bd7-40ba-a607-969082868059 · inbound

Learning Market Making with Closing Auctions cites this paper.

Learning Market Making with Closing Auctions Optimal Rebate Design: Incentives, Competition and Efficiency in Auction Markets

Reference 42

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-03T08:26:58.375626Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-03T08:26:58.375626Z digest=sha256:91e41b950cb43312b70fa6eef23e476357984e233346dcf20dac333a51b23f94